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Abstract
Network Protocols are critical to the operation of the Internet and hence the se-
curity of these protocols is paramount. Our work covers the security of three widely
deployed protocols: Domain Name System (DNS), Transport Layer Security (TLS)
and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS). Our work shows that the design or
implementation of some variants of these protocols are vulnerable to attacks that com-
promise their fundamental security features. In all of the cases we include experimental
results demonstrating the feasibility of our attacks in realistic network environments.
We propose a number of countermeasures for the attacks, some of which have already
been implemented in practice.
We start by describing the structure of DNS and present a number of existing DNS
security protocols. We then focus on DepenDNS, a security protocol that is intended to
protect DNS clients against cache poisoning attacks. We demonstrate that DepenDNS
suffers from operational deficiencies, and is vulnerable to cache poisoning and denial of
service attacks.
We then give an overview of Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Trans-
port Layer Security (DTLS), and draw the similarities and differences between the two
protocols. We describe the padding oracle concept and present a number of recent
attacks against TLS.
We then present new techniques to conduct a full plaintext recovery attack against
the OpenSSL implementation of DTLS, and a partial plaintext recovery attack against
the GnuTLS implementation of TLS and DTLS. Our attacks exploit timing-based side
channels that would not have been exploitable without our new techniques. We also
describe countermeasures for the attacks.
We then present new distinguishing and plaintext recovery attacks against all ver-
sions of TLS and DTLS and in almost all implementations of the two protocols. Our
attacks are based on timing-based side channels and exploit TLS and DTLS design and
implementation decisions. We describe how to conduct a full plaintext recovery attack
against implementations that follow the standard, and a partial plaintext recovery at-
tack against implementations that do not. We discuss a number of countermeasures
for the attacks, and describe their practicality and effectiveness.
We conclude the thesis by discussing the wider implications of our work on the
design and implementation of secure network protocols.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Context
The evolution of secure network protocols has been largely driven by the discovery and
the successful exploitation of weaknesses in either the design or the implementation
of these protocols. The Domain Name System (DNS) and Transport Layer Security
(TLS) provide good examples that demonstrate this broken reactive model of evolution.
Maintaining the security of DNS has been a continues challenge with high-profile
and high-impact attacks frequently emerging (for example, Kaminsky’s cache poisoning
attack against DNS), which are usually followed by the development of ad hoc security
protocols that try to protect DNS from these attacks. In most cases, attacks against
DNS have exploited trivial, and on occasion known, weaknesses. Most of these attacks
would have been prevented if the basic DNS security mechanisms had been deployed.
TLS, on the other hand, is by far the most widely deployed secure network protocol
today, and which best show-cases the failure of this ad hoc approach of designing and
implementing secure network protocols. Attacks of different severity and practicality
levels have been published against TLS (and its predecessor, Secure Socket Layer),
triggering ad hoc and non-coordinated responses from the Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF) who maintain the protocol specification, and the TLS open and closed
source code development community. Alarmingly, the number of attacks against TLS
has recently been on the rise including, for example, BEAST, CRIME, Lucky 13 (our
attack discussed in Chapter 5) and BREACH.
Our work takes advantage of previously unknown weaknesses introduced by this
ad hoc approach to develop attacks that exploit the above mentioned protocols using
basic, but novel, techniques.
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1.2 Contributions
The work presented in this thesis reflects our analysis of three secure network protocols:
DepenDNS (a DNS security protocol), TLS and Datagram TLS (DTLS). We describe
a number of weaknesses in the design and implementation of these protocols that could
be exploited by an adversary to conduct various, and in many cases severe, attacks that
undermine their fundamental security goals. The impact and applicability of our work
goes beyond academia and extends to cover the larger community of secure network
protocol researchers, designers and software implementers. Our work demonstrates
again the (in)security of the MAC-then-Encode-then-Encrypt (MEE) construction for
TLS and DTLS, using new techniques to exploit design and implementation decisions
made for the two protocols to build attacks. We describe how to use these new tech-
niques to recover TLS and DTLS-protected plaintext. In addition, we demonstrate
that a number of DNS security protocol implementations are impractical and, in the
case of DepenDNS, are ineffective.
We took the route of: identifying and verifying potential design or implementation
weaknesses, practically exploiting these weaknesses, and then responsibly disclosing
our research results. We responsibly disclosed our findings, working closely with the
(D)TLS standards’ design and development community to address the newly discovered
weaknesses; a large number of open source software developers and vendors had to
modify their code in response to our attacks. During our research, we collaborated
with the authors of the IETF (D)TLS standards, various vendors such as Google and
Microsoft, and open source software developers maintaining cryptographic libraries
such as OpenSSL and GnuTLS.
Our work promotes further the use of secure TLS modes of operation such as authen-
ticated encryption (AE) and the proper implementation of secure network protocols,
while considering clarity, effectiveness, practicality and ease of deployment.
Secure network protocols are implemented as part of a system. The interaction
between the secure network protocols and the other components of the system, espe-
cially their upper and lower-layers, plays a critical role in defining the system’s overall
security. We demonstrate this in the different chapters of this thesis. For example, we
demonstrate how to use application layer messages to construct a new realisation of
Vaudenay’s padding oracle [102] in the context of DTLS in Chapter 4.
1.3 Publications
This thesis contains published research materials with K.G. Paterson:
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An Analysis of DepenDNS [7]: Published in the 13th Information Security Con-
ference (ISC), and forming the basis of Chapter 2.
Plaintext-Recovery Attacks Against Datagram TLS [5]: Published in the 19th
Network and Distributed System Security (NDSS) Symposium, where we received one
of the two distinguished paper awards1. The work in [5] forms the basis of Chapter 4.
Lucky Thirteen: Breaking the TLS and DTLS Record Protocols [6]: Pub-
lished in the 34th IEEE Security and Privacy (IEEE S&P) Symposium, and forming
the basis of Chapter 5.
1.4 Thesis Outline
In Chapter 2, we give an introduction to DNS, the services it provides and the standard
security mechanisms available to protect DNS from denial of service and cache poisoning
attacks. We then describe a number of security protocols that have been proposed to
further secure DNS and give an overview of their current deployment status. We
analyse a particular protocol, DepenDNS, in detail and demonstrate that the protocol
is vulnerable to a number of attacks despite the protocol designers’ claims. We also
describe a number of issues that make DepenDNS impractical to deploy. We conclude
the chapter by summarising our findings and giving our perspective on the ongoing
efforts to secure DNS.
In Chapter 3, we provide the necessary background information and prerequisite
material that are needed to establish an understanding of the TLS and DTLS pro-
tocols. We provide background information about the TCP/IP protocol suite and
describe three fundamental networking protocols: IP, TCP and UDP. We then in-
troduce Transport Layer Security (TLS), describe how the protocol is structured and
discuss its modes of operation. We also introduce Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS) and describe the differences between TLS and DTLS. We then present in detail
the padding oracle concept and describe how an attack can be theoretically mounted
against TLS using the oracle. Finally, we present a number of recent attacks against
the two protocols, serving as a forerunner to our attacks on DTLS and TLS, which we
present in Chapters 4 and 5.
In Chapter 4, we present our attacks against the OpenSSL implementation of DTLS
with the MAC-then-Encode-then-Encrypt construction. We report our experimental
results demonstrating efficient and reliable recovery of full DTLS plaintexts in the
OpenSSL case. We then discusses how similar attacks can recover partial plaintexts in
1http://www.internetsociety.org/events/ndss-symposium-2012/papers
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the GnuTLS implementation of TLS and DTLS.
In Chapter 5, we present a family of attacks that apply to the MAC-then-Encode-
then-Encrypt construction in all TLS and DTLS implementations that are compliant
with TLS 1.1 or 1.2, or with DTLS 1.0 or 1.2. Our attacks also apply to implementa-
tions of SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 that incorporate padding oracle attack countermeasures.
We first provide further background on the HMAC calculation. We then present the
basic distinguishing attack against RFC-compliant implementations of TLS and DTLS,
followed by a description of our plaintext recovery attacks in the context of TLS. We ex-
plain how to modify them to apply to DTLS. We report on the experimental validation
of our attacks for the OpenSSL implementation. We then describe the modifications
needed to make our attacks applicable to other implementations. We finally give guid-
ance on how to implement the MAC-then-Encode-then-Encrypt construction so as to
avoid the attacks.
We conclude the thesis by discussing the wider implications of our work on the
design and implementation of secure network protocols.
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The Domain Name System
2.1 Introduction
We start the chapter by giving an introduction to the Domain Name System (DNS),
the services it provides and the standard security mechanisms available to secure DNS
against denial of service and cache poisoning attacks. We then describe a number of
security protocols that have been proposed to further secure DNS and give an overview
of their current deployment status. We analyse a particular protocol, DepenDNS, in
detail and show that the protocol is vulnerable to a number of attacks despite the
protocol designers’ claims. We also describe a number of issues that make DepenDNS
impractical to deploy. We conclude the chapter by summarising our findings and giving
our perspective on the ongoing efforts to secure DNS.
2.2 Introduction to the Domain Name System
The Domain Name System (DNS) [65, 66] is a fundamental service that is critical to
the proper operation of the Internet. While people are quite good at remembering
names, they are not good at remembering IP addresses and hence the need for DNS to
help translate names to IP addresses that the Internet can route. The most common
service that DNS provides is mapping names to IP addresses (for example, translating
“www.example.com” to 192.0.43.10). In addition to mapping names to IP addresses,
DNS provides other services such as mapping IP addresses to names (commonly referred
to as reverse DNS) and assigning aliases to domain names.
Domain names, IP addresses and other information are maintained on DNS servers
in the form of persistent or cached entries referred to as Resource Records (RRs). RRs
share the structure described in RFC 1035 [66] and shown in Figure 2.1.
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
/ NAME /
/ /
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
| TYPE |
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
| CLASS |
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
| TTL |
| |
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
| RDLENGTH |
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--|
/ RDATA /
/ /
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
Figure 2.1: Resource Record structure. The structure shows the fields in a RR that
are explained in Section 2.2.
The 2-byte TYPE field shown in Figure 2.1 contains the RR type code. Examples
of commonly used types include:
• A: The address record used for serving IPv4 host addresses.
• AAAA: The address record for serving IPv6 host addresses.
• CNAME: The canonical name record used for serving an alias of a host name.
Multiple CNAMEs can be created such that the same host name that a user queries
would resolve to multiple canonical names pointing to different IP addresses,
hosted on different servers that could be geographically distributed. Figure 2.2
shows an example where two CNAMEs are created to serve “www.gov.uk”1.
• MX: The mail exchange record used for serving the mail server host name.
• NS: The name server record used to identify the authoritative name server hosting
the domain.
• PTR: The pointer record used in reverse DNS look-ups to map an IP address to a
host name.
1The reader may receive a different output when trying the same DNS query. The values he receives
would largely depend on the source of the DNS requests.
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www.gov.uk canonical name = www.gov.uk.edgekey.net.
www.gov.uk.edgekey.net canonical name = e6452.b.akamaiedge.net.
Name: e6452.b.akamaiedge.net
Address: 23.14.4.23
Figure 2.2: DNS look-up showing two CNAME RRs being served for the host name
“www.gov.uk”.
The time-to-live (TTL) value associated with an RR specifies how long, in seconds,
should DNS clients or resolvers cache an RR. For example, a TTL value of 3600 indicates
that the RR should be cached for only an hour, while a TTL value of 0 indicates that
the RR should not be cached. The receiver of an RR can choose to ignore the TTL
value it receives and assign a value of its choice.
The other fields that make up an RR include:
• NAME: The domain name that owns the RR.
• CLASS: The CLASS code. The reader may think of this field as the category of
the record and is typically set to 1 for an Internet CLASS.
• RDLENGTH: The length of the RDATA field in octets (bytes).
• RDATA: A variable length string that describes the RR. The format of this record
varies according to the TYPE and CLASS of the RR. For example, the RDATA
field may contain a host name and an IPv4 address in case it was for an A RR.
DNS can be thought of as a distributed database with a hierarchical structure that
is made up of name servers hosting the database and serving RRs. This hierarchy
is shown in Figure 2.3. The root domain (“.”) is at the top of the hierarchy and is
served presently by thirteen root operators with servers distributed around the world2.
The list of the current root servers is shown in Table 2.1. Typically, DNS server
packages (for example, ISC BIND3 and Microsoft DNS4) would embed this information
in their code. This clearly makes changing the IP address of a root server a daunting
task. The second level in the hierarchy contains top-level domains (TLDs) that can be
classified as generic (gTLD) such as “.com”, or country code (ccTLD) such as “.uk”.
Multiple levels exist underneath the TLDs. The domain names located in the lower
levels are generally served by their corresponding organisations. For example, the
Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)5 hosts the domain “example.com” [3].
2http://www.root-servers.org
3http://www.isc.org/downloads/BIND
4http://technet.microsoft.com/en-US/network/bb629410.asp
5http://www.iana.org
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root(.)
.uk
.ac
.rhul
www .isg
www . . .
mail . . .
. . .
. . .
.com
.example
www
.yahoo
www
. . .
. . .
Figure 2.3: The Domain Name System structure. The figure shows the DNS root
domain (“.”) in the top of the hierarchy. The figure also show two TLDs, “.com” and
“.uk” and sample levels that exist under the “.uk” TLD.
The operation of DNS is based on queries (requests) and responses (replies). A client
initiates the process by sending a DNS resolution query for a host name (for example,
“www.example.com”) to its DNS resolver which in return searches its cache entries
for the name being requested. If an entry does not exist, resolvers may go through a
recursive DNS look-up process that starts from the root servers and continues all the
way down to the authoritative name servers (ANSs) responsible for hosting the domain
being requested (for example “example.com”). Resolvers capable of performing this
recursive DNS look-up are referred to as recursive DNS (RDNS) resolvers; we refer to
them in this chapter as resolvers in short. A resolver can also be configured to forward
DNS queries to other resolvers (referred to as upstream resolvers) to perform recursive
DNS look-ups on its behalf.
Information about domains and their records are contained within DNS zones. An
ANS maintains the zone’s database and responds to DNS queries for hosts that exist
in the zone. Upon receiving an answer from an ANS, a resolver caches and forwards
the answer to the requesting client.
2.2.1 DNS and Content Delivery Networks
Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) are built to enhance the user’s experience when
trying to access an Internet resource like a website. A Content Delivery Network
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Root Server Host Name IP Address Operator
a.root-servers.net 198.41.0.4 VeriSign, Inc.
b.root-servers.net 192.228.79.201 University of Southern California (ISI)
c.root-servers.net 192.33.4.12 Cogent Communications
d.root-servers.net 199.7.91.13 University of Maryland
e.root-servers.net 192.203.230.10 NASA (Ames Research Center)
f.root-servers.net 192.5.5.241 Internet Systems Consortium, Inc.
g.root-servers.net 192.112.36.4 US Department of Defence (NIC)
h.root-servers.net 128.63.2.53 US Army (Research Lab)
i.root-servers.net 192.36.148.17 Netnod
j.root-servers.net 192.58.128.30 VeriSign, Inc.
k.root-servers.net 193.0.14.129 RIPE NCC
l.root-servers.net 199.7.83.42 ICANN
m.root-servers.net 202.12.27.33 WIDE Project
Table 2.1: DNS root servers.
consists of a set of surrogate servers distributed around the world. The surrogate
servers are deployed in multiple locations in order to optimise the end user experience
by choosing the nearest surrogate server to the user [101]. For example, web requests
generated by a UK-based end user for a website hosted by a CDN will generally be
served by a surrogate server that is located in the UK. Most CDN providers deploy DNS
redirection to forward the client’s request to the closest server containing the resource
being requested. One of the characteristics of DNS records served by CDNs is that they
have a low TTL value. Serving a low TTL value causes more frequent DNS look-ups for
the same host name, allowing the DNS server hosting the DNS entry to possibly serve
different IP addresses, based on factors such as the availability of the surrogate servers
or the client’s proximity to the surrogate servers. By way of example, the following
shows the TTL value for “134.g.akamai.net”, which is the CNAME RR corresponding to
“www.live.com”. It can be seen that the TTL value is set to only 20 seconds.
$ dig www.live.com
...
www.live.com. 1216 IN CNAME search.msn.com.edgesuite.net.
search.msn.com.edgesuite.net. 2382 IN CNAME a134.g.akamai.net.
a134.g.akamai.net. 20 IN A 88.221.94.72
a134.g.akamai.net. 20 IN A 88.221.94.34
...
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CDNs have proven lately to be a very attractive option for hosting rich web content
such as video. In fact, high profile websites such as YouTube, CNN and BBC commonly
make use of commercial CDNs such as Akamai and Limelight [96].
2.3 Security of DNS
Threats targeting DNS and DNS caches in particular are not new. They have existed
since the day DNS was introduced. However, the topic gained significant visibility
and attention after a number of high-profile attacks such as Kaminsky’s DNS cache
poisoning attack [50], described in Section 2.3.3. Kaminsky discovered a fundamental
flaw within DNS implementations that could allow remote attackers to corrupt the
cache of a DNS server within a matter of seconds, exploiting a combination of old
(known) and new (previously unknown) vulnerabilities.
Attacks against DNS can be classified as denial of service (DoS) or cache poisoning
attacks. The former targets the availability of the DNS service or data, while the
latter targets the integrity of the DNS data. Typically, denial of service attacks target
ANSs while cache poisoning attacks target resolvers. DNS information served over
the Internet is considered public. Guaranteeing the integrity and authenticity of the
Internet DNS data are of top concern. Although confidentiality is generally not a
concern, keeping DNS information confidential might be required in private networks
(for example, networks serving internal corporate users). A good description of threats
against DNS is given in RFC 3833 [13].
2.3.1 DNS Cache Poisoning
Cache poisoning, in the context of DNS, refers to act of intentionally corrupting the
data contained in DNS caches. DNS messages, including queries and responses, are
communicated in clear using User Datagram Protocol (UDP) [77], and possibly Trans-
mission Control Protocol (TCP) [79, 18], with no integrity check mechanisms in place
[66], other than the basic, non-cryptographically generated, UDP and TCP checksums
that are mainly targeted to detect network errors. We provide further background in-
formation on UDP and TCP in Chapter 3 of this thesis. The lack of a proper integrity
check mechanism makes DNS vulnerable to attacks involving unauthorised data mod-
ification, in which an attacker may alter the data in various ways, with an ultimate
objective of poisoning the content of a resolver’s cache, or possibly a DNS client’s cache.
Such attacks are referred to as DNS cache poisoning and they present potential security
threats to users. For example, a user can unknowing be redirected to a malicious web
site, which mimics the actual one in attempt to harvest the user’s personal information;
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all as a result of receiving a poisoned DNS RR pointing to the malicious web server IP
address.
DNS cache poisoning is commonly achieved through blind injection of spoofed DNS
replies, where the attacker has no access to the information contained in the original
DNS query. This becomes a trivial attack in the man-in-the-middle (MITM) setting,
in which the attacker has visibility of all DNS data and hence can respond to DNS
queries using information of his choice.
In a cache poisoning attack, the attacker may target:
• Resolvers: These servers contain cached entries and generally serve a large number
of users. An attacker may try to poison the resolver’s cache for a domain or a
number of domains, or even try to gain control of the underlying system running
the DNS service.
• Clients: Although spoofing DNS responses from a resolver to a particular DNS
client is possible, this might not be a cost effective attack, unless the client under
attack is of high-value to the attacker.
The attacker can also target ANSs. These servers contain persistent DNS entries for
zones. An attacker may try to control a zone (for example, “.rhul.ac.uk”) by controlling
the underlying system running the DNS service. An attacker gaining control of a server
acting as an ANS would have full control over the DNS zone. Attackers taking control
of ANSs that are high in the DNS hierarchy (for example “.com”) can cause major
Internet service disruption. However, an attack of this type does not fall under the
cache poisoning category. In the next sections, we further describe the cache poisoning
attack in the context of resolvers.
To successfully poison the cache of a DNS server, an attacker may spoof a DNS
response and deliver it to the requester ahead of the legitimate one. Subsequent re-
sponses for the same DNS query should be ignored by the requester as per RFC 1034
[65]. To be accepted by the requester, the spoofed response must also pass the standard
security controls incorporated within DNS. These include comparing the DNS 16-bit
transaction identifier (TXID) and the randomised UDP source port in queries and re-
sponses [46]. The value of TXID is assigned by the program running the DNS service
while the UDP source port assignment is handled by the underlying operating system.
In RFC 6335 [27], IANA divides port numbers into three ranges:
• 0 - 1023: Well known ports;
• 1024 - 49151: Registered ports;
29
Chapter 2. The Domain Name System 2.3. Security of DNS
• 49152 - 65535: Ephemeral ports.
Operating systems are expected to use the ephemeral port range when assigning
random UDP source ports for DNS queries. However, operating system developers can
choose to ignore this and use a smaller pool of ports for UDP source assignment or
even assign sequential UDP source ports. For example, Windows Server 2008 assigns a
random source UDP port numbered 49152 or above6, while earlier versions of Microsoft
Windows assign it from a much smaller range of ports7, only 1024 to 5000. The Linux
2.4 kernel is configured by default to assign a port from the range 32768 to 61000. This
clearly shows that DNS heavily relies on the specific implementation of the underlying
operating system for the UDP source port assignment. Operating systems not properly
randomising the UDP source port was one of the weaknesses that Kaminsky exploited
in his attack [50].
Using a random TXID value introduces 16 bits of entropy, while using a random
UDP source port adds a variable amount of entropy that depends on the operating
system configuration and the number of already used UDP ports. This added entropy
makes it harder to perform blind injection.
The following are definitions for some of DNS related concepts that we will use in
the coming sections.
Definition 2.1. Window of opportunity: The moment right after sending a DNS
query to the moment right before the arrival of the (first) valid response. This applies
to queries and responses between a resolver and an ANS or between a resolver and
its upstream resolver, if it was configured with one. This also applies to queries and
responses between a client and its resolver. This definition assumes that the domain
name being requested is not in the cache of the resolver or the client. Responses received
outside the window of opportunity should be rejected by the DNS query initiator [66].
Definition 2.2. Outstanding DNS query: A DNS query that has been sent by a
resolver or a client and is waiting for a response.
Definition 2.3. Valid DNS Response: A DNS response that meets the security re-
quirements enforced by the initiator of the DNS query.
For example, the security requirements could be matching the TXID and the UDP
source port contained in the original query.
Definition 2.4. Collision: Having two or more valid DNS responses for the same
query.
6http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd197515(v=ws.10).aspx
7http://support.microsoft.com/kb/832017
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In the case of a collision, typically, one of the responses will be spoofed by the
attacker and the other will be the legitimate response.
Definition 2.5. DNS blind injection: An injection of a DNS response by an attacker
with the goal of causing a collision and ultimately poisoning the DNS cache.
There are cases, as we see later, in which the attacker has partial information about
the legitimate DNS response (for example, the domain name being requested). We refer
to this type of injection as partially sighted injection.
RFC 5452 [46] gives an overview of the success probability of DNS cache poisoning
attacks. The success probability, P , of an attacker poisoning the cache of a resolver
after n spoofed DNS responses that arrive within the window of opportunity is equal
to n divided by the size of the DNS problem space, i.e. the number of possible TXID
and UDP port combinations. This assumes that the query is for a host name that is
not in the resolver’s cache. The value of P is calculated as:
P =
n
N · U · T , (2.1)
where N is the number of ANSs serving the domain name being requested, with an
average value of around 2.4 according to [46], U is the number of available UDP ports
to choose from, and T is the number of TXIDs available (maximum of 216). Here, we
assume that the TXID and UDP source port are randomly selected.
The attacker can initiate queries for domain names that are not in the cache of a
resolver and follow that with spoofed responses in a partially sighted injection mode, in
which the attacker has information about the domain name being requested. We would
expect that the attacker can increase the number of concurrent queries for the same
domain to increase the success probability. If this is the case, then for d simultaneous
outstanding queries, the success probability, Pd, is calculated as:
Pd =
n · d
N · U · T . (2.2)
Equation (2.2) applies when the value of d is small, relative to the amount of entropy
available. As the value of d increases, the attacker can start exploiting the “birthday
paradox”8, significantly raising the chance of success. Therefore, for d incoming queries
to the same domain name, DNS resolvers are expected to rate-limit the number of
requests they send to the same ANS hosting the domain name being queried [46]. This
is to thwart the birthday paradox attack, which we further discuss in Section 2.3.2.
If we assume that the window of opportunity is W seconds in size and that the
8http://www.secureworks.com/resources/articles/other_articles/dns-cache-poisoning
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attacker can send r spoofed responses per second, all arriving within the window of
opportunity, then the success probability can be calculated as:
P =
W · r
N · U · T , (2.3)
where we assume d = 1.
Some resolver implementations contained flaws in the TXID or the source UDP
port randomisation processes, resulting in an insufficient amount of entropy in DNS
queries and making it easier for an attacker to predict the values of the TXID or the
source UDP port [50]. Other situations include the implementation of Network Address
Translation (NAT) in front of DNS resolvers. A NAT device may replace the original
random source port with a sequential one of its choice, also causing a reduction in the
unpredictability of the UDP source port. We assume that the attacker has no access
to the DNS query and hence must guess the two random variables, the TXID and the
UDP source port. A more severe scenario is when the attacker acts as a MITM. In this
case, attackers have visibility of all DNS data and hence can respond to DNS queries
using information of their choice.
2.3.2 DNS Cache Poisoning and the Birthday Paradox
Some implementations of DNS such as old versions of ISC BIND (version 9.2.8 and
earlier9) send simultaneous DNS requests to the same ANS for the same domain name.
An attacker can take advantage of this behaviour by sending d DNS queries followed
by an equal or higher number of spoofed DNS responses, arriving within the window
of opportunity, to exploit the “birthday paradox”. The attack was first published in
200210 and gives the attacker an opportunity to match a valid response using fewer
spoofed DNS responses, hoping for a collision. The more DNS queries the attacker
sends, accompanied with an equal or higher number of spoofed responses that arrive
within the window of opportunity, the greater the probability of collision.
If the attacker issues d DNS queries for the same domain name served by the same
ANS, and sends d spoofed responses, then the probability of a collision (having two
or more valid DNS responses for the same query) in the DNS responses which would
result in successfully poisoning the DNS cache can be calculated using the following
lower bound formula:
P = 1−
(
1− 1
U · T
)d(d−1)/2
. (2.4)
9http://www.isc.org/downloads/BIND
10http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/457875
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The attack becomes more serious when an implementation fails to properly ran-
domise the values of the TXID or the UDP source port. To protect against the birth-
day attack, resolvers should be configured to limit the number of requests they send
for a domain name. For example, Google Public DNS11, a free global DNS resolution
service, never allows more than a single outstanding query on one of its resolvers, for
the same domain name, query type, and ANS IP address.
To demonstrate the effect of exploiting the birthday paradox, let us take the case
when an implementation fails to randomise the UDP source port, leaving TXID as
the only source of entropy. Figure 2.4 shows the success probability, calculated using
equation (2.4), as the value of the number of outstanding queries, d, increases. The
attacker can achieve a success probability of 0.5 with only 300 outstanding queries and
matching spoofed responses, and 0.99 with only 776 outstanding queries and matching
spoofed replies; compare this to Figure 2.5, when only one query is sent from the
resolver to the ANS. In both cases, we assume that the value of the 16-bit TXID has
been randomly assigned.
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Figure 2.4: Birthday attack success probability with variable d outstanding queries and
when relying on a random TXID only. The figure shows that the attacker can achieve
a success probability of 0.5 with only 300 outstanding queries and matching spoofed
responses, and 0.99 with only 776 outstanding queries and matching spoofed replies
2.3.3 Kaminsky Attack Against DNS
In this section, we give a short overview of Kaminsky’s attack [50], one of the most high-
profile attacks against DNS. Kaminsky’s cache poisoning attack against DNS exploited
two basic vulnerabilities in a number of DNS implementations. Not properly randomis-
ing the source UDP port is a known weaknesses that Kaminsky exploited in his attack,
11https://developers.google.com/speed/public-dns/docs/security.html
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Figure 2.5: Birthday attack success probability with only one outstanding query and
when relying on a random TXID only. The reader would compare this to Figure 2.4,
which shows the birthday attack success probability with variable d outstanding queries
and when relying on a random TXID only
taking advantage of the fact that many implementations have ignored randomising the
source UDP port. He also exploited a previously unknown vulnerability that allows an
attacker to overwrite a cached DNS RR, even if the RR’s TTL has not expired. Let us
assume that the attacker tries to poison a resolver’s cache NS entry for the domain name
“foo.com”. If successful, then the attacker can serve DNS queries generated by this
resolver for any host name under “foo.com” (for example “www.foo.com”) using data
of his choice. This will impact all the clients that are configured to use the targeted
resolver. The attack proceeds as follows.
The attacker sends DNS queries for different random host names under “foo.com”,
which are unlikely to be in the resolver’s cache (for example “123456.foo.com”), forcing
the resolver to query the ANS serving “foo.com” for every queried host name. The
attacker simultaneously floods the resolver with spoofed DNS responses, but with DNS
delegation information that contains a forged NS RR pointing to a DNS server controlled
by the attacker. A vulnerability existed in many DNS implementations which allowed
the overwrite of cached RRs using delegation information contained in DNS responses,
and which the resolver will happily accept. Kaminsky demonstrated that combining
lack of proper UDP source port randomisation and this vulnerability results in a severe
attack against DNS, allowing an attacker to poison a resolver’s cache in a very short
period of time, in matter of seconds in some cases. The reader can refer to [39] for
greater detail on the attack.
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2.4 Securing DNS Against Cache Poisoning Attacks
The amount of entropy introduced by using random TXID and random UDP source
port has proven to be insufficient to protect against cache poisoning attacks, mostly be-
cause of implementation issues12,13,14,15. This has resulted in various security protocols
being proposed to add further controls to secure DNS from cache poisoning attacks.
These protocols do not eliminate the use of a random TXID and a random UDP source
port; they build on-top of these basic DNS security controls and are executed only
when the standard DNS security checks pass. These protocols use techniques that can
be implemented in clients, resolvers, ANSs, or a combination of them. Examples of
such protocols include Domain Name Cross Referencing (DoX) [108], 0x20-Bit encod-
ing [29], ConfiDNS [76], WSEC DNS [75] and DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC)
[1]. In this section, we give an overview for some of these protocols before focusing on
DepenDNS [97], the protocol that we analyse in more detail in Section 2.5.
2.4.1 Domain Name Cross Referencing
Domain Name Cross Referencing (DoX) [108] is a resolver-based protocol that forms
peer-to-peer networks of resolvers. Resolvers in a DoX peer-to-peer network establish
and maintain verification channels. A resolver joins a verification channel and gets
assigned k random peers, where a peer is just another participating resolver in the
same peer-to-peer verification channel. The exact process of how a resolver joins a
verification channel is described in [108].
In DoX, each resolver maintains its own verification cache, vCache, which contains
record entries that have been previously verified by DoX. The vCache is kept sepa-
rate from the standard DNS cache that is maintained by the DNS program running
on the system. DNS response messages received from ANSs are evaluated by DoX’s
consistency check shown in Algorithm 1. A resolver running DoX accepts a DNS re-
sponse, Rd, if an entry for the domain name being queried exists in its vCache, Rv, and
Rv = Rd, else the resolver checks if Rd is consistent with what its k peers have in their
vCaches. It does this by sending Rv and Rd to its k peers. Every peer is expected to
compare Rd with its vCache entry for the domain name in Rd or with a fresh response
from the ANS hosting the domain name in question. Every peer would then reply back
to the resolver with Agree, Disagree or DiffView:
• An Agree reply indicates to the resolver that the peer found Rd to be legitimate,
12http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-1997-22.html
13http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/457875
14http://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2008-1447
15http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2007-2926
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either by finding a similar entry in its vCache or after contacting the ANS serving
the domain name contained in Rd and receiving a response, Ra, that is similar
to Rd.
• A Disagree reply indicates that the peer found Rd to be different from the
version it has in its vCache and different from the response it received from the
ANS serving the domain name, Ra.
• A DiffView reply indicates that the peer found Rv, which it received from the
resolver, to be different from the entry it has in its vCache. However, it found
Ra = Rd.
A threshold value, thresh, is maintained by the resolver and is used to accept or
reject Rd. If no peer replies with Disagree then the record is accepted by DoX. Else,
the resolver issues a fresh query to the ANS serving the domain name being requested.
The DNS response is then saved to Ra. Rd is accepted and the resolver’s vCache
is updated, when Ra = Rd and the number of received Agree replies is higher than
thresh. Else Rd is rejected by the resolver and is assumed to be the result of a cache
poisoning attempt.
An issue that DoX must address is how to populate an empty vCache on start-up.
The authors of [108] propose a safe start-up phase for resolvers to build up their vCache.
However, they do not give details on how to implement this safe start-up phase. We
are not aware of practical DNS implementations that have made use of DoX.
2.4.2 0x20-Bit Encoding
0x20-Bit encoding [29] is another resolver-based protocol that tries to increase the
entropy size beyond what the random TXID and the UDP source port provide. It
achieves this by encoding DNS queries using a combination of lower and upper case
characters, i.e randomising the case pattern in name requests for the ranges (A..Z) and
(a..z), (0x41..0x5A) and (0x61..0x7A) respectively. The protocol’s encoding relies on
ANSs retaining the original string in their response and ANSs replying to any case
pattern, i.e. it is required that DNS queries are case-insensitive. For example, DNS
queries for “Www.rHul.AC.uk” and “www.rhul.ac.uk” would resolve to the same IP
addresses, while preserving the case pattern in the responses. This behaviour follows
the standard, RFC 1034 [65], which states that no significance should be attached to
the case of domain names, i.e. two names with the same spelling but different case
pattern are to be treated as if identical.
The authors of [29] propose the following simple algorithm to produce an 0x20-
encoded domain name:
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Algorithm 1: DoX Consistency Check Algorithm
input : DNS query received from the DNS client, Q
input : k DoX peers received after joining a verification channel
input : thresh
output: Poison Detected, OK or WARNING
Rd ← DNS Lookup(Q);
Rv ← vCache Lookup(Q);
if Rd = Rv then
return OK;
else
Send (Rv, Rd) to k peers and get the first m results;
If #Disagree = 0 return OK;
else
Ra ← ANS Lookup(Q);
if Ra 6= Rd then
Poison Detected;
else if Ra = Rd and #Agree > thresh then
return OK;
else
return WARNING;
1. The resolver normalises the DNS query, or response, field by converting each
letter in the domain name to lower case.
2. The resolver encrypts the normalised version using some algorithm such as AES.
3. The resolver uses the output of Step 2 to encode the domain name such that:
(a) if the ith bit of the encrypted output is 0, then make the ith letter in the
queried domain name upper case, i.e. perform an OR operation between the
character and 0x20, hence the name of the protocol.
(b) else make the ith letter in the queried domain name lower case.
The resolver then sends the encoded version of the query to the ANS hosting the
domain name or to its upstream resolver if it was configured with one. Upon receiving
the DNS response, the resolver applies the same algorithm to the DNS response and
compares the newly produced encoded version with the name contained in the DNS
response it received. The resolver rejects the response if the two do not match and
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considers it a cache poisoning attempt. This assumes that the same key was used when
encrypting the normalised version of the query and response messages.
Clearly, the additional entropy introduced by this encoding technique depends on
the number of letters contained in the domain name being queried. For example, 0x20-
Bit encoding would add only three more bits of entropy to DNS queries for “123.net”.
The following shows the success probability of poisoning the cache of a resolver when
implementing the protocol:
P =
n
N · U · T ·B , (2.5)
where B is the number of characters in the domain name being queried. The other
symbols are the same ones used in equation (2.1). According to [29], the protocol adds
an average of 12 additional bits of entropy. The authors of [29] also claim that over
99.7% of all DNS servers they have analysed could support 0x20-Bit encoding.
Google Public DNS resolution service implements 0x20-Bit encoding. In a report
published by Google16, two major issues have been identified when implementing the
protocol:
• Some ANSs would respond with different character cases than the ones in the
DNS query.
• Some ANSs are case sensitive and would respond with NXDOMAIN due to case
mismatch. Receiving a NXDOMAIN RR indicates to the resolver that the name
being queried does not exist in the DNS zone served by the queried ANS.
To overcome these issues, Google created a whitelist containing ANSs that would
support 0x20-Bit encoding. Only queries to ANSs in this whitelist are encoded. Ac-
cording to Google, the whitelisted ANSs account for more than 70% of Google’s DNS
traffic.
2.4.3 WSEC DNS
Wildcard secure (WSEC) DNS increases the entropy of DNS queries by randomising
names contained in newly introduced TXT and CNAME RR queries. These queries are
sent by resolvers to ANSs that support the protocol. Additional TXT and CNAME RRs
are created in DNS zones served by ANSs to support WSEC DNS. The administrator
of an ANS is expected to perform the following tasks to make use of WSEC DNS:
• Add two specific TXT RRs to the configuration of the DNS zone to indicate to
resolvers that WSEC DNS is supported by this ANS for this zone. Figure 2.6
16https://developers.google.com/speed/public-dns/docs/security.html
38
Chapter 2. The Domain Name System 2.4. Securing DNS Against Cache Poisoning Attacks
;; Respond to DNS TXT queries and indicate that WSEC DNS is supported
;; for this zone.
* 86400 IN TXT |wsecdns=enabled|
_test_._wsecdns_ 86400 IN TXT |wsecdns=enabled|
Figure 2.6: TXT RRs added for WSEC DNS.
;; Respond with a CNAME RRs to requests coming from WSEC-capable resolvers
*._wsecdns_.www IN CNAME www
*._test_.wsecdns_.www IN CNAME _test_.wsecdns_
Figure 2.7: CNAME RRs added for WSEC DNS.
shows examples of RRs added to a zone’s configuration file. The use of “*”
indicates that this is a wildcard entry and hence the name of the protocol, wildcard
secure DNS. An ANS responds to TXT queries, covered by this wildcard, with
|wsecdns=enabled|.
• Add two CNAME RRs for each WSEC-protected host name. An example is shown
in Figure 2.7.
WSEC DNS Process
Let us take the example when the host name being queried is “www.example.com”
and when WSEC DNS is being used. The client sends a DNS query to its WSEC-
capable resolver. Upon receiving this request, the resolver sends a specially formatted
discovery DNS TXT RR query to the ANS serving the host name being queried. The
query is in the form of 〈rand〉. test . wsecdns .www.example.com, where 〈rand〉 is
a random alphanumeric string generated by the resolver. The ANS replies with a TXT
RR containing |wsecdns=enabled| if it was configured for WSEC DNS.
The resolver now knows whether this ANS supports WSEC DNS for the host name
being queried or not. If it does, then the resolver sends a specially crafted A RR query
in the form of 〈rand〉. wsecdns .www.example.com, where 〈rand〉 is another random
alphanumeric string generated by the resolver and is the source of the added entropy.
The ANS responds with a CNAME RR containing “www.example.com”, an alias for the
name being requested, 〈rand〉. wsecdns .www.example.com. It also attaches the A
RR for “www.example.com” to the same response.
There are a couple of reasons why WSEC DNS is unattractive. First, changes
are required on every participating ANS and DNS resolver. The large number of
DNS servers and the fact that ANSs are decoupled from resolvers make this a very
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difficult task to accomplish. Second, a WSEC DNS look-up would require two round
trips instead of one, with larger query and response message sizes when compared
to standard DNS query and response messages, increasing the amount of DNS traffic
generated by ANSs and resolvers. We are not aware of practical DNS implementations
that make use of WSEC DNS.
2.4.4 DNSSEC
The protocols we have described so far, other than 0x20-Bit encoding that can use
AES to randomise the case pattern, do not deploy cryptographic controls to secure
DNS. Examples of DNS security protocols that make significant use of cryptography
include DNSSEC [1], Transaction SIGnature (TSIG) [103] and DNSCurve17 . Out of
the three protocols, DNSSEC is by far the most prominent in terms of acceptance,
industry support and deployment. The use of DNSSEC requires changes to resolvers
and ANSs. DNSSEC provides data origin authentication and integrity services to DNS
using digital signatures [10]. It also provides means of public key distribution needed for
the operation of the protocol. DNSSEC relies on resolvers verifying the authenticity of
responses received from ANSs to counter DNS poisoning attacks. DNSSEC is supported
by most of today’s commercial and open source DNS implementations. For example,
in Google Public DNS, a free Internet-based DNS service, support for DNSSEC came
in January 2013.
Enabling DNSSEC on resolvers requires assigning an initial DNSSEC trust anchor.
This is generally performed outside DNSSEC. DNSSEC Look-aside Validation (DLV),
a protocol implemented today by a number of DNS packages, can be used for this
purpose.
Definition 2.6. A DNSSEC trust anchor is a public key that acts as the entry point
for a chain of authority.
The signed DNS root would make an ideal trust anchor to consider since it gives the
receiver access to all possible chains of trust used when validating a DNSSEC response.
DNSSEC deploys cryptographic measures to ensure the authenticity of the DNS data
exchanged by digitally signing the DNS records. RSA and SHA-1 are to be used to
sign the DNS records [12, 89]. When an ANS hosting a signed zone receives a DNS
query, it responses with two RRs: the RR being queried and an RR for the digital
signature associated with queried RR. DNSSEC introduces a number of new RRs to
contain digital signatures, public keys and key hashes [10]:
17http://www.dnscurve.org
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• DNSKEY: A record containing the public key for the zone. DNSKEY can contain
either a Zone Signing Key (ZSK) or a Key Signing Key (KSK). The ZSK is used
to sign the RRs in a zone, while the KSK is only used to sign the DNSKEY RR.
• Resource record signature (RRSIG): A record holding the signatures for a specific
record type.
• Delegation signer (DS): A record that is submitted to the zone’s parent. DS RRs
are included only in the parent’s zone, and correspond to NS RRs providing a link
between the parent and the zone. DS RRs are part of the chain of trust from the
zone’s parent to the zone.
• Next secure (NSEC): A record used to provide proof of non-existence of a RR.
Each name in a zone has an NSEC RR added when signed to allow both positive
answers and negative answers to queries to be cryptographically secure.
• Next secure version 3 (NSEC3): This record is used in negative answers to prove
that a name does not exist. It is similar in function to the NSEC record, but has
some advantages in certain situations. Zones signed with NSEC are “walkable.”
This means that the entire contents of a zone can be retrieved simply by following
the NSEC chain. Also, every name within a zone must be signed and have NSEC
records. NSEC3 uses cryptographic hashes to prevent zone walking while retaining
the ability to prove negative answers.
The DNSSEC specifications were first published in 1999 in RFC 2535 [1]. This RFC
was then obsoleted by RFC 4033 [10] in 2005. A number of supporting RFCs such as
[12, 11, 34, 59, 45, 89] have also been published for DNSSEC.
Eleven years after the release of RFC 2535, in June 2010, the Internet Corporation
for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)18 held the first Key Signing Key (KSK)
ceremony event for the root’s zone. DNSSEC for the root zone is a joint effort between
ICANN and VeriSign, with support from the U.S. Department of Commerce. ICANN, a
non-profit corporation, maintains an updated database19 about the global deployment
of DNSSEC. As of 15th of July 2013, there were:
• 317 TLDs in the root zone in total, 111 of which have been signed. Examples of
signed TLDs include “.uk”, “.com” and “.org”.
• 107 TLDs having trust anchors published as DS records in the root zone.
18http://www.icann.org
19http://stats.research.icann.org/dns/tld_report
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• Only 3 TLDs having trust anchors published in the Internet Systems Consortium
(ISC) DNSSEC Look-aside Validation (DLV) repository.
Despite the fact that the DNS root, “.”, was signed in 2010, DNSSEC has not
gained the expected momentum or adoption levels, at least in the last three years.
This is clearly reflected in the numbers published on ICANN’s web site20, where for
example only three TLDs have trust anchors published in the ISC DLV repository. An
Asia-Pacific Network Information Centre (APNIC) report21 shows that in February
2013, around 3.3% of users had DNSSEC validating resolvers. In May 2013, this value
rose to 8.1%, a 4.8% increase. This increase has been mainly attributed to the Google
Public DNS service fully enabling DNSSEC. According to the APNIC report: “Of the
2.34M unique IP addresses of clients who ran this experiment, we saw 174,082 clients
use Google Public DNS servers, or 7.4% of all tested clients”. These numbers relate to
DNSSEC on resolvers; they do not provide an overview of how many ANSs and zones
have DNSSEC configured. Although DNSSEC has had a slow start, we believe that
the adoption level will pick up over time. The adoption of DNSSEC by the Google
Public DNS servers and other major Internet service providers will further push in
this direction. The adoption of DNSSEC is being tracked by SecSpider22, a DNSSEC
monitoring project that is sponsored by VeriSign.
2.5 DepenDNS
2.5.1 Introduction to DepenDNS
DepenDNS [97] is proposed as a client-based DNS implementation designed to protect
clients from cache poisoning attacks. The fundamental concept behind DepnDNS is
sending the same DNS query to multiple resolvers and then evaluating the responses.
The evaluation is based on an algorithm referred to as pi in [97]. DepenDNS is supposed
to be practical, efficient and secure, according to [97].
The authors of [97] position DepenDNS as a comprehensive solution against cache
poisoning attacks. Therefore, the protocol should be able to protect clients from vari-
ous DNS cache poisoning attacks including the following three generic spoofing attack
scenarios:
• Scenario 1: A spoofing attack against a client in which the attacker sends
spoofed DNS replies to the client. We assume that the attacker has no access to
20http://stats.research.icann.org/dns/tld_report
21http://labs.apnic.net/blabs/?p=368
22http://secspider.cs.ucla.edu/growth.html
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the DNS requests and hence is not aware of the host names being requested. Let
us suppose that this attack has a success probability of p1 when DepenDNS is
not deployed.
• Scenario 2: A spoofing attack against the DNS resolver. We assume that the
attacker has no access to DNS requests and hence is not aware of the host names
being requested. In this scenario, the attacker tries to poison the resolver’s DNS
cache for an arbitrary host name at any point in time. Let us assume that
the attack has a success probability of p2. The impact of this attack is higher
compared to scenario 1 since it would affect all clients served by the targeted
resolver when requesting entries that have been poisoned.
• Scenario 3: The attacker has control over the DNS resolver and hence has
visibility of the DNS requests. The probability of success of a spoofing attack is
1 when DepenDNS is not deployed.
The reader can think of the above scenarios from an abstract point of view, in which
the exact implementation is irrelevant. For example, a random 16-bit TXID may or
may not be in use. The objective of using this approach is to evaluate the effectiveness
of the DepenDNS protocol regardless of the underlying implementation. In addition,
the spoofing approaches discussed above can also be used to conduct other types of
attacks than cache poisoning, as we demonstrate in this section.
When DepenDNS is deployed, clients should be able to detect and prevent the above
three generic attacks and hence decrease their success probabilities to a minimal value.
This is supposed to be achieved by querying multiple DNS resolvers and evaluating the
responses against a set of pre-defined conditions.
The fundamental security objective of DepenDNS is to protect clients from bogus
IP addresses sent by DNS resolvers. These bogus IP addresses would have either
arrived from an already poisoned resolver’s cache or as a result of a spoofed DNS
response message directed against the client. The former is the more likely scenario.
An attacker would target a DNS resolver serving a large number of clients in order to
achieve a higher impact. The protocol proposed in [97] describes how a client running
DepenDNS can detect and reject such bogus IP addresses.
The protocol relies on forwarding the same DNS query to multiple resolvers and then
evaluating the replies using an algorithm pi. Algorithm pi runs on the client’s machine
and accepts or rejects each IP address suggested by the resolvers. The decision is based
on comparing a number of parameters against a set of pre-defined thresholds. Accepted
IP addresses are passed to the client and are saved in a history table maintained by
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DepenDNS. The resolvers and authoritative servers are not involved in the IP addresses
selection process carried out by DepenDNS.
The concept of invoking multiple resolvers in the DNS resolution process has been
proposed by other DNS security protocols such as DoX [108], described earlier in Sec-
tion 2.4.1. The motivation behind using multiple resolvers is that the probability of
poisoning several resolvers at the same time should be much lower than that of poison-
ing one resolver. Although DepenDNS makes use of the same approach, the parameters
defined and the calculations carried out by its algorithm pi are different.
Our work focuses on evaluating the security and deployability aspects of DepenDNS.
Our approach consists of analysing the proposed protocol, investigating the existence of
vulnerabilities and eventually attacking the protocol. First, we start with an explana-
tion of the operation of DepenDNS and how algorithm pi’s calculations are performed.
The reader will find that our explanation of algorithm pi and the symbols we use differ
slightly from the original DepenDNS paper [97]. Our aim is to give the reader a concise
and clear description of the algorithm. Second, we provide a review of the protocol and
highlight a number of unclear assumptions made in [97]. We also consider a number of
practical deployment issues that should have been addressed in [97]. Third, we analyse
if DepenDNS is vulnerable to cache poisoning, Denial of Service (DoS) and amplifica-
tion attacks. We have discovered scenarios in which we were able to successfully exploit
the protocol. The attacks that we have performed against DepenDNS are based on a
full implementation of the protocol and the use of real data collected over a period of
time. This data was collected using our implementation of the protocol. DNS responses
received from public Internet DNS servers, in response to DNS queries that we gener-
ate, are evaluated by our implementation of the protocol. Further information about
out experimental results are provided in later in the chapter. We clearly highlight any
assumptions made for our attacks to be successful. Fourth, we study the performance
and accuracy of DepenDNS.
2.5.2 DepenDNS Algorithm pi
The decision making process of DepenDNS is carried out by algorithm pi. This algo-
rithm expects the following inputs [97]:
• The IP addresses returned by all the resolvers being queried for the given host
name.
• Access to a history table containing the previously accepted IP addresses for the
given host name. This is a separate table that is maintained by DepenDNS and
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is different from the client’s DNS cache table. In Section 2.5.3 we further analyse
the suggestions made in [97] on how to build and maintain the history data.
The output of algorithm pi is a set of IP addresses that are supposed to be legitimate
for the host name being requested. The output is used to update the history table and is
forwarded to the requesting entity on the client’s machine. An example of a requesting
entity is a web browser. It is important to highlight that DepenDNS does not maintain
history information about rejected IP addresses. Algorithm pi defines the following
parameters:
• t is the number of the resolvers to which the client is configured to send its DNS
request messages.
• Rj is the set of IP addresses returned by the jth resolver, where 1 ≤ j ≤ t. We
write Rj = {IP1j , IP2j , ..., IPlj}, where lj is the number of distinct IP addresses
returned by the jth resolver. In practice, a DNS reply may contain duplicate IP
addresses. DepenDNS normalises the reply by removing the repeated IP addresses
and including a single copy of each IP address in Rj .
• R is the set that contains all the distinct IP addresses in the replies from t
resolvers, i.e. R = R1 ∪R2 ∪ ... ∪Rt. We write R = {IP1, IP2, ..., IPm} where m
is the number of the distinct IP addresses returned by the t resolvers.
• nij is a variable that is set to 1 if IPi ∈ Rj and 0 otherwise.
• ni is the number of times IPi appears across all Rj , i.e. ni =
∑t
j=1 n
j
i .
• nmax = max(n1, n2, ..., nm).
• ckcurrent is a variable with value between 0 and 1. The value of ckcurrent is calculated
by dividing the number of occurrences of IP addresses in all Rj that share the
same leftmost 16 bits (represented by the integer k) by the total number of IP
addresses returned by the t resolvers. IP addresses that share the same leftmost
16 bits are considered to be part of the same class, k.
• H is the history data maintained by DepenDNS. H contains the IP addresses
that have been accepted by algorithm pi for each host name.
• ckhistory is a variable parameter with value between 0 and 1. The value of ckhistory
is calculated in a similar way as ckcurrent but uses the information in H for the
host name being requested as input for calculation.
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• A is the set of IP addresses that are accepted by algorithm pi for a specific DNS
request. Each run of algorithm pi generates a new A.
In general, algorithm pi makes the decision to accept or reject an IP address after
examining data related to the number of occurrences, history information and the
leftmost 16 bits of that IP address. For each address IPi, algorithm pi calculates the
variables αi, βi, and γi as follows:
1. αi can be thought of as an indicator for the distance between n
i and nmax. αi is
determined by comparing ni to nmax along with a tolerance variable that is set
to 20% in [97]. Specifically, we have:
αi =
1, if ni ≥ (0.8 · nmax);0, otherwise.
2. βi is related to the history data of DepenDNS. βi is set to 1 if the IP address for
the host name under evaluation exists in H. This indicates that the IP address
has passed the evaluation process at some earlier point in time. Thus:
βi =
1, if IPi exists in the history data, H;0, otherwise.
3. γi is related to the leftmost 16 bits of the IP address and is determined by
comparing ckcurrent and c
k
history. γi is set to 1 if the absolute difference between
ckcurrent and c
k
history is at most 0.1.
γi =

1, if IPi belongs to the k
th class and
−0.1 ≤ ckcurrent − ckhistory ≤ 0.1;
0, otherwise.
Once αi, βi, and γi are calculated for each IPi, algorithm pi constructs the following
sets:
• Rα, which contains the IP addresses in R with αi = 1. Thus Rα = {IPi ∈ R :
αi = 1}
• Rβ, which contains the IP addresses in R with βi = 1. Thus Rβ = {IPi ∈ R :
βi = 1}
• Rγ , which contains the IP addresses in R with γi = 1. Thus Rγ = {IPi ∈ R :
γi = 1}
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Algorithm pi then calculates N , which is referred to as the dispersion strength in
[97]. N is calculated as follows:
N =
|Rα ∪Rβ ∪Rγ |
Mode(|R1|, |R2|, ..., |Rt|) . (2.6)
Upon calculating N , algorithm pi proceeds to calculate the grade, Gi, for each
address IPi. The value of Gi determines whether an IP address is accepted or not. Gi
is calculated as follows:
Gi = αi · (Gα − 10 · (N − 1)) + 1
2
· (βi + γi)(Gβγ + 10 · (N − 1)), (2.7)
where Gα and Gβγ represent the weights given to α and βγ and are set to 60 and 40
respectively in [97]. Note that N is the only variable in the above equation, since the
values of Gα and Gβγ are fixed. IP addresses with grades higher than or equal to 60
are accepted and are used to update A and H.
2.5.3 Protocol Review
According to [97], a good percentage of end-points should be able to make use of
DepenDNS, since it is intended to be a client-based protocol. This may result in a
large number of clients running DepenDNS. Such a potential large deployment of a
protocol should not only consider the security aspects of the protocol but should also
study the deployment challenges and the expected practical impacts.
In the previous section we described the calculations performed by algorithm pi
along with the decision making process. To reach a decision on whether to accept or
reject an IP address, the protocol makes a number of explicit and implicit assumptions.
Unfortunately, some of these assumptions in [97] have not been justified or backed by
supporting information. In addition, the protocol has not addressed some important
operational aspects of DNS. In this section we examine the validity of some of the
assumptions made in [97]. We also highlight some of the characteristics of DNS that
the proposal in [97] has failed to recognise.
System Initialisation:
A client running DepenDNS needs to be configured with the IP addresses of the DNS
resolvers that it needs to query. The method by which the resolvers’ IP addresses are set
on the client is not discussed in [97]. This might seems to be a minor issue but we believe
that it has a great operational impact in the case of large scale deployments. Manual
configuration of the resolvers’ IP addresses is impractical and hence an automated IP
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assignment approach should be considered.
Managing the History Data of DepenDNS:
Variables that are related to the history data maintained by DNS have a significant
influence on the decisions made by the protocol. The values of βi and γi are determined
by the existence of history data and are part of the grade calculation. The values of
βi and γi are set to 0 in case no information exists in the history for the host name
being requested. This clearly introduces an operational challenge since the history is
expected to be empty initially. To address this challenge, [97] proposes either deploying
a centralised database that can be used when new domains are queried, or adjusting the
values of Gα and Gβγ accordingly. The first option is unrealistic and cannot be practi-
cally deployed: there are more than 233 million domain name registrations23 and there
exists no centralised database that contains information about all the domains; even
if one existed, it would be impossible to maintain such a database and track changes
in domains’ information around the world. The second option can be implemented.
However, the proposed changes in the values of Gα and Gβγ are not included in [97]
and there is no assurance provided that such changes will not negatively impact the
security properties of the protocol.
Tolerance Value Used to Calculate α:
The value of αi is set to 1 if n
i ≥ (0.8 · nmax) for IPi. Else, αi is set to 0. The use of
a 20% tolerance level is not justified, nor is any guideline on how to select a suitable
value given in [97]. We would have expected more detailed discussion of how to select
such critical system parameters.
Tolerance Value Used to Calculate γ:
The value of γi is set to 1 if −0.1 ≤ ckcurrent− ckhistory ≤ 0.1 for IPi. Else, γi is set to 0.
As with α, the use of a 10% tolerance level for γ should have been justified.
Class Consideration by γ:
Algorithm pi determines the value of γi based on the leftmost 16 bits of IPi. The authors
of [97] claim that a domain name may have several IP addresses but these IP addresses
usually share the same leftmost 16 bits. However, no evidence or experimental data to
support such a claim is offered in [97].
23http://www.verisigninc.com/assets/domain-name-brief-july2012.pdf
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Number of Resolvers:
The proposed implementation of the protocol considers the use of 20 resolvers. How-
ever, the proposal does not explain the reasons behind choosing this number of resolvers.
We use this number when analysing the protocol’s behaviour in the coming sections.
On the other hand, corporate networks generally deploy a small number of resolvers in-
ternally, typically 2 or 3. Adding 20 resolvers for the sake of implementing DepenDNS
is clearly an expensive exercise. Although service providers deploy a larger number
of servers compared to corporate entities, only few might employ such a number of
resolvers. This introduces another challenge, which is the method through which the
DNS resolvers are selected.
2.5.4 Attacking DepenDNS
The implementation of DepenDNS is supposed to provide a good level of protection
against DNS cache poisoning attacks. In Section 2.5.1 we referred to three attack sce-
narios that clients running DepenDNS should be able to detect and prevent. Each
attack has its own probability of success. In this section, we explore how the protocol
behaves under a number of conditions with the intention of trying to find and exploit
vulnerabilities in the protocol. We were able to find conditions under which we can poi-
son the cache of DepenDNS, perform a denial of service attack against the protocol, and
execute amplification attacks that can trigger the generation of high volume of network
traffic. Our cache poisoning and DoS attacks show that implementing DepenDNS has
no effect in lowering the probability of success of the three attack scenarios identified
in Section 2.5.1. We state any assumptions we make for our attacks to be successful.
General Assumptions
Our general assumptions are as follows:
Assumption 2.1. The attacker knows the IP address of one of the t resolvers that the
client communicates with.
Assumption 2.2. The attack is bounded to a single resolver.
This assumption is made to make our attack model realistic and also considers a
worst case scenario for the attacker: If an attack against DepenDNS is successful when
a message from a single resolver is bogus, then it will certainly be successful when two
or more resolvers are targeted.
Assumption 2.3. The client is configured to use 20 resolvers as suggested in [97], i.e
we set t = 20. Our attacks can still be successful for other values of t.
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The above general assumptions apply across all our attacks. However, some of the
attacks we conduct might require meeting extra conditions. We will clearly highlight
any additional assumptions we make.
DNS Cache Poisoning Attack
The fundamental security objective of DepenDNS is to protect clients from bogus IP
addresses received from DNS resolvers. Detecting these bogus IP addresses is based
on the calculations performed by algorithm pi and the rejection is based on comparing
the grade of each IP address to 60. IP addresses having grades Gi with Gi ≥ 60 are
accepted and are added to A and H. In this attack we attempt to circumvent the
protocol by trying to achieve a grade of 60 or higher and eventually inject bogus IP
addresses for a host name into the history data of DepenDNS.
Assumption 2.4. The history table of DepenDNS contains IP addresses for the host
name being requested.
The attacker’s goal is to bypass the security controls implemented by DepenDNS
and have algorithm pi accept false information in the form of bogus IP addresses. To
achieve this, the attacker needs to spoof an IP address, IPbogus, in a DNS response in
such a way that the resulting grade, Gbogus calculated using equation (2.7), exceeds 60.
Assumption 2.4 implies that the value of β is 0 for IPbogus, and αbogus is likely to be 0.
The reason for this is that nbogus is 1 since the attacker would target a single resolver
as per Assumption 2.2, making it difficult for nbogus to be above the threshold of nmax.
This leaves the attacker with one variable, γbogus, to focus on. The attacker needs to
make sure that γbogus for IPbogus is 1. To achieve this, the following conditions must
be met:
• The leftmost 16 bits of the bogus IP address are the same as the legitimate IP
addresses for the host name, i.e. IPbogus belongs to a valid k
th class IP address
for the host name being requested.
• ckcurrent−ckhistory is within the pre-defined threshold, i.e.−0.1 ≤ ckcurrent−ckhistory ≤
0.1
Since the values αbogus and βbogus are 0, then the grade for IPbogus can be calculated
as
Gbogus =
1
2
(Gβγ + 10 · (N − 1)),
assuming γbogus is 1. For IPbogus to be accepted, the value of Gbogus must be 60 or
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higher, i.e. the following condition must be met:
1
2
(Gβγ + 10 · (N − 1)) ≥ 60.
Since Gβγ is 40, the condition that N ≥ 9 will guarantee that IPbogus achieves the
passing grade.
Our experiments have shown that the value of N is 1 or less for most host names.
However, this is not the case when the host name is served by a CDN. We have noticed
that the value of N is within a range that would allow attackers to inject bogus IP
addresses using the technique we have explained in this section. For example, Figure
2.8 shows that the average value of N for “www.live.com” is 13.5. We have found
similar results for other host names such as “maps.live.com”, “www.youtube.com” and
“www.vmware.com”.
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Figure 2.8: Value of N over time for “www.live.com”. The reader would notice that the
shows that the average value of N for “www.live.com” is 13.5. As described in Section
2.5.4, the condition that N ≥ 9 will guarantee that IPbogus achieves the passing grade,
allowing DNS cache poisoning to succeed.
Our full experimental results are described in Section 2.5.5; meanwhile, Table 2.2
provides the percentage of runs when N ≥ 9. A run is defined as the execution of
algorithm pi against R and H when a host name is being requested. The table shows
that a high percentage of runs had N ≥ 9 for the host names listed earlier. This gives
the attacker an opportunity to launch her attack during the majority of runs. Please
note that this is based on real data collected over time and hence includes situations
when there are no response messages due to network connectivity issues, causing the
value of N to be 0.
We have simulated the above attack by injecting a bogus IP address, 96.17.222.222,
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Host name Number of runs % of runs with N ≥ 9
www.live.com 1100 98.3
maps.live.com 1100 98.2
www.youtube.com 1100 98.5
www.vmware.com 1100 80.3
www.hsbc.com 1100 0
Table 2.2: Percentage of runs with N ≥ 9.
into the cache of one of the resolvers for the host name “www.live.com”. Our attack was
successful, and the bogus IP address was accepted by our implementation of algorithm
pi and added to the history data.
Impact: An attacker can inject a bogus IP address that points to a malicious website
or inject IP addresses that can make the host being requested unreachable. The attack is
applicable when the host name is hosted by a CDN and the client is running DepenDNS.
Denial of Service Attack
Unlike a network-based Denial of Service (DoS) attack, our work targets the layer
where DepenDNS would operate and where the decision of accepting or rejecting an
IP address takes place. In our attack we try to force algorithm pi into rejecting all IP
addresses in R for a host name, hence making the host unreachable by clients running
DepenDNS. The same spoofing attack scenarios listed in Section 2.5.1 can be used by
the attacker with the same success probabilities of p1, p2 and 1 respectively.
Assumption 2.5. The history data of DepenDNS does not contain information about
the host name being requested.
Consider a run of the algorithm pi on a set of sets of returned IP addresses Rj ,
1 ≤ j ≤ t. The above assumption implies that the value of both βi and γi is 0 for each
IPi in R. As a result, Rβ = ∅, Rγ = ∅ and Gi = αi · (Gα− 10 · (N − 1)). For our attack
to succeed, all IPi in R should have a grade value, Gi, of less than 60. Therefore, the
following condition must be met for each i:
αi · (Gα − 10 · (N − 1)) < 60.
Since Gα is known to be 60, then N must be higher than 1 for all IPi to be rejected.
In our situation, N can be calculated as:
N =
|Rα|
Mode(|R1|, |R2|, ..., |Rt|) ,
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since Rβ = ∅ and Rγ = ∅.
To increase the value of N , an attacker would need to focus on increasing the size
of Rα or decreasing the modal value of |Rj |. Decreasing the modal value proved to
be very difficult since we assume that the attacker targets one resolver only (as per
Assumption 2.2).
Our experimental results presented in Section 2.5.5 show the value of N for a num-
ber of host names queried over a period of time. For example, the average value of N
for “www.live.com” is 3.5, meaning that the conditions for the DoS attack to succeed
are met. Correspondingly, Figure 2.9 shows that no IP addresses for “www.live.com”
were accepted during the vast majority of runs.
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Figure 2.9: Number of IP addresses accepted over time for “www.live.com”. With an
average value of N for “www.live.com” is 3.5, means that the conditions for the DoS
attack to succeed are met. The figure shows that no IP addresses for “www.live.com”
were accepted during the vast majority of runs.
On the other hand, we have noticed that the value of N can be easily influenced in
the case when the host name being requested is hosted by a CDN. Therefore, rather
than injecting bogus IP addresses in the DNS cache of a resolver, an attacker would
include a good number of correct IP addresses for the host name. The goal is to
maximise the number of IP addresses that pass the α test and hence increase the value
of |Rα|.
We simulated the attack using real data collected from querying 20 DNS resolvers
(the proposed number of resolvers to query as per [97]) for “www.youtube.com” and
we were able to force algorithm pi into rejecting all IP addresses received from all 20
resolvers. We tested this for six consecutive runs and the attack was successful during
each run. Before the attack, a total of six IP addresses would have been accepted (see
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(a) Number of IP addresses accepted during six runs
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(b) Number of IP addresses rejected during six runs
Figure 2.10: Results of the attack against “www.youtube.com”. After injecting a
number of valid IP addresses as per the technique described in this section we found
that algorithm pi starts rejecting all the IP addresses received from the 20 resolvers.
The two figures show the number of accepted and rejected IP addresses during the six
runs.
Section 2.5.5 for details). After injecting a number of valid IP addresses as per the
technique described in this section we found that algorithm pi starts rejecting all the
IP addresses received from the 20 resolvers. Figures 2.10a and 2.10b show the number
of accepted and rejected IP addresses during the six runs.
Impact: An attacker can perform a DoS attack against a specific host name when it
is hosted by a CDN and when the client is running DepenDNS.
Amplification Attack
In this attack we try to exploit the fact that DepenDNS employs a number of resolvers,
t. The success of an amplification attack relies on the ability of the attacker to trigger
the generation of a large volume of traffic by sending requests of negligible size. The
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higher the amplification factor, the more severe the attack is. Such attacks are not
new for DNS. In fact, DNS has been the target of various DNS amplification attacks
[50], which rely on the fact that DNS response messages are significantly larger than
response messages. In practice, an attacker will employ a set of machines under her
control, like a botnet, to perform such attacks [50].
Assumption 2.6. In our attack, we take the average size of a DNS request message to
be 60 bytes and of a DNS response message to be 124 bytes. These numbers are based
on the data collected during our experiments. This takes into account the TCP/IP
headers.
Our attack uses clients running DepenDNS and does not require the use of a botnet.
We show how an implementation of DepenDNS can cause such attacks with a high
amplification factor. We also show a sample code for performing the amplification
attack.
Our attack is encoded in Hyper Text Markup Language (HTML) code. The sam-
ple code that we show in this section does not require the installation of any software
on the client’s machine and can be automatically executed by any application which
can interpret HTML or JavaScript. The HTML code can be delivered to clients by
email or can be published on a website which the client visits. To ensure a large scale
effect, the attacker would publish this code on a popular website with thousands of
concurrent visitors. Uploading the code onto social networking websites would be an
attractive choice to the attacker. Figure 2.11 shows an example of HTML code that
employs JavaScript. In the code in Figure 2.11, we use the image object, img, to force
the web browser to perform a DNS look-up. The size of the above code is 306 bytes.
The code generates two random strings, s1 and s2. These strings are then concate-
nated to build the host name in the image HTML tag, img. The attacker can change
the number of host names being requested by increasing the length of the loops. In
the above example, the variable “i” is incremented by one in every loop until reaching
10. Although changing the length of loops in the JavaScript to a higher value has a
negligible effect on the size of the code, it has a significant impact on the amplification
factor. For example, changing the length of the loops to 100 will increase the code size
by only 1 byte, but will cause the generation of at least 736 kbytes of DNS request
and response messages under Assumption 2.6. This number will be multiplied by the
number of search domains the client is configured for. For example, the expected traffic
will be at least 1.58 Mbytes if the client is configured for one search domain such as
“example.com”.
Impact: Although, this attack applies to the standard DNS implementation, DepenDNS
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<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv="refresh" content="5">
</head>
<body>
<script>
for (i=1;i<=10;i++)
{
s1= String.fromCharCode(97+Math.round(Math.random()*25));
s2= String.fromCharCode(97+Math.round(Math.random()*25));
document.write(’<img src="ftp://’+s1+’.’+s2+’/f">’);
}
</script>
</body>
</html>
Figure 2.11: Sample HTML code that employs JavaScript and could be downloaded and
executed by the client’s browser, resulting potentially in a DNS amplification attack,
when DepenDNS is deployed.
amplifies it by a factor of 20 which makes it more attractive to attackers. Hence, an
attacker can turn clients running DepenDNS into a source of a serious DoS attack.
For example, an attacker could post this code to a popular website causing a storm of
DNS traffic on the Internet.
2.5.5 Experimental Results
In this section we evaluate the operation of DepenDNS under a number of scenarios
using real life data collected over a period of time. We queried 20 resolvers, all located
in the US, for the following host names every five minutes, with a total of 1100 queries
for each host name:
• “www.live.com”. This host name has a CNAME RR of “a134.g.akamai.net” and is
served by a CDN.
• “maps.live.com”. This host name has a CNAME RR of “a1234.g.akamai.net” and
is served by a CDN.
• “www.youtube.com”. This host name has a CNAME RR of “youtube-ui.l.google.com”
and is served by a CDN.
• “www.vmware.com”. This host name has a CNAME RR of ‘e508.g.akamaiedge.net‘”
and is served by a CDN.
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• “www.hsbc.com”.
We developed a perl script that implements DepenDNS. The script takes DNS
response messages from the 20 resolvers and runs them through an implementation of
Algorithm pi. The script also maintains a history table as described in Section 2.5.2.
We collected the following set of information for each host name listed above:
• The value of N for each run.
• The number of accepted and rejected unique IP addresses for each run.
A run is defined as the execution of algorithm pi against R and H when a host name
is being requested.
The results shown in this section validate the findings presented earlier in this
chapter. We divide our experiments into two categories based on the availability of
history information about the host name being requested.
Experimenting with no History Information
We present here the results of running DepenDNS without existing history information
about the host name being requested. The results of all the runs show the following
trends:
• A large percentage of valid replies are rejected by DepenDNS when the host name
being requested is hosted by a CDN. For example, Table 2.3 shows that 98.6% of
the unique IP addresses for “www.live.com” were rejected after 1100 runs.
• A large number of runs had no accepted IP addresses when the host name being
requested is hosted by a CDN. During these runs, the host name being requested
is considered unreachable by the client.
• IP addresses for host names that are not hosted by CDNs were accepted in all of
the runs.
• The value of N varies depending on the host name being requested.
Table 2.3 shows the results of running DepenDNS against the five host names. We
collected the following set of information for each host name that we evaluated:
• The value of N for each run, calculated using equation 2.6.
• The number of accepted and rejected unique IP addresses for each run.
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Host name After run Number of dis-
tinct accepted IP
addresses
% Number of dis-
tinct rejected IP
addresses
%
www.live.com 1100 8 1.4 567 98.6
maps.live.com 1100 7 2.7 251 97.3
www.youtube.com 1100 6 5.2 110 94.8
www.vmware.com 1100 16 19.5 66 80.5
www.hsbc.com 1100 1 100 0 0
Table 2.3: Summary results for all host names without existing history information.
Figures 2.12, 2.13, 2.14, 2.15 and 2.16 show the value of N , the number of accepted
IP addresses and the number of rejected IP addresses over time for the host names
in Table 2.3. The figures show that when starting with an empty H, the DepenDNS
history table, algorithm pi rejects most of the IP addresses it receives for host names
served by CDNs.
The reader might notice some dips in the graphs shown below. These are due to
loss of network connectivity.
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(b) Number of accepted IP addresses
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(c) Number of rejected IP addresses
Figure 2.12: Results for “www.live.com” starting without existing history information.
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(b) Number of accepted IP addresses
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(c) Number of rejected IP addresses
Figure 2.13: Results for “maps.live.com” starting without existing history information.
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(b) Number of accepted IP addresses
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(c) Number of rejected IP addresses
Figure 2.14: Results for “www.youtube.com” starting without existing history infor-
mation.
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(b) Number of accepted IP addresses
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(c) Number of rejected IP addresses
Figure 2.15: Results for “www.vmware.com” starting without existing history infor-
mation.
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(b) Number of accepted IP addresses
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(c) Number of rejected IP addresses
Figure 2.16: Results for “www.hsbc.com” starting without existing history information.
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Host name Age of history After run Number of
accepted IP
address
% Number of
rejected IP
address
%
www.live.com 1st run 1100 209 36.3 366 63.7
www.live.com 1 hour 1100 285 49.6 290 50.4
www.live.com 12 hours 1100 342 59.5 233 40.5
www.live.com 24 hours 1100 393 68.3 182 31.7
maps.live.com 1st run 1100 72 27.9 186 72.1
maps.live.com 1 hour 1100 105 40.7 153 59.3
maps.live.com 12 hours 1100 127 49.2 131 50.8
maps.live.com 24 hours 1100 156 60.5 102 39.5
www.youtube.com 1st run 1100 105 90.5 11 9.5
www.youtube.com 1 hour 1100 105 90.5 11 9.5
www.youtube.com 12 hours 1100 105 90.5 11 9.5
www.youtube.com 24 hours 1100 108 93.1 8 6.9
www.vmware.com 1st run 1100 47 57.3 35 42.7
www.vmware.com 1 hour 1100 63 76.8 19 23.2
www.vmware.com 12 hours 1100 70 85.4 12 14.6
www.vmware.com 24 hours 1100 74 90.2 8 9.8
www.hsbc.com 1st run 1100 1 100 0 0
www.hsbc.com 1 hour 1100 1 100 0 0
www.hsbc.com 12 hours 1100 1 100 0 0
www.hsbc.com 24 hours 1100 1 100 0 0
Table 2.4: Summary results for all host names with existing history information.
Experimenting with Existing History Information
In this section we evaluate DepenDNS when history information exists for the host name
being requested. The data used to initialise the history of DepenDNS was collected at
different points of time. We evaluate DepenDNS using history data collected in the
following different ways:
• The first set of replies received from the t resolvers.
• The collection of replies received from the t resolvers after one hour.
• The collection of replies received from the t resolvers after 12 hours.
• The collection replies received from the t resolvers after 24 hours.
The results of all the runs show the following trends:
• A good percentage of valid replies are rejected by DepenDNS. The percentages
are listed in Table 2.4 for the five host names we have queried.
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• The value of N is high for host names hosted by CDNs. For example the value
of N is around 13.5 for “www.live.com” and 10 for “www.vmware.com”.
We present the value of N over time along with the number of accepted and rejected
IP addresses in each run for the host names that we have queried. The values presented
are the results of running DepenDNS using as history the data collected from the first
set of replies from the 20 resolvers. We collected the following set of information for
each host name that we evaluated:
• The value of N for each run.
• The number of accepted and rejected unique IP addresses for each run.
Figures 2.17, 2.18, 2.19, 2.20 and 2.21 show the value of N , the number of accepted
IP addresses and the number of rejected IP addresses over time for the host names in
Table 2.4. When compared to the results reported in the previous section, the figures
in this section show that when initialising H, in this case by populating it with the
first set of replies from the 20 resolvers, algorithm pi performs better and rejects less
number of IP addresses received over time for host names served by CDNs.
The reader might notice some dips in the graphs shown below. These are due to
loss of network connectivity.
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Figure 2.17: Results for “www.live.com” with existing history information.
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Figure 2.18: Results for “maps.live.com” with existing history information.
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Figure 2.19: Results for “www.youtube.com” with existing history information.
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Figure 2.20: Results for “www.vmware.com” with existing history information.
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Figure 2.21: Results for “www.hsbc.com” with existing history information.
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Location of the t Resolvers
We have also conducted experiments that evaluate DepenDNS when the t resolvers
are distributed over multiple geographical locations. The objective was to compare
the results of these experiments to the ones we have presented earlier. The overall
results show a lower number of accepted IP addresses in each run when host names
that are served by CDNs. Rejecting more IP addresses is largely attributable to how
algorithm pi calculates the value of N when the IP addresses it receives are served
by resolvers consulting CDNs located in different countries or geographies, causing, in
most cases, each resolver to reply with a different IP address based on the location (and
configuration) of the CDN’s DNS server. Host names that are not served by CDNs
such as “www.hsbc.com” exhibited the same behaviour that we saw when using DNS
resolvers located in the same geography.
2.6 Chapter Conclusion
DNS is critical to the operation of the Internet and hence maintaining the security of
DNS is paramount. In this chapter we discussed a number of vulnerabilities in the
protocol and its implementation, and how exploiting these vulnerabilities could impact
the DNS service availability or integrity.
In summary, only a few of the proposed DNS security protocols have been adopted
in practice; most of them have not been considered practical for deployment. The
main reason behind this is the significant effort required to change the underlying DNS
infrastructure to accommodate these new protocols. A good example is DNSSEC which
is one of the most visible initiatives to secure DNS. Here, the challenges associated with
the practical implementation of DNSSEC have lead to a significant delay in deploying
the technology.
We also argue that proposals which attempt to address challenges in critical infras-
tructures should carefully study the impact of their implementations. For example, our
analysis of DepenDNS has revealed a set of deficiencies in both the security controls
and the operational aspects of the protocol. Although the protection controls imple-
mented by DepenDNS do work for general web sites, domains that are hosted by CDNs
have proven to be more of a challenge. The designers of DepenDNS made various as-
sumptions, which were not justified or backed up by scientific evidence, for example the
recommended number of resolvers to use and the DepenDNS history table population
techniques. On the other hand, we have found conditions under which denial of service
and cache poisoning attacks can be launched against DepenDNS. We have also shown
that the implementation of DepenDNS can be exploited in an amplification attack. As
a result, we do not recommend adopting DepenDNS with its current proposed design.
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TLS and DTLS
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter we provide the necessary background information and prerequisite ma-
terial that are needed to establish an understanding of the TLS and DTLS protocols.
First, we provide background information about the TCP/IP protocol suite and de-
scribe three fundamental networking protocols: IP, TCP and UDP. Second, we intro-
duce Transport Layer Security (TLS), describe how the TLS protocol is structured and
discuss its modes of operation. We also introduce Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS) and describe the differences between TLS and DTLS. We then present in detail
the concept of padding oracles and show how an attack can be theoretically mounted
against TLS using a padding oracle. Finally, we present a number of attacks against
the TLS and DTLS protocols, serving as a forerunner to our attacks on DTLS and
TLS, which we present later in Chapters 4 and 5.
3.2 The TCP/IP Protocol Suite
The Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) protocol suite [22,
95], also known as the Internet protocol suite, is a set of networking protocols that
are used on the Internet. The specifications of the protocol suite are managed by
the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and were first published by the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in RFC 791 [78]. This RFC was later
updated by RFCs 1349 [9], 2474 [69] and 6864 [98]. The structure of the TCP/IP
protocol suite consists of the following stack of layers, arranged from bottom-to-top:
link, internet, transport and application. A networking protocol is mapped to one,
or more, of these four layers. For example, the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP)
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|Version| IHL |Type of Service| Total Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Identification |Flags| Fragment Offset |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Time to Live | Protocol | Header Checksum |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Source Address |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Destination Address |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Options | Padding |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 3.1: Structure of the IPv4 header as per RFC 791. The structure shows the
different fields that are available in an IPv4 packet. We descricbe some of these fields
in 3.2.1
maps to the application layer.
Every layer in the TCP/IP protocol stack maintains its own datagram (envelope)
structure and performs a number of operations such as fragmenting messages received
from its upper-layer (if necessary), assembling datagrams received from its lower-layer
(if necessary), and adding, verifying and removing its own datagram header. For ex-
ample, a message received from an application, such as a browser is first fragmented
(if necessary) by the transport layer before a fragment is encapsulated in a transport
layer datagram that contains a transport layer-specific header. This datagram is then
encapsulated in lower-layer (internet and link) datagrams as it propagates down the
TCP/IP protocol stack.
3.2.1 The Internet Protocol
The Internet Protocol (IP) is the core protocol that facilitates the operation of the
Internet. In this section, we provide a basic introduction to IP focusing on aspects
related to the attacks discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.
IP operates at the internet layer of the TCP/IP protocol stack [22, 95] and has its
own datagram (packet) structure. The structure of IPv4 [78] packet headers is shown
in Figure 3.1. We will be referring to IPv4 only from now on in this thesis.
IP is a connection-less protocol, i.e. no connection is established at the IP layer be-
tween the two communicating hosts. In addition, no information regarding a transac-
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tion state is maintained by hosts at this layer. Other than the 2-byte Header Checksum
field, shown in Figure 3.1, there is no error detection or control facilities built into
IP. According to [78], the value of the 2-byte Header Checksum field is assigned by
the sender to the 16-bit one’s complement of the one’s complement sum of all 16-bit
bytes in the IP header [78]. For the purpose of calculating the checksum, the Header
Checksum field is initially set to zero. Clearly, the Header Checksum must be calcu-
lated every time an IP datagram is created or a change is made to any of the other IP
header fields. The receiver of an IP datagram is expected to also compute the value
of Header Checksum for validation purposes. A receiver discards an IP datagram if
the checksum it calculates is different from what the Header Checksum field contains.
Obviously, using the Header Checksum field only provides weak integrity protection
since the value is calculated using a basic keyless algorithm over known information.
In practice, the Header Checksum field is mainly meant to detect changes resulting
from network errors.
IP Spoofing
IP spoofing is an integral part of many attacks. It refers to creating a valid IP packet
using a forged source IP address, typically with the objective of impersonating another
IP host. Generally, the receiver cannot reliably identify if a packet has been spoofed
using only information contained in the IP header. In this case, the receiver must rely
on upper layer protocols (for example, TLS and DTLS) to detect IP spoofing.
3.2.2 The Transmission Control Protocol
The Protocol field in an IPv4 header contains the identification number of the trans-
port protocol. For example, TCP is assigned to protocol number 6, while the User
Datagram Protocol (UDP) is assigned to protocol number 17. The protocol identifica-
tion numbers are managed by IANA [85].
The Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) [79] operates at the transport layer,
just above the IP layer as shown in Figure 3.2. The specifications of TCP are given
in RFC 793 [79]. Several RFCs [22, 80, 43, 42] were later published to update the
TCP specifications given in RFC 793. TCP is a reliable connection-oriented proto-
col; a three-way TCP handshake must complete successfully before a connection is
established between two hosts. TCP provides confirmation of reception through its
acknowledgement facility. TCP segments are retransmitted by the sender if not ac-
knowledged by the receiver within a timeout interval that is maintained by the sender.
TCP sequence numbers along with a window are used to maintain the state of the
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connection. The window indicates the range of acceptable sequence numbers beyond
the last successfully received one. The window is maintained by the receiver and its
value is communicated to the sender inside every acknowledgment sent. Sequence num-
bers are also used for re-ordering incoming TCP datagrams and discarding duplicate
TCP datagrams. The starting sequence number of a connection must be randomly
assigned. Implementations of TCP must maintain separate state information for every
TCP connection. A TCP connection progresses through a series of states during its
lifetime [79]: LISTEN, SYN-SENT, SYN-RECEIVED, ESTABLISHED, FIN-WAIT-1,
FIN-WAIT-2, CLOSE-WAIT, CLOSING, LAST-ACK, TIME-WAIT and CLOSED .
IP
TCP UDP Others
TLS DTLS
HTTP RTP
Figure 3.2: Relationships between protocols. The figure shows the construct in which
protocols operate.
TCP maintains its own basic checksum field. According to RFC 793 [79] “The
checksum field is the 16 bit one’s complement of the one’s complement sum of all 16
bit words in the header and text. If a segment contains an odd number of header and
text octets to be checksummed, the last octet is padded on the right with zeros to form a
16 bit word for checksum purposes. The pad is not transmitted as part of the segment.
While computing the checksum, the checksum field itself is replaced with zeros.”
Spoofing a TCP datagram requires performing IP spoofing, described earlier, as well
as guessing the correct 4-byte TCP sequence number and the 2-byte TCP source port,
and updating the TCP Checksum field accordingly. The correct 4-byte TCP sequence
number and the 2-byte TCP source port are readily available to a Man-in-the-Middle
(MITM) or an attacker who has access to the TCP header information. The attacker
also needs to make sure that his spoofed TCP datagrams arrive ahead of the legitimate
ones. Otherwise, the spoofed datagrams would be discarded by the receiver on arrival.
Recall that in a MITM configuration, the attacker can control the flow of information,
and hence can delay, alter or drop legitimate datagrams.
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Source Port | Destination Port |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Sequence Number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Acknowledgement Number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Data | |U|A|P|R|S|F| |
| Offset| Reserved |R|C|S|S|Y|I| Window |
| | |G|K|H|T|N|N| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Checksum | Urgent Pointer |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Options | Padding |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| data |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 3.3: Structure of the TCP header as per RFC 793. A number of TCP header
fields shown in this figure, such as Sequence Number, Acknowledgement Number,
Window and Checksum, and described in Section 3.2.2, are required to achieve the
TLS reliability feature that upper layer protocols such as TLS rely on. We describe
the relationship between TCP and TLS later in this chapter.
3.2.3 The User Datagram Protocol
Similar to TCP, the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) [77] is a protocol that operates
at the transport layer of the TCP/IP protocol stack, as shown in Figure 3.2. The
specifications of UDP are given in RFC 768 [77]. UDP is an unreliable connection-
less protocol that provides best-effort delivery of datagrams, allowing applications to
generate and send data at any time. The structure of a UDP datagram header is shown
in Figure 3.4, a much simpler structure than the TCP header. The reason behind this
simplicity is the minimal number of services that the UDP protocol provides when
compared to TCP. For example, unlike TCP, UDP does not require the establishment
of a connection before data is exchanged between to IP nodes. This UDP property
would be suitable, and in many cases desired, for applications where reliability is not
of a concern, DNS as one example.
Similar to TCP, UDP maintains its own a checksum field, Checksum. A UDP
datagram is discarded by the receiver if the Checksum field is found to be invalid. The
UDP Checksum field can be set to zero, indicating that the sender has not calculated
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Source Port | Destination Port |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Length | Checksum |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| data |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 3.4: Structure of the UDP header as per RFC 768.
the checksum for the UDP datagram, and that the field can be ignored by the receiver;
in this case, the receiver can choose to accept or reject the UDP datagram.
3.2.4 Implementing the TCP/IP Protocol Suite
Typically, operating systems would implement most of the TCP/IP protocol stack.
This includes performing tasks related to handling datagrams for the internet and
transport layers. Examples of these tasks include constructing datagrams, sending and
receiving datagrams, and maintaining datagram queues. The exact implementation of
the TCP/IP protocol suite is operating system-dependent. For example, in the case of
the Linux kernel, there are two datagram buffers for each direction of traffic (incoming
and outgoing traffic). The first buffer is located at the internet layer. The second
buffer is located at the transport layer and its maximum size is based on the number of
bytes the buffer can handle [26]. For example, the default maximum UDP buffer size
for a Linux kernel is 131071 bytes1. Operating systems are expected to implement the
standards’ mandatory requirements when handling datagrams. For example, operating
systems should handle incoming UDP datagrams in accordance to [95], “If the incoming
UDP datagrams arrive faster than the application can read them and if the queue fills
to a maximum value, UDP datagrams are discarded by UDP. UDP will continue to
discard UDP datagrams until there is space in the queue.”
3.3 Cryptographic Primitives
TLS and DTLS make use of a number of cryptographic primitives. In this section, we
give an introduction to cryptographic hash functions and message authentication codes
(MACs). We will refer to these cryptographic primitives in the course of this chapter
1http://access.redhat.com/site/documentation/en-US/JBoss_Enterprise_Web_Platform/5/
html/Administration_And_Configuration_Guide/jgroups-perf-udpbuffer.html
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and the next two chapters, and describe how they are deployed in the context of TLS
and DTLS.
3.3.1 Hash Functions
A hash function takes an input, M , a bitstring of arbitrary length and produces a
message digest, x, that is of fixed length. A cryptographic hash function, h, is designed
to withstand pre-image, second pre-image and collision attacks.
Definition 3.1. Pre-image resistance: For essentially all pre-specified outputs, it is
computationally infeasible to find any input which hashes to that output, i.e. to find
any pre-image x′ such that h(x′) = y when given any y for which a corresponding input
is not known.
Definition 3.2. Second pre-image resistance: It is computationally infeasible to find
any second input which has the same output as any specified input, i.e. given x, to
find a second pre-image x′ 6= x such that h(x) = h(x′).
Definition 3.3. Collision resistance: It is computationally infeasible to find any two
distinct inputs x and x′ which hash to the same output, i.e. such that h(x) = h(x′).
Hash functions are used in a wide variety of applications including the construc-
tion of other cryptographic primitives such as message authentication codes (MACs),
digital signatures, pseudo random functions (PRFs) and pseudorandom number gener-
ators (PRNGs). Clearly, the security of these applications relies on the cryptographic
strength of the underlying hash function used and its resistance to attacks. Widely
used hash functions include MD5 [87, 99], SHA-1 [71] and SHA-256 [71]. SHA-3 [71],
based on Keccak [20], is the latest addition to the list of hash functions. Today, it is
practically feasible to find collisions in MD5 [107], and hence MD5 should not be con-
sidered for constructing other cryptographic primitives [99]. SHA-1 collision resistance
has also been under attack [105, 106].
3.3.2 Message Authentication Codes
A MAC can be thought of as a fixed-size cryptographic tag, T , that is produced from
applying algorithm f on a variable-length message, M , along with a secret key, K.
The use of the secret key, K, in MAC allows the receiver to verify the integrity and
authenticity of the received message. Integrity and authenticity verification is a feature
that the use of hash functions, for example, cannot provide. Algorithm f can be
constructed using block ciphers (for example, CBC-MAC [70], OMAC [47] and PMAC
[109]), but can also be constructed using a cryptographic hash functions such as in the
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case of HMAC. The HMAC-based constructions [58] are the most commonly used MAC
realisations and are the ones supported by the different TLS versions [31, 32, 33]. The
different realisations of HMAC are denoted by HMAC-MD5, HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-
SHA-256, etc. We give more detail on the construction of HMACs in Chapter 5.
3.4 Introduction to Transport Layer Security
Transport Layer Security (TLS) is arguably the most widely used secure communica-
tions protocol on the Internet today. TLS and its predecessor, Secure Sockets Layer
(SSL), establishes a secure channel between two parties. SSL was originally designed by
Netscape and was never formally published as a standard by the IETF. Starting with
SSL 2.0, a deprecated version that was released in 1994, Netscape’s intent was to build
a layer that can provide transparent protection services to a wide variety of application-
level traffic. SSL 2.0 suffered a number of severe security flaws [104] and was shortly
replaced by SSL 3.0, in 1995. Microsoft also responded to the flaws discovered in SSL
2.0 by creating their own protocol, called Private Communications Technology (PCT)
[19, 21], also in 1995. PCT was not implemented by platforms other than Microsoft
Internet Explorer and was eventually dropped by Microsoft. It is worth noting that a
recent IETF standard was published to prohibit the use of SSL 2.0 [100].
All versions of SSL were mainly developed and maintained by Netscape; the IETF
published RFC 6101 [38] for SSL 3.0, but for the historical record only. SSL was
later adopted by the IETF and was specified as an RFC standard in 1999 under the
name of TLS 1.0 [31]. It has since evolved through TLS 1.1 [32] to the current version
TLS 1.2 [33]. Various other RFCs define additional TLS cryptographic algorithms and
extensions such as the ones specified in [92, 90, 84, 52, 2, 93].
TLS is now used for securing a wide variety of application-level traffic: It serves,
for example, as the basis of the HTTPS protocol for encrypted web browsing, it is used
in conjunction with Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP) or Simple Mail Transfer
Protocol (SMTP) to cryptographically protect email traffic, and it is a popular tool
to secure communication with embedded systems, mobile devices, and in payment
systems.
TLS and SSL require an underlying reliable transport protocol to operate. This is
mainly TCP, this being the dominant reliable transport protocol used on the Internet.
TLS relies on TCP’s reliability to reorder incoming datagrams and retransmit lost
datagrams. An example of another reliable protocol that TLS can operate over is the
Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) [72, 49]. DTLS, on the other hand,
operates over an unreliable protocol such as UDP. We give more detail on DTLS in
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Section 3.5.
TLS is actually a protocol suite, rather than a single protocol. The main component
of TLS is the Record Protocol, which uses symmetric key cryptography (block ciphers,
stream ciphers and MAC algorithms) in combination with sequence numbers to build
a secure channel for transporting application-layer data. Other major components
are the TLS Handshake Protocol, which is responsible for authentication, session key
establishment and cipher suite negotiation, and the TLS Alert Protocol, which carries
error messages and management traffic. There is also the Change Cipher Spec Protocol,
which is used to signal transitioning to a protected mode. In the next sections, we
describe these four protocols with more emphasis on the Record Protocol. The following
are (D)TLS-related definitions that we will be regularly referring to in the course of
this chapter and the rest of this thesis:
Definition 3.4. TLS cipher suite: A set of cryptographic algorithms that is agreed-on
between two TLS parties. This set identifies the authentication, key establishment,
bulk encryption and message authentication algorithms.
Every cipher suite is assigned a 2-byte identification number. For example, the
cipher suite TLS RSA WITH AES 128 CBC SHA is assigned number 0x2F, and indicates
the use of RSA for authentication and key establishment, AES using a 128-bit key in
CBC-mode for encryption, and HMAC-SHA-1 for generating message authentication
codes. IETF RFCs (for example, RFCs 5288 [90] and 5932 [52]) are published to
update the list of approved and supported cipher suites for the different TLS versions
[31, 32, 33]; new approved cipher suites are introduced, while existing cipher suites
that are considered insecure are dropped. TLS 1.2 introduced the option of using
authenticated encryption with additional data (AEAD) encryption modes [62] such as
GCM [64, 90]. In AEAD encryption, the plaintext is simultaneously encrypted and
integrity protected. AEAD ciphers take as input a single key, a nonce, a plaintext, and
additional data to be included in the authentication check [62].
Definition 3.5. TLS session: A virtual construct that maps to a specific cipher suite
and a specific active master secret. Every session is assigned a random session iden-
tifier, which is an arbitrary sequence of bytes. The length of the session identifier is 16
bytes in the case of SSL 2.0 and between 0 and 32 bytes in the case of SSL 3.0 and all
versions of TLS.
In Section 3.4.2, we discuss the key derivation process in (D)TLS and show how
master secret is computed.
Definition 3.6. TLS connection: A specific communication channel that carries the
actual application data and maps to a TCP connection.
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Every TLS connection is assigned its own encryption and MAC keys, and sequence
numbers. A TLS connection is created only after the successful establishment of a
session. The two ends of a TLS connection must agree on the same cipher suite to be
able to communicate. The cipher suite to use is negotiated by the two TLS parties as
described in Section 3.4.3.
3.4.1 Pseudo Random Functions in TLS
In addition to compressing data using HMAC, for integrity and authenticity purposes,
another construction is required to do expansion of secrets into blocks of data for
the purposes of key generation or validation. This is achieved by using a pseudo
random function (PRF), which takes in the case of TLS as input a secret, a seed
and an identifying label, and produces an output of arbitrary length. The PRF, as
we show in the coming sections, takes a key role in the TLS key derivation and the
Handshake Protocol; TLS relies on HMAC-based PRFs to perform key derivation, and
the generation and verification of particular messages. Unlike TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1
which hard code the HMAC algorithms to use, TLS 1.2 specifies that the PRF must
be explicitly identified in the cipher suite and that it should be at least SHA-256. In
TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1, the PRF output is created by splitting the secret, S, into two
halves, S1 and S2, and using S1 with MD5 and S2 with SHA-1, then performing an
XOR operation on the outputs of these two expansion functions. The PRF calculation
in TLS 1.2 does not require to split S; only one hash function is used.
3.4.2 TLS Key Derivation
The TLS key derivation process produces keys that are used for encryption, integrity
protection and authentication. This is achieved first by creating (or computing) and
then expanding a 48-byte pre-master secret, pre master secret. The process of es-
tablishing the pre-master secret depends on the key establishment method identified
in the selected cipher suite. The pre-master secret is set either by direct transmis-
sion of the RSA-encrypted secret, as described in Section 3.4.3, or by the transmis-
sion of Diffie-Hellman (DH) parameters that will allow each side to reach the same
pre master secret [33]. The length of pre master secret varies depending on the
key establishment method. For example, in the case of RSA, pre master secret is 48
bytes long and is composed of a 2-byte version number and a 46-byte random number
that is locally generated by the client and communicated “securely” to the server, using
RSA encryption under the server’s public key.
The pre-master secret is then expanded using a PRF to generate a 48-byte master
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secret, master secret. The master secret is specific to a TLS session and is main-
tained for the lifetime of a particular TLS session. In TLS, master secret is com-
puted by applying a PRF on the following inputs [33]: pre master secret, the string
“master secret” and ClientHello.random || ServerHello.random (random values ex-
changed in the Handshake Protocol, as we describe in Section 3.4.3). The master secret,
master secret, is associated with a TLS session and is used to generate the required
keying material for TLS connections under a session. The exact keying material to
generate depends on the selected cipher suite and can include encryption keys, MAC
keys and IVs for each of the TLS parties.
3.4.3 The TLS Handshake Protocol
Before application layer data can be exchanged between two TLS parties, a TLS con-
nection establishment phase must complete successfully. This phase is delivered by the
TLS Handshake Protocol. Figure 3.5 shows a typical sequence of the TLS Handshake
messages when RSA, a public-key encryption algorithm, is used for authentication and
key establishment. This Handshake Protocol example, which we explain in detail in
this section, also assumes that server authentication is performed using a certificate
that the client trusts; client authentication, on the other hand, is optional.
The Handshake Protocol example proceeds as follows (again, we assume that RSA
is used for key establishment):
The client usually initiates the TLS Handshake Protocol. It does this by sending
a ClientHello message, after successfully establishing the underlying TCP connec-
tion of course. Sending a ClientHello message indicates to the server the client’s
interest in starting a TLS handshake message exchange and informs the server about
the client’s preferences. The ClientHello message includes the following fields in se-
quence: a 2-byte protocol number (for example, 0x3 0x2 for TLS 1.1 and 0x3 0x3 for
TLS 1.2), a 32-byte number referred to as ClientRandom (28 bytes of which are to
be randomly generated), the session identifier, a variable number of bytes (multiple of
two) containing the list of cipher suites supported by the client for this connection, and
the compression methods the client supports (if any). All this information is sent in
plaintext. It is worth noting that TLS 1.2 [33] introduced a new handshake message,
HelloRequest, a notification message that the server can send requesting the client to
begin the handshake negotiation process.
The server responds with three TLS messages, transmitted in one or more TCP
datagrams. The first message is the ServerHello message, sent in plaintext in re-
sponse to the preferences offered by the client in its ClientHello message. The server
can ignore the client’s preferences and choose another cipher suite. The ServerHello
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Client Server
ClientHello -------->
ServerHello
Certificate
CertificateRequest(optional)
<-------- ServerHelloDone
Certificate(optional)
ClientKeyExchange
CertificateVerify(optional)
[ChangeCipherSpec]
Finished -------->
[ChangeCipherSpec]
<-------- Finished
Application Data <-------> Application Data
Figure 3.5: Sample TLS Handshake Protocol sequence of messages. The figure shows
the messages exchanged between the TLS client and the TLS server in the scenario
discussed in Section 3.4.3. In this scenario, we assume that RSA is used for key
establishment. In this scenario, the pre master secret, which is a 48-byte key, is
generated by the client and shared, securely, with the server in the third step in the
ClientKeyExchange message. The master secret, master secret, that gets associated
with a TLS session and is used to generate the required keying material for the TLS
connection, is computed from pre master secret. The keying material that is gen-
erated will include encryption and MAC keys used by the clinet and the server for a
particular TLS connection.
message includes the following fields in sequence: a 2-byte protocol number, a 32-byte
number referred to as ServerRandom (28 bytes of which are to be randomly generated),
a session identifier assigned by the server, the 2-byte cipher suite identifier which the
server is willing to use, and the compression method (if any). The ServerRandom and
ClientRandom messages are used by the client and server in the key derivation process
described in Section 3.4.2 to make sure that the generated keying material is differ-
ent, even if the same secret input (the pre-master secret) has been chosen, protecting
TLS connections from replay attacks and making sure that keys in each connection
are different. In addition to ServerHello, the server sends a Certificate message
containing a chain of X.509 certificates, and which must at least contain the server’s
certificate. The server finally sends the ServerHelloDone message, an empty message
that indicates to the client that the server has finished sending all of its messages for
this phase of the handshake.
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The client continues with the Handshake Protocol only if it is satisfied with the
server’s response. That is, if the client accepts the server’s chosen cipher suite and
successfully authenticates the server’s certificate it just received. If it does, then the
client locally generates a secret key referred to as the pre-master secret and sends it to
the server in the ClientKeyExchange message. The generation of the pre-master secret
was described in Section 3.4.2. The ClientKeyExchange message is protected using
the server’s public key contained in the server’s certificate. The ClientKeyExchange
message is followed by the 1-byte ChangeCipherSpec message. This message is actually
part of the TLS Change Cipher Spec Protocol and indicates that a TLS party, in this
case the client, is switching to sending and accepting only messages that are protected
by the selected cipher suite and the newly derived keys. The client finally sends the
ClientFinished message, the first message that is protected by the newly derived
keys used in accordance with the selected cipher suite. The ClientFinished message
contains the client’s Verify Data, a cryptographically generated message used to verify
that the current key exchange was successful. We show how to compute Verify Data
later in this section.
The server proceeds only if it successfully decrypts the ClientFinished message
and verifies the client’s Verify Data. If so, then the server sends a ChangeCipherSpec
message, followed by a ServerFinished message containing the server’s Verify Data.
The client is expected to decrypt and verify the content of ServerFinished, before
any application data is sent.
The Verify Data message is cryptographically generated. For example, in TLS
1.2 [33], Verify Data is computed by applying the ciphersuite-specified PRF (or SHA-
256 if not specified) on the following data [33]: master secret, finished label and
h(handshake messages). The finished label is set to the strings “client finished”
or “server finished”, if the Verify Data message is generated by the client or server
respectively. In TLS 1.2, the length of Verify Data, in bytes, should be explicitly
identified by the selected cipher suite, otherwise it is set to 12 bytes. In TLS 1.0
and 1.1, the length of Verify Data is fixed to 12 bytes. Here, h is the cipher-suite-
specified cryptographic hash function for the PRF and handshake messages refers to
all handshake messages sent or received, starting at client hello and up to, but not
including, the Finished message.
The above Handshake Protocol example is for the case in which RSA (TLS–RSA)
is used for key establishment. The Handshake Protocol proceeds differently when using
other key establishment and authentication algorithms. Recall that the key establish-
ment and authentication algorithms are specified in the selected cipher suite. TLS
and DTLS support cipher suites where static DH (TLS–DH) or ephemeral DH (TLS–
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DHE) can be used. The DH parameters are specified by the server and may be either
ephemeral (in the case of TLS–DHE) or contained within the server’s certificate (in
the case of TLS–DH). In TLS-DH and TLS-DHE, the pre-master secret is created
from the output of the DH key exchange protocol. According to [33], the shared DH
key is used as the pre-master secret, after stripping the leading bytes of the shared
key that contain all zero bits. If needed, TLS–DHE can be used to achieve perfect
forward secrecy (PFS), a feature that cannot be guaranteed by RSA or static DH.
TLS-DHE does not provide authentication, but can be combined with an authentica-
tion method such as RSA or Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) [33]. For example,
TLS DHE RSA WITH AES 128 CBC SHA identifies DHE as the key exchange algorithm
and RSA as the authentication algorithm. Using TLS with Anonymous DH, on the
other hand, is possible, but does not provide authentication; it is strongly recommended
not to use anonymous DH since it is vulnerable to basic MITM attacks.
3.4.4 TLS Session Renegotiation
Two TLS parties can renegotiate the parameters of their session without the need to
tear down their TLS connection. Re-negotiated parameters can include the cipher suite
and the pre-master secret, along with recomputing the master secret accordingly. The
session renegotiation capability is negotiated when two TLS parties first establish a TLS
session. Unlike most of the messages of a new handshake which are sent in plaintext,
all renegotiation messages are protected by the current cipher suite. RFC 5746 [84]
defines a secure renegotiation method, published in response to a TLS renegotiation
attack, described in [81].
3.4.5 TLS Session Resumption
To avoid the computationally expensive public key cryptography operations used to
establish the pre-master secret, a client and a server can resume a previously established
session. Successful session resumption results in updating the TLS keying material
and possibly a change in the cipher suite; the master secret associated with the TLS
session is not changed. A non-empty session identifier in an unencrypted ClientHello
indicates to the server the client’s interest to resume an existing session. The session
resumption mechanism is also referred to as “session caching”, and requires the server
to keep information about every session for a configurable amount of time. The authors
of RFC 5077 [92] introduces a new TLS extension for stateless session resumption that
does not make use of session identifiers.
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3.4.6 The TLS Record Protocol
The TLS Record Protocol transparently provide services the TLS higher-level proto-
cols. The Record Protocol accepts data from its higher-level protocols and from the
underlying reliable transport protocol layer (for example, TCP). Data received from
higher-level protocols are first fragmented into records, compressed (if selected) and
encapsulated in TLS datagrams. Application messages exceeding 214 bytes are broken
into multiple plaintext records, each not exceeding 214 bytes, before they are further
processed. The Record Protocol applies authentication, padding and encryption to each
plaintext record, as appropriate. The exact list of steps for processing TLS plaintext
records is governed by the state of the TLS connection and the cipher suite selected
during the TLS connection establishment phase. For example, some of the TLS hand-
shake messages are sent in plaintext, while others are protected by the selected cipher.
Data received from applications are always protected by the selected cipher. According
to [33], the length of a TLS ciphertext record must not exceed 214+212 bytes. The TLS
Record Protocol performs the reverse operations on data received from its underlying
reliable transport protocol. Again, the exact processing of TLS records is governed by
the state of the TLS connection and the selected cipher suite.
Let us now analyse the structure of the TLS record header. The 5-byte header,
HDR, is simple and consists of three fields: Content Type, Version and Length. The
1-byte Content Type field contains the value assigned to the higher-level protocol.
The four basic higher-level protocols are the Change Cipher Spec Protocol (0x14),
the Alert Protocol (0x15), the Handshake Protocol (0x16), and the Application Data
Protocol (0x17). The Record Protocol supports adding extensions so that new higher-
level protocols can be introduced whenever needed [33, 2]. The 2-byte Version field,
identifies the version of the protocol used, and is broken into 1-byte Major and 1-byte
Minor versions. For example, TLS 1.2 is assigned the value 0x3 0x3. The 2-byte Length
field identifies the length of the TLS record in bytes.
Sequence numbers are used by the Record Protocol to maintain the state of a TLS
connection. The value of an 8-byte sequence number, SQN, is initialised to zero whenever
a new connection is established. The 8-byte sequence number is not exchanged over
the wire, but is maintained by the two parties of a TLS connection and is protected
by the Record Protocol MAC. Two separate sequence numbers are maintained for
every TLS connection; one for outgoing records and another for incoming records.
The corresponding sequence number is incremented for each record sent or received.
Sequence numbers are also used to protect TLS against anti-replay attacks. Although
TCP provides a reliable layer that assures in-sequence delivery of datagrams, it does not
protect TLS against adversaries intentionally re-ordering TCP datagrams or injecting
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TCP datagrams of their choice. The TLS Record Protocol detects this manipulation
or injection by continuously maintaining the value SQN and including SQN in the MAC
calculation. The MAC is verified for every TLS record received and the TLS session
is destroyed immediately, along with its associated keying material, after encountering
an invalid MAC.
3.4.7 Modes of Operation
In the Record Protocol, there are three encryption options:
• HMAC followed by CBC-mode encryption using a block cipher,
• HMAC followed by encryption using the RC4 stream cipher, or
• authenticated encryption using the GCM [90] or CCM [63] mode of operation
of a block cipher. In this mode of operation, the same construction is used to
perform the expected encryption and authentication functions.
The third of these three options is only available with TLS 1.2 [90, 63], which is
yet to see widespread adoption. The second option has seen some recent cryptanalysis
work [4]. Our attacks, presented in Chapters 4 and 5, were conducted against DTLS
and TLS when CBC-mode encryption is used. Therefore, the background information
we give in the remaining of this chapter focuses on the TLS Record Protocol with this
mode of operation, which we refer to as MEE-TLS-CBC in the rest of the thesis. In
this case, MEE-TLS-CBC refers to using the MAC-then-Encode-then-Encrypt (MEE)
construction or TLS (and DTLS), under CBC-mode encryption.
CBC-Mode Encryption in TLS – MEE-TLS-CBC
An individual TLS plaintext record R (viewed as a byte sequence of length at least
zero) is processed as follows: the sender maintains the 8-byte sequence number SQN,
and forms the 5-byte header field HDR described earlier. It then calculates a MAC over
the bytes SQN || HDR || R; let T denote the resulting MAC tag. Note that exactly 13
bytes of data are prepended to the record R here before the MAC is computed. The
size of the MAC tag is 16 bytes (HMAC-MD5), 20 bytes (HMAC-SHA-1), or 32 bytes
(HMAC-SHA-256). We let t denote this size in bytes.
The record is then encoded to create the plaintext P by setting P = R || T || pad.
Here pad is a sequence of padding bytes chosen such that the length of P in bytes is a
multiple of b, where b is the block-size of the selected block cipher (so b = 8 for 3DES
and b = 16 for AES). In all versions of TLS and DTLS, the padding must consist of
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p + 1 copies of some byte value p, where 0 ≤ p ≤ 255. In particular, at least one
byte of padding must always be added. So examples of valid byte sequences for pad
are: “0x00”, “0x01 || 0x01” and “0x02 || 0x02 || 0x02”. The padding may extend over
multiple blocks, and receivers must support the removal of such extended padding. In
SSL the padding format is not so strictly specified: it is only required that the last
byte of padding must indicate the total number of additional padding bytes. However,
this opens up TLS to simple attacks as described in [68].
In the encryption step, the encoded record P is encrypted using CBC-mode of
the selected block cipher. TLS 1.1 and 1.2 mandate an explicit IV, which should be
randomly generated; TLS 1.0 and SSL use a chained IV. Thus, the ciphertext blocks
are computed as:
Cj = EKe(Pj ⊕ Cj−1), (3.1)
where Pj are the blocks of P , C0 is the IV, and Ke is the key for the block cipher E,
that was agreed-on during the TLS handshake phase.
For TLS (and SSL), the data transmitted over the wire then has the form:
HDR || C,
where C is the concatenation of the ciphertext blocks Ci (including or excluding the
IV depending on the particular SSL or TLS version). Note that the sequence number
is not transmitted as part of the message in TLS.
Simplistically, the decryption process, shown in Figure 3.6, reverses this sequence of
steps: first the ciphertext is decrypted block-by-block to recover the plaintext blocks:
Pj = DKe(Cj)⊕ Cj−1, (3.2)
where D denotes the decryption algorithm of the block cipher. Then the padding is
removed, and finally, the MAC is checked, using the header information (and, in TLS,
a version of the sequence number that is maintained at the receiver).
In reality, much more sophisticated processing than this is needed. We describe the
further steps to perform later in Section 3.9.2.
3.4.8 The TLS Alert Protocol
The TLS Alert Protocol [33] carries alert messages which identify the severity of errors
occurring at any stage of a TLS connection. For example, an alert message is sent by a
server if none of the cipher suites offered by the client, during the Handshake Protocol,
are acceptable. Alert messages are classified as either fatal or warning. Alert messages
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Cj-1
DK
Pj-1
Cj
DK
Pj
Figure 3.6: CBC-mode decryption. In this figure, C is the concatenation of the cipher-
text blocks Ci (including or excluding the IV depending on the particular SSL or TLS
version), while P is the decrypted ciphertext and K is the key used for decryption.
with a level of fatal result in the immediate termination of the TLS connection and
destruction of the session construct accordingly.
3.5 Introduction to Datagram Transport Layer Security
A datagram-based protocol implies the use of an unreliable underlying network proto-
col such as UDP. The Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol was first
introduced at the Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS) in
2004 [67]. Two years later, the IETF assigned RFC 4347 [82] to DTLS 1.0. The aim of
DTLS 1.0 is to provide a variant of TLS 1.1 [32] that eliminates the dependency on a
reliable underlying protocol such as TCP. Similar to TLS, DTLS is intended to provide
privacy and integrity for data exchanged between a client and a server. We explain
later in this section the main differences between DTLS and TLS. Applications that
operate over an unreliable transport protocol such as UDP can easily take advantage of
the security services offered by DTLS. Since its introduction, there has been a growing
interest in the security services offered by DTLS. Leading implementations of DTLS
can be found in OpenSSL2 and GnuTLS3. Both of these provide source toolkits that
implement TLS and DTLS as well as being general purpose cryptographic libraries
that software developers can use. The first release of OpenSSL to implement DTLS
was 0.9.8. Since its release, DTLS has become a mainstream protocol in OpenSSL.
There are also a number of commercial products that have taken advantage of DTLS.
2http://www.openssl.org
3http://www.gnu.org/software/gnutls
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For example, DTLS is used to secure Virtual Private Networks (VPNs)4,5 and wireless
traffic6. Platforms such as Microsoft Windows, Microsoft .NET and Linux can also
make use of DTLS7. In addition, the number of RFC documents that are being pub-
lished on DTLS is increasing. Recent examples include RFC 5415 [24], RFC 5953 [44]
and RFC 6012 [91]. Recently, support for DTLS was added to Google Chrome and
Firefox to protect Internet video traffic8.
By design, DTLS 1.0 [82] is very similar to TLS 1.1 [32]. In fact, RFC 4347 [82]
presents only the changes to TLS 1.1 introduced by DTLS and refers to RFC 4346 [32]
for the rest of the protocol specification. According to RFC 4347, this approach has
been chosen to minimise the amount of effort needed to implement the protocol. Thus,
to fully understand and be able to analyse and code DTLS, the reader of RFC 4347 is
expected to be familiar with TLS 1.1. The same approach was taken when developing
DTLS 1.2 [83], which aligns the DTLS protocol with TLS 1.2. It is worth noting that
there was no DTLS 1.1. The jump was to synchronise the DTLS and TLS numbering
for ease of referral, and possibly development and implementation.
A number of changes were introduced in the design of DTLS, compared to TLS, so
that the services of TLS could be delivered over an unreliable transport protocol such
as UDP. We list here a number of these changes:
• To compensate for the lack of an underlying reliable protocol, the DTLS Hand-
shake Protocol implements its own retransmission timers and datagram reorder-
ing settings. The Handshake Protocol also implements other features such as
anti-spoofing and denial of service protection. For example, to protect against
denial of service attacks, DTLS introduces a handshake verification phase in
which a challenge message, HelloVerifyRequest, in the form of a 4-byte cookie,
borrowed from [51], is generated by the server and sent to the client. The client
is expected to retransmit the ClientHello, this time with the cookie included,
making denial of service using spoofed IP addresses difficult. Figure 3.7 shows
the new handshake phases. The rest of the DTLS handshake proceeds similarly
to the TLS handshake example shown in Figure 3.5, along with the implementa-
tion of message timeouts. The Record Protocol does not offer these features and
assumes that they are handled by the upper layer protocols, if needed.
• In TLS, MAC errors must result in connection termination. In DTLS, the receiv-
4http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps10884/index.html
5http://campagnol.sourceforge.net
6http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/wireless/controller/7.0MR1/configuration/guide/cgi_
lwap.html
7http://www.eldos.com/sbb/desc-ssl.php
8http://sites.google.com/site/webrtc/interop
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ing implementation may simply discard the offending record and continue with
the connection. According to [83, Section 4.1.2.1], DTLS implementations should
silently discard data with bad MACs. The idea is that datagrams may be lost,
duplicated, reordered, or possibly modified. Discarding these packets is based on
the fact the underlying protocol used by DTLS is unreliable. TLS, on the other
hand, would terminate the connection since it expects the underlying protocol,
for example TCP, to carry out the functions of packets re-ordering and discard-
ing packets with checksum errors. We exploit the DTLS tolerance to datagram
alteration in our attacks in Chapter 4.
• Unlike TLS, fragmentation of record messages is not permitted in DTLS. Instead,
a DTLS record must fit within a single lower layer datagram. According to
[83, Section 4.1.1], DTLS implementations are expected to determine the path
maximum transmission unit (PMTU) possible and send records smaller than
the PMTU. If an application attempts to send a record larger than the allowed
PMTU, the DTLS implementation should respond to the application with an
error message.
• Unlike TLS, the 8-byte sequence number field, SQN, in DTLS is explicit, i.e.
is included in the DTLS Record header, and is composed from a 2-byte epoch
number and a 6-byte sequence number, As with TLS, the 6-byte DTLS sequence
number is set to zero after each ChangeCipherSpec message is sent. The epoch
number is initially set to zero and incremented each time the ChangeCipherSpec
message is sent within a session (for reasons such as session renegotiation). For
simplicity, we use DTLS sequence number field, SQN, to refer to both the 2-byte
epoch and the 6-byte sequence number.
• DTLS optionally supports record replay detection. TLS support for anti-replay
is based on including the current SQN in the MAC calculation as described in
Section 3.4.6. In DTLS, the technique used for anti-replay is the same as in
IPsec’s AH protocol [53], by maintaining a bitmap window of received records.
Records that are too old to fit in the window and records that have previously
been received are silently discarded. According to [82, 83], the replay detection
feature is optional, since packet duplication is not always malicious, but can also
occur due to routing errors. In DTLS, the 8-byte sequence number field, SQN,
is included in the DTLS Record header; this value is used for calculating and
verifying the MAC.
• RC4, the only stream cipher that is supported by TLS, must not be used with
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Client Server
------ ------
ClientHello -------->
<------- HelloVerifyRequest
ClientHello -------->
Figure 3.7: Startup of DTLS Handshake Protocol.
DTLS. This is because the DTLS Record Protocol and its underlying transport
layer protocol do not provide reliability, message delivery assurance or datagram
in-order processing, and hence the state synchronisation required by stream ci-
phers like RC4 cannot be guaranteed.
3.6 Heartbeat Extension for (D)TLS
The Heartbeat extension [93] provides a new protocol for (D)TLS allowing a keep-alive
functionality. This is very useful in the case of DTLS, which runs on top of unreliable
transport protocols that have no concept of session management. The only mechanism
available at the (D)TLS layer to determine if a peer is still alive is performing a costly
renegotiation. The Heartbeat extension uses Heartbeat request and response messages
between two entities that have an established (D)TLS connection. A Heartbeat request
message can be sent by either of the entities and is protected using the same (D)TLS
cipher suite and keys used for protecting other payloads. According to [93], whenever
a Heartbeat request message is received, it has to be answered with a corresponding
Heartbeat response message. Both messages have specific lengths that can be detected
by the adversary. The use of (D)TLS’s variable length padding feature adds minimal
difficulty in identifying the Heartbeat messages. We make use of the (D)TLS Heartbeat
messages in our attacks in Chapters 4 and 5.
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3.7 Implementations of (D)TLS
TLS 1.0 is universally supported by almost all modern web browsers and web servers.
TLS 1.1 and 1.2 are not yet widely supported9,10, but TLS 1.2 is gaining further mo-
mentum, after a number of recent high-profile attacks against TLS [35, 4] and Chapter
5 of this thesis (published as [6]). Examples of widely-used open source implemen-
tations of TLS 1.2 include OpenSSL11, NSS12 (used in Google Chrome and Firefox),
GnuTLS13, PolarSSL14, JSSE15, CyaSSL16 and yaSSL17. Some vendors such as Mi-
crosoft have opted to develop their own implementations of the protocol18. The number
of DTLS 1.1 implementations is fewer and includes, for example, OpenSSL, GnuTLS
and CyaSSL.
The implementers of TLS and DTLS are expected to follow the IETF standards for
their code design and implementation. Despite their best efforts, vulnerabilities can be
introduced through developers making their own interpretation of the standards or as
a result of the usual kinds of coding error. There are also cases where vulnerabilities
are the result of incorrect protocol design decisions. We demonstrate examples of such
vulnerabilities later in Chapters 4 and 5, and introduce new techniques for exploiting
(D)TLS design decisions and attacking a number of (D)TLS implementations.
3.8 Side Channel Attacks
Physical attacks on cryptosystems take advantage of implementation-specific charac-
teristics to recover secret parameters that are involved in different computations. An
attack that exploits information leaked by a system is generally referred to as a side
channel attack; typically, exploiting unintended leakage that hardware and software
implementations of cryptosystems may produce. Sources of hardware leakage include
timing [55, 23], power consumption [54] and electromagnetic radiation [56]. Sources
of software leakage include error messages [73, 30, 102, 16] and message sizes [8]. An
9SSL Pulse (https://www.trustworthyinternet.org/ssl-pulse/) reported in August 2013 that
only 14.5% of 170,000 websites surveyed support TLS 1.1 and 17% of the of 170,000 websites support
TLS 1.2.
10As of September 2013, Firefox support for TLS 1.2 is available on selected releases (Firefox 24
Beta, Aurora and Nightly), Google Chrome support for TLS 1.2 was introduced in release 29, and
Microsoft plans to support TLS 1.2 in release 11 of its Internet Explorer.
11http://www.openssl.org
12http://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/NSS
13http://www.gnutls.org
14http://polarssl.org
15http://download.java.net/jdk8/docs/technotes/guides/security/jsse/JSSERefGuide.html
16http://www.yassl.com
17http://www.yassl.com
18http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa380123
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attacker exploiting a side channel can gain further information that may potentially
help him exploit a cryptosystem. For example, this might help an attacker recover the
encryption key or recover encrypted messages.
3.8.1 Timing Side Channel Attacks
A timing side channel attack is, essentially, a way of obtaining secret information by
measuring the time it takes for cryptographic operations to complete. The timing vari-
ance in the operations reveals enough information to the attacker for him to acquire
relevant, and possibly sensitive, information about the system. Timing side channel
attacks are typically coupled with statistical analysis. The timing side channel attack
idea was first introduced by Kocher in [55], where he showed that carefully measur-
ing the amount of time required to perform private key operations could possibly help
attackers find fixed Diffie-Hellman exponents, factor RSA keys, and break other cryp-
tosystems. The fundamental idea is taking advantage of timing variations. The idea
was then translated into a real attack against a smart card-based implementation of
RSA [54]. Boneh and Brumley later took this further and demonstrated in [23] how to
extract private keys from an OpenSSL-based web server running on a machine in the
local network. The work we present in Chapters 4 and 5 exploits timing side channels
to recover plaintext.
3.9 Padding Oracles
An oracle can be thought of as a black box that responds to queries. A padding oracle
reveals side channel information that indicates the correctness of padding. In certain
circumstances, a padding oracle can be leveraged to build a decryption oracle, that
is, enables plaintext attacks against a protocol. For it to be useful to an adversary,
a padding oracle must have a practical realisation. This realisation can be achieved
by exploiting the leakage of padding-related side channel information such as error
messages or timing.
The concept of a padding oracle was first introduced by Vaudenay [102]. In Vau-
denay’s formulation, a padding oracle is a notional algorithm which, when presented
with a CBC-mode ciphertext, returns VALID if the underlying plaintext has padding
that is correctly formatted and INVALID otherwise. Here, correctness is with respect to
some padding scheme. For example, for (D)TLS padding, correctness means that the
decryption of the ciphertext is a byte string ending in one of the valid padding pat-
terns “0x00”, “0x01 0x01”, etc. Vaudenay showed that, for certain padding schemes,
repeated access to a padding oracle can be used to decrypt arbitrary target ciphertext
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blocks (and indeed complete ciphertexts in a block-by-block manner).
Vaudenay’s techniques apply to the (D)TLS padding scheme and, for completeness,
we show in Algorithm 2 how to decrypt a complete block from a target ciphertext C,
given access to a padding oracle. Recall that in CBC-mode encryption, the ciphertext
is decrypted block-by-block using equation (3.2), demonstrated by Figure 3.6.
Let us start with the simplest scenario, in which the attacker tries to recover the
last byte of a plaintext block, Pt. We use Ct to denote the target block in ciphertext C
and use Ct−1 to denote the ciphertext block preceding Ct. Let ∆, which we refer to as
the masking block, be a block made of b bytes. Also, for any block B of plaintext or
ciphertext, we write B = [B[0]B[1] . . . B[b− 1]], where B[i] denotes the ith bytes of B.
In CBC-mode encryption, modifying the value of a byte of Ct−1 by XORing it
with ∆ has the effect of modifying Pt in the same byte by XORing it with the same
∆, as shown in Figure 3.8. In addition, modifying any byte in Ct−1 would result in
unpredictable changes to plaintext block Pt−1; this is due to the characteristics of the
block cipher used. It is worth highlighting at this point that any change in C would,
with overwhelming probability, invalidate the (D)TLS record’s MAC. In this text, we
refer to the modified versions of C and P as C∗ and P ∗ respectively. If the attacker
can place Ct−1 and Ct as the last two ciphertext blocks, then a change in Ct−1[b − 1]
(the last byte of Ct−1) would result in a change in Pt[b−1], which is treated in (D)TLS
as the padding length byte. Recall that in all versions of TLS and DTLS, the padding
must consist of p+ 1 copies of some byte value p, where 0 ≤ p ≤ 255. Here:
P ∗t [b− 1] = ∆[b− 1]⊕ Pt[b− 1]. (3.3)
The attack proceeds as follows. The attacker initialises ∆[b−1] to 0 and constructs
C∗ using:
C∗ = Ct−1[0]Ct−1[1] . . . (Ct−1[b− 1]⊕∆[b− 1]) || Ct. (3.4)
The attacker then submits C∗ to the padding oracle, PO. If PO responds with
INVALID, then the attacker increments the value of ∆[b − 1], constructs a new C∗
(using the above formula) and submits the new C∗ to PO. The attacker stops when
PO responds with VALID, indicating valid padding (“0x00” in this case – note that
the probability of encountering the other valid padding combinations than “0x00” is
considerably lower). The attacker recovers Pt[b− 1] using:
Pt[b− 1] = ∆[b− 1]⊕ 0x00
= ∆[b− 1]. (3.5)
The attack takes on average 128 and at most 256 queries to PO to recover Pt[b−1].
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So far, we described how to recover only the last byte of a block. Algorithm 2 describes
how to decrypt a complete ciphertext block using PO. The attack as presented in
Algorithm 2 uses 2-block ciphertexts, but is easily adapted to use longer ciphertexts
simply by ensuring that blocks C∗t−1, Ct are always placed at the end of the ciphertext.
The fundamental idea is that the attacker recovers a block, one byte at a time, starting
from the rightmost byte, Pt[b− 1]. When trying to recover a plaintext byte Pt[i], ∆[i]
is initialised to 0, where 0 ≤ i < b. In addition, all plaintext bytes in positions i + 1
to b− 1, if any, and which have been already recovered by now, are set to b− i− 1 by
modifying the corresponding bytes in ∆ using:
∆[j] = Pt[j]⊕ (b− i− 1), (3.6)
for i < j < b. The attacker computes C∗t−1[b− i− 1] using:
C∗t−1[b− i− 1] = Ct−1[b− i− 1]⊕∆[b− i− 1]. (3.7)
Starting with ∆[b − i − 1] = 0, the attacker computes C∗t−1[b − i − 1] and submits
C∗ = C∗t−1 || Ct to PO. A VALID response from PO for some value of ∆[b − i − 1],
indicates valid padding, i.e. P ∗t [b − i − 1] = i for 0 ≤ i < b. The attacker can now
Ct-1
DK
Pt-1
Ct
DK
Pt
1. Ct-1[b-1] ⊕ ∆[b-1]
2. Results in Pt[b-1] ⊕ ∆[b-1]
Figure 3.8: In this example, where CBC-mode encryption is used, Ct−1[b−1]⊕∆[b−1]
has the same effect of Pt[b − 1] ⊕∆[b − 1]. The other bytes of Pt are not affected. In
CBC-mode encryption, modifying the value of a byte of Ct−1 by XORing it with ∆ has
the effect of modifying Pt in the same byte by XORing it with the same ∆.
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Algorithm 2: Decrypting a block using a padding oracle, PO, with block-mode
encryption.
input : Ct−1, Ct
output: Pt
Initialise all bytes of ∆ to 0;
for i = 0 to b− 1 do
for byte = 0 to 255 do
∆[b− i− 1]← byte;
C∗ = (Ct−1 ⊕∆) || Ct;
if PO(C∗) = VALID then
Pt[b− i− 1] = ∆[b− i− 1]⊕ i;
Break;
for j = 0 to i do
∆[b− j − 1] = Pt[b− j − 1]⊕ i;
Output Pt;
compute Pt[b− i− 1] using:
Pt[b− i− 1] = ∆[b− i− 1]⊕ i. (3.8)
The attack requires on average 128 and at most 256 queries to the padding oracle
to decrypt a byte. In the case of TLS, things are not as simple; there are complica-
tions to consider when building a padding oracle realisation for PO. We discuss these
complications in the next section.
3.9.1 Using a Padding Oracle to Attack TLS
In practice, to mount a padding oracle attack, an adversary must find some way of
actually realising a padding oracle for a specific implementation. In the original pre-
sentation for TLS in [102], Vaudenay posited that such an oracle could be built by
sending a message to a TLS server and then waiting for a replay in the form of an
error message. In TLS 1.0, a decryption failed message would indicate a padding
error, while a bad record mac message would indicate that padding was correct, but
that MAC verification had failed. There are (at least) two challenges to building a TLS
padding oracle in this way:
1. The two TLS errors, decryption failed and bad record mac, are classified as
fatal, causing the immediate termination of the TLS connection after every query
to the padding oracle. Informally, we say that the padding oracle behaves as a
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bomb oracle. The adversary must wait for a new TLS connection to be established
before making another query, but each new connection will have fresh keying
material. This makes the attack impractical unless connections are re-established
quickly. Moreover, unless the same plaintext is repeated in a known ciphertext
block across many connections, the adversary can not efficiently recover plaintext.
For example the probability of recovering the last byte of a block is 1/28, while
the probability of recovering the byte before the last one in a block is 1/216.
2. The two error messages are encrypted, making it more difficult for the adversary
to distinguish them.
Based on this, the attack against TLS was flagged as impractical, until the intro-
duction of a side channel by Canvel et al.
3.9.2 Canvel et al. Timing Attack Against TLS
The work of Canvel et al. [25] addressed the second issue above, by developing a
different realisation for the padding oracle19.
The Canvel et al. realisation of the padding oracle relies on the fact that, for a
TLS implementation, the processing of a message with valid padding may take longer
than the processing of a message with invalid padding. The reason for this is that
the padding is checked for validity before the MAC verification is performed, and so
a TLS implementation that aborts processing immediately after detecting an error (of
any kind) will exhibit a timing difference in message processing for packets with valid
and invalid padding: in the former case, the MAC verification will take place, while in
the latter it will not. The timing difference would then show up as a difference in the
time at which the error messages appear on the network. As observed in [25], this is
exactly how TLS was implemented in OpenSSL.
In the attack of [25], the timing difference was amplified by working with long mes-
sages, since these take longer to pass through MAC verification. Canvel et al. reported
timing differences of as much as 2 milliseconds for these long messages. Because of noise
introduced by various sources, the padding oracle so obtained is not fully reliable, so
the server had to be queried a number of times for every message and a statistical model
used to analyse the observed timings. Moreover, the oracle is still a bomb oracle, so
only one query per TLS connection can be made. Even so, Canvel et al. [25] were able
to use this approach to extract TLS-encrypted passwords for an IMAP e-mail server
running stunnel, an application using the OpenSSL implementation of TLS. The attack
19The reader might find our description of the work of Canvel et al. to be different from the original;
this is merely for the purpose of presenting the work in the context of padding oracles.
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of Canvel et al. assumes the multi-session setting, in which the same plaintext is sent
in the same position, in multiple sessions.
Countermeasures
The attack of Canvel et al. was perceived as serious enough that the OpenSSL code
for TLS was updated from releases 0.9.6i and 0.9.7a in an attempt to ensure that the
processing time for TLS messages is essentially the same, whether or not the padding
is correct, and to send the same encrypted error message, bad record mac, in both
cases. Eventually, the same countermeasures appeared in the specification for TLS 1.1
[32], with the requirement that they must be implemented.
Other Issues to Consider
Recall our description of CBC-mode decryption for TLS in Section 3.4.7, in which we
highlighted that much more sophisticated processing is required than that discussed in
the section. Here, we expand on that issue.
The receiver of a (D)TLS record should also check that the ciphertext size is a
multiple of the block size and is large enough to contain at least a zero-length record,
a MAC tag of the required size, and at least one byte of padding to avoid underflow
conditions that could lead to denial of service or other severe attacks. After decryption,
the receiver should check that the format of the padding is one of the possible patterns
when removing it, otherwise attacks are possible [68] (SSL allows a loose padding
format, while no specific padding checks are enforced during decryption in TLS 1.0,
so both are potentially vulnerable to the attacks in [68]). Typically this is done by
examining the last byte of the plaintext, treating it as a padding length byte padlen,
and using this to dictate how many additional bytes of padding should be removed. But
care is needed here, since blindly removing bytes could result in an underflow condition:
there needs to be sufficient bytes in the plaintext to remove a total of padlen+1 bytes
and leave enough bytes for at least a zero-length record and a MAC tag.
If all this succeeds, then the MAC can be recomputed and compared to the MAC tag
in the plaintext. If the padding fails to be correctly formatted, then implementations
should continue to perform a MAC check anyway, to avoid providing the timing side-
channel of the type exploited by the attack of Canvel et al. But since the padding
format is incorrect in this case, it’s not immediately clear where the padding ends and
the MAC tag is located: in effect, the plaintext is now unparseable. The solution
recommended in TLS 1.1 and 1.2 is to assume zero-length padding, interpret the last t
bytes of the plaintext as a MAC tag, interpret the remainder as the record R and run
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MAC verification on SQN || HDR || R.
3.10 The BEAST Attack
The so-called BEAST attack [35] is a blockwise-adaptive chosen-plaintext attack
(BACPA) that can be mounted against SSL and TLS 1.0. This attack exploits the use
of chained initialisation vectors (IVs) for CBC-mode and has its roots in [88, 68, 14, 15].
The BEAST attack achieved full plaintext recovery against SSL and TLS 1.0, but
only in scenarios where an attacker can gain access to a chosen plaintext capability,
perhaps by inducing the user to first download malicious JavaScript code into his
browser. It is worth noting that the attack presented in [35] was constrained to the web
setting, i.e. where TLS communications take place between a browser and a web server.
In [35], it is assumed that the attacker has network eavesdropping, chosen-boundary
and blockwise privileges. The chosen-boundary privilege allows the attacker to control
block boundaries by prepending variable length sequences of bytes to a record, while
the blockwise privilege allows him to prepend plaintext blocks to ongoing requests
[35, 68, 15], i.e. the attacker can insert his block as the first block for encryption. The
network eavesdropping privilege provides the attacker with access to OBA, an oracle
that returns TRUE when two ciphertext blocks match and FALSE otherwise. The reader
will find that our description of the attack and the symbols we use slightly differ from
[68, 14, 15]. Our goal is to give the reader a clear description of the attack that could be
easily implemented. We first describe the attack model, list a number of assumptions
and discuss how to implement the three privileges described above. We then describe
the steps that the attack takes to recover an unknown message, one byte at a time.
The victim, in this case a user with a web browser, is somehow induced to visit a
web site that hosts the attacker’s malicious code (for example, a malicious JavaScript)
which gets downloaded to his browser. By way of example, the attacker can try to inject
an iframe tag in a website that the victim normally visits or simply send the victim
an email with an embedded link pointing to the malicious web site. For simplicity, we
refer to the malicious code as the web agent (WA). When executed, the web agent sends
an HTTPS request to a web server (for example, “www.paypal.com”). The attacker’s
goal is to recover all or part of the TLS-protected message in the victim’s HTTPS
request to the web server. Web cookies [17], contained in web requests, make a good
target for attackers to try to recover. The web agent HTTPS request would trigger the
establishment of a TLS (or SSL) connection, in case one does not already exist. We
assume that CBC-mode encryption is used.
Let us take the example in which the attacker is trying to recover an l-byte cookie.
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We assume that the attacker knows l and knows the exact position of the cookie in
the web request. For the attack to work, continuous communication between the web
agent and a network eavesdropping agent (NA) is required. The network eavesdropping
agent has access to the ciphertext blocks only and implements the blockwise-adaptive
oracle, OBA. In addition, it is important that the characters prepended by the attacker
do not cause the server to abandon the session. The web agent must also be able to
bypass the browser’s same-origin policy (SOP)20, a browser-based security mechanism
that controls which messages one origin (web site) can send to another through the
browser. Clearly, a good number of prerequisites must be satisfied for the attack to
work.
In practice, the original web request can be sent over multiple records; for simplicity,
we assume that the cookie is contained in one TLS plaintext record. The attacker tries
to recover the cookie one byte at a time. Recall that the attacker can prepend a
sequence of characters of his choice to the request, through the web agent, making
use of the chosen-boundary privilege, always positioning the targeted unknown byte at
the end of a block in which all other bytes are already known. The exact number of
bytes to prepend, m, is adjusted by the web agent during the attack. Let us assume
that the current plaintext record, which contains the attacker’s prepended bytes, is
P . P is made of blocks P1P2 . . . Pn, where n is the total number of blocks including
padding and MAC. Applying CBC-mode encryption on P generates the corresponding
ciphertext blocks, C1C2 . . . Cn.
Let us now describe how to implement the actual attack that recovers the cookie (or
any other unknown message). Once the web agent is successfully downloaded, executed
and able to communicate with the network eavesdropping agent, the attack proceeds
in two iterative steps to recover one byte of plaintext at a time:
Step 1: The web agent sends a web request that positions the current unknown byte
at the end of Pj , that is at position Pj [b − 1]. It does this by prepending the correct
number of bytes, m, to the web request (implementing the chosen-boundary privilege).
In this case, all the bytes in Pj , except Pj [b− 1], are known to the web agent. The web
agent submits P to the web browser which encrypts it to obtain C.
Step 2: Starting with i = 0, the attacker computes:
P ∗i = C
′
n ⊕ Cj−1 ⊕ (Pj [0], ..., Pj [b− 2], i), (3.9)
where 0 ≤ i ≤ 255, C ′n is the last block in the previous record, C
′
, and Cj−1 is the
20http://www.w3.org/Security/wiki/Same_Origin_Policy
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ciphertext block preceding Cj . Recall that all the plaintext bytes of Pj , except Pj [b−1],
are known to the attacker. The attacker prepends P ∗i to the request, i.e. the attacker
positions P ∗i as the first block in the record for encryption. In SSL and TLS 1.0, the
last block of the previous ciphertext record, C
′
n, is used as the IV when processing the
current record; the ciphertext block C∗i is calculated as follows:
C∗i = EKe(C
′
n ⊕ P ∗i )
= EKe(C
′
n ⊕ C
′
n ⊕ Cj−1 ⊕ (Pj [0], ..., Pj [b− 2], i))
= EKe(Cj−1 ⊕ (Pj [0], ..., Pj [b− 2], i)).
(3.10)
C∗i and Cj are then submitted to OBA, which is implemented by the eavesdropping
agent. The network eavesdropping and the web agent continuously communicate so
that i is incremented as needed. If OBA returns TRUE, i.e. C∗i = Cj , then the attacker
concludes that i = Pj [b − 1] as per equation (3.10). Otherwise, the attacker (the web
agent in this case) increments i, computes another C∗i and queries OBA. The attack
takes on average 128 and at most 256 queries to OBA to recover a byte. Once Pj [b−1] is
recovered, the attacker then targets the next plaintext byte in the cookie by performing
step 1 and step 2 accordingly, until the whole cookie is recovered.
3.10.1 Countermeasures
Despite its strong requirements (the three privileges explained earlier and bypassing the
SOP restriction), the BEAST attack attracted significant industry and media attention
in 2011. The author of [15] suggested a number of countermeasures to defeat BACPA,
well before the BEAST attack was released:
• Upgrade to TLS 1.1 (or TLS 1.2) in which explicit IV s are used.
• Keep using TLS 1.0, but introduce a single dummy first plaintext block in every
TLS record. This dummy block can be for example an all-zero string.
• Keep using TLS 1.0, but send an empty message that has no data, but that would
still result in adding only padding and MAC, i.e. the CBC-encrypted part of such
a record will consist just of a MAC and padding.
The second and third options can be thought of as hacks to implementations of
TLS 1.0 (and SSL). OpenSSL implemented the third option since version 0.9.6d, where
a record with an empty plaintext fragment is prepended before sending the actual
payload. The countermeasure was then switched off due to incompatibility with other
implementations, mainly Microsoft Internet Explorer21.
21http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt
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Some implementations, such as NSS opted for another hack to TLS 1.0, which relies
on splitting non-empty application data records into two; the first record has only the
first byte of plaintext, and the second has the rest.
Prioritising the RC4 algorithm over CBC-mode encryption was also proposed as
another countermeasure. However, in 2013, the authors of [4] demonstrated that the
TLS implementation of RC4 is vulnerable to other serious attacks, which we describe
in the next section.
3.11 Other Attacks Against TLS
In this section, we give a short overview of recently published attacks against TLS.
3.11.1 Distinguishing Attack Against TLS with Short MACs
The authors of [74] described a distinguishing attack against the MEE-TLS-CBC con-
struction. Their attack exploits the use of short MACs in TLS as standardised in RFC
6066 [2] and TLS’s support for variable length padding. The outline of their attack
is that if the size of the MAC is smaller than the size of the cipher block, and the
plaintext message is small enough, then a distinguishing attack against TLS, with the
MEE-TLS-CBC construction, can be mounted. The authors of [74] described how to
distinguish whether an encrypted message contains for example YES or NO by modifying
a few bits in the original ciphertext, C. The response (or lack of response) from the
receiver of the TLS record helps the attacker identify whether the original message was
YES or NO. The authors of [74] argue that the attack can be mounted in practice against
TLS; they refer to the use of 80-bit truncated MACs in extensions to TLS 1.2, defined
in RFC 6066 [2].
Countermeasures
The attack was considered to be more theoretical since no short MAC algorithms were
supported in implementations of TLS. In addition, the work in [74] was not extended
to a plaintext recovery attack. The recommended countermeasure would be not to use
truncated MACs with the MEE-TLS-CBC construction.
3.11.2 The CRIME Attack
Recall that in Section 3.4.3, we described how TLS supports optional compression.
The so-called CRIME attack was published in 2012 by the same authors of the BEAST
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attack [35]. The attack exploits the use of the DEFLATE compression method, imple-
mented by the TLS Record Protocol and negotiated during the Handshake Protocol, in
combination with a chosen plaintext capability to mount a plaintext recovery attack.
The attack exploits side-channel information in the form of message size that is leaked
when crafting web requests using a malicious web agent such as a JavaScript. All ver-
sions of TLS (and SSL) were vulnerable to the CRIME attack, regardless of their mode
of operation.
Countermeasures
The workaround that was suggested and eventually deployed by most TLS implemen-
tations was to disable the use of TLS compression, i.e. implementations of TLS must
make sure that the use of compression is not offered by the client in the Handshake
Protocol’s ClientHello message or is ignored by the server in case it was offered.
3.11.3 The BREACH Attack
The so-called BREACH attack [41] confirms the statement we made in the introduction
chapter of the thesis that the interaction of secure network protocols with their upper
and lower-layers plays a critical part in defining the system’s overall security. Although
implementations of TLS disabled the use of compression after the CRIME attack, as
discussed earlier, the authors of the BREACH attack demonstrated how to exploit
HTTP-level compression to mount a chosen plaintext attack that can recover TLS-
protected plaintext. The BREACH attack relies on exploiting side channel information
leaked in HTTP responses rather than requests. As expected, the attack applies to all
versions of TLS with all modes of operation.
Countermeasures
A number of countermeasures are suggested in [41]. Examples of countermeasures listed
in [41] include disabling HTTP compression, length hiding and limiting the number of
cookie requests.
3.11.4 RC4 Attack
The authors of [4] present ciphertext-only plaintext recovery attacks against TLS when
RC4 is selected for encryption. The authors of [4] identified new biases in the RC4
key stream output. In the multi-session setting, these biases can be used to recover
plaintext with varying probability of success, depending on the position of the byte to
recover and the amount of ciphertext captured. The authors of [4] also demonstrate
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how to exploit biases in consecutive pairs of bytes in the RC4 keystream that were first
reported by Fluhrer and McGrew [37].
Countermeasures
A number of countermeasures have been proposed in [4]. It is worth noting that the
attacks in [4] require large amounts of ciphertext and hence their practical relevance
could be questioned. Despite this, countermeasures were implemented in practice to
defeat the attacks. For example, Opera has implemented a cookie limiting counter-
measure22, while Microsoft has modified their code so that RC4 is no longer enabled
by default for TLS in Windows 8.1 Preview23.
3.12 Attacks Against DTLS
DTLS has not been put under as much scrutiny as TLS. This is largely attributable to
the protocol’s recent introduction and its limited, but growing, number of implemen-
tations, when compared to TLS. Most of the identified security issues with DTLS were
associated with the protocol’s implementation, with most of these issues resulting in a
form of denial of service24,25.
In addition to our work presented in Chapters 4 and 5, we have identified a number
of security issues in one of Cisco Systems’ DTLS implementations, which was based
on OpenSSL. We successfully conducted denial of service and cipher suite downgrade
attacks against the ASA line of products, in which DTLS is used to provide a re-
mote access VPN. In fact, during this work we identified a critical OpenSSL software
vulnerability that was independently discovered by another researcher and reported as
CVE-2010-418026. We communicated, privately, our findings to the vendor and worked
with them to implement and test appropriate fixes.
We argue that our attacks against DTLS, which we present in later chapters, are by
far the most involved and high-impact work carried out against the DTLS protocol, to
date. In fact, performing a basic Internet web search for “DTLS vulnerability” reveals
links mostly pointing to our work against DTLS.
22http://my.opera.com/securitygroup/blog/2013/03/20/on-the-precariousness-of-rc4
23http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn303404.aspx
24http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2009-1386
25http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2007-4995
26http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2011-4108
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3.13 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we provided background information about the TLS and DTLS pro-
tocols. We discussed the structure of TLS and DTLS, their modes of operation, and
explained the similarities and differences between TLS and DTLS. The TLS and DTLS
protocols are flexible by design; new protocol extensions can be easily introduced, some-
times in an ad hoc fashion. Although this flexibility is an advantage, it could poten-
tially introduce an amount of confusion to implementor who need to be familiar with
the different versions of (D)TLS (and SSL 3.0), and their various extensions in order
to implement and maintain the protocols properly, taking into consideration that all
versions of (D)TLS (and SSL 3.0) are already in deployment.
We also covered a number of attacks against TLS that are relevant to the work
we present in the next two chapters. The attacks we described in this chapter demon-
strate the fact that not addressing what are considered at one point of time theoretical
weaknesses could eventually lead to attacks that are practical and serious against a
protocol, requiring ad hoc industry reaction (the BEAST attack being an example).
As security researchers, we believe that “attacks only get better”. Despite the number
of high-profile attacks against the TLS MAC-then-Encode-then-Encrypt construction,
and recently against RC4, we are yet to see a significant uptake of TLS 1.2 and authen-
ticated encryption algorithms. Authenticated encryption algorithms deliver the two
functions simultaneously: data encryption and authentication.
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Attacks Against DTLS
4.1 Introduction
Given the fact that the DTLS specification is based on that of TLS, implementations
of DTLS should be immune to padding oracle attacks and their variants. In this
chapter we show that this is not the case for either the OpenSSL or the GnuTLS
implementations of DTLS 1.0. More specifically, this was not the case in OpenSSL
versions 1.0.0e or 0.9.8r and earlier, and GnutLTS version 3.0.10 and earlier, the latest
versions of these libraries at the time we carried out our research. DTLS 1.2 [83] was
an RFC draft at the time when we carried out our work and was not implemented by
OpenSSL or GnuTLS.
In this chapter, we first focus on OpenSSL, showing that there is a small timing
difference in OpenSSL’s processing of DTLS packets having valid and invalid padding
fields: just like old versions of OpenSSL’s implementation of TLS, if the padding is
invalid, then the MAC is not checked, while if the padding is valid, the MAC check is
done. This results in a timing difference for processing of packets with valid and invalid
padding that is on the order of a few tens of microseconds (µs) on a modern processor.
However, one major difference between TLS and DTLS, and which we highlighted
in Chapter 3, is that DTLS provides no error messages when decryption encounters an
error. The detection of these error messages is essential to the attacks of Canvel et al.
[25] on TLS. Thus it would appear that this timing difference cannot be used to build
a padding oracle. This may explain why the OpenSSL code for DTLS had not been
patched to remove the known timing difference.
By bringing new techniques into play, we show that the lack of DTLS error messages
is not a serious impediment to the attack – we are able to exploit the DTLS extension
for Heartbeat messages [93] to ensure that the timing difference shows up in the timing
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of Heartbeat response messages rather than error messages. In fact, any upper layer
protocol which has messages that also provoke a response message with a predictable
delay can be used in place of Heartbeat messages in our attack. We demonstrate this
in our attack against GnuTLS where we use other types of message than Heartbeats.
We also introduce new techniques which amplify the identified timing difference. In
TLS, this is easily done by using long messages, since TLS supports messages up to
roughly 214 bytes in size. This approach was used by Canvel et al. [25]. But this is not
possible in DTLS, since the maximum message size is limited by the path maximum
transmission unit (PMTU). To overcome this, we build trains of DTLS packets which all
either have valid or invalid padding and hence which all contribute to an accumulated
timing difference in the same way. These trains need to be carefully injected into the
network – fast enough so as to ensure each packet arrives before the processing of the
previous one has completed, but not so fast that DTLS’s buffer for incoming packets
gets swamped. Thus the success of the attack depends on delicate, µs-level timing of
network events.
Another major difference we highlighted in Chapter 3 in between TLS and DTLS
is that, in TLS, any error arising during cryptographic processing is treated as fatal,
meaning that the TLS connection is discarded in the event of any error. TLS can afford
to do this because it is built on top of a reliable transport protocol, TCP. DTLS, on
the other hand, cannot afford to do so, since its underlying transport protocol is UDP.
This means that DTLS does not discard connections in the event of errors, but merely
discards error-generating packets. The reader may refer to Section 3.5 for a detailed de-
scription of the differences between TLS and DTLS. So, in contrast to previous attacks
on TLS, our attack on OpenSSL’s DTLS implementation can efficiently recover as much
plaintext as the adversary desires, without having to wait for the re-establishment of
DTLS connections. This also underlies the above mentioned amplification technique.
Our attack becomes even more efficient in the situation where DTLS’s anti-replay fea-
ture is disabled, which is an option within the DTLS specification.
We then switch our focus to the GnuTLS implementation, and show that, even
though it properly implements the countermeasures in TLS 1.1, it is still vulnerable
to a partial plaintext recovery attack in its default configuration. We show that a
small timing channel is introduced into the decryption process because a plaintext-
dependent sanity check is carried out at an early stage during decryption, followed
later by assigning a zero value to the plaintext message length in the case when this
sanity check fails. This introduces a detectable timing difference that, when combined
with our new techniques, allows 4 or 5 bits of plaintext to be recovered per ciphertext
block. In principal, the attack could also be applied to the GnuTLS implementation of
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TLS (but then the timing difference would be hard to amplify).
Despite the availability of easy fixes, we argue that the attacks are still interesting
and provide valuable lessons for protocol designers and implementors:
• To our knowledge, our attacks are the first of their kind against any implementa-
tions of DTLS. Our OpenSSL attack is also the first plaintext-recovering attack
against a protocol implemented by OpenSSL since the work of Canvel et al. [25].
• Our attacks exploit the fact that DTLS has to be error-tolerant, but we had to
find novel means to circumvent the resulting lack of error messages.
• The DTLS specification (for versions 1.0 and 1.2) is rather brief and refers to
the TLS specification for many details, particularly those relating to how packets
are encrypted and decrypted. This then requires an implementor to cross-refer
to other standards during implementation, which may lead to software that does
not implement the known countermeasures.
• Our attack on the GnuTLS implementation of DTLS and TLS shows that, even
if all the known countermeasures are carefully implemented, DTLS and TLS
implementations may still be vulnerable to attack via subtle timing side channels.
• Our attack on GnuTLS also points the way forward to the more general attacks
in the next chapter.
We expand on these themes later in the chapter. Section 4.2 presents our basic
attack against the OpenSSL implementation of DTLS. Section 4.3 discusses a number
of implementation issues for this attack and discusses refinements of it. Section 4.4
presents our experimental results demonstrating efficient and reliable recovery of full
DTLS plaintexts in the OpenSSL case. Section 4.5 briefly discusses how similar attacks
can recover partial plaintexts in the GnuTLS case. Section 4.7 discusses the wider
implications of our work for secure network protocol design.
4.2 Building a Padding Oracle for OpenSSL
4.2.1 Using the Heartbeat Extension
Although we exploit Heartbeat messages in our attack against OpenSSL, other type of
messages could also be used. The only constraint is that they should always predictably
generate responses that can be detected by the adversary. We demonstrate this in our
attack against GnuTLS.
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4.2.2 Assumptions on the Adversary
The objective of the attack is to recover DTLS-protected plaintext. We assume that
the adversary:
• Has access to the ciphertext. This can be achieved by the adversary gaining
access to a network device like a switch or a router and making copies of the
ciphertext exchanged by the endpoints of a DTLS connection.
• Can send arbitrary DTLS messages to the original recipient. This can be achieved
by injecting packets into the network while spoofing the IP and UDP headers.
• Is aware of the encryption algorithm’s block size, b. The adversary can infer
this by either monitoring the connection’s handshake messages, or the size of the
encrypted messages over time.
• Can detect and record a number of Heartbeat request packets.
The above assumptions apply when anti-replay is deactivated. We note that anti-
replay is enabled by default for both the OpenSSL and GnuTLS implementations of
DTLS, and we had to modify the server source code to disable it in our experiments.
When anti-replay is activated, then we also need to assume that the adversary can
stop messages of his choice from reaching their final destination. For example, the
adversary may achieve this by exploiting his control over a router or a firewall in the
data path. In presenting our attack below, we assume that anti-replay is disabled, i.e.
we assume that the targeted system does not perform sequence number checking for
incoming DTLS messages. We explain how to modify the attack to handle the case
where anti-replay is enabled in Section 4.3.6.
4.2.3 Building a Padding Oracle for the OpenSSL Implementation of
DTLS
In this section, we explain how to construct a padding oracle for the OpenSSL im-
plementation of DTLS. This oracle can then be used in the standard way to decrypt
arbitrary ciphertext blocks and hence arbitrary amounts of plaintext data, as described
in Section 3.9 of Chapter 3. The key observation we use is that, in the OpenSSL im-
plementation of DTLS (the latest the versions available at the time we carried out
our research), if the padding underlying a ciphertext is valid, then the MAC on the
message is checked, whereas if the padding is invalid, then the MAC is not checked
and the ciphertext is rejected immediately. This contravenes the requirement for equal
processing times in TLS 1.1 that is inherited by reference in the DTLS specification.
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As a consequence of this deviation, we would expect the processing time for a DTLS
packet with invalid padding to be slightly less than that of a DTLS packet with valid
padding. The actual time difference depends on a number of factors including the al-
gorithms used, the clock-speed of the target system, the size of the DTLS packet, other
processes running on the target system, and the network conditions. For example, we
measured the MAC verification time on our testing machine running OpenSSL with
HMAC-SHA-1 and found it to be in in the order of tens of µs – see Figure 4.1.
So far, this is identical to the timing side channel exploited in [25]. However, DTLS
does not have any error messages, so we cannot use existing methods to observe the
difference in processing times. This may explain why the implementors of DTLS in
OpenSSL chose not to implement the required countermeasures. Instead, we introduce
an alternative means of observing the difference, by exploiting Heartbeat messages.
The basic idea is quite simple. Suppose we send to the target system a packet train
consisting of a DTLS packet PC carrying the ciphertext C (whose padding validity we
wish to test) immediately followed by a Heartbeat request message. Then this train
will result in a detectable Heartbeat response message being sent back on the network,
and, assuming orderly processing on the target system, the total amount of time needed
to process PC and to produce the Heartbeat response message will reflect whether
or not MAC verification was carried out when processing C. From an adversary’s
perspective, only send and receive times of packets can be captured, so the adversary
will measure the time difference between sending the initial packet train and receiving
the Heartbeat response packet, which we refer to as the round trip time (RTT). If this
time difference is larger than some threshold T , the adversary will assume the padding
was valid (and so the MAC verification was carried out), while if it is lower than this
threshold, the adversary will assume the padding was invalid. The threshold can be set
by doing some initial system profiling to measure the typical timing difference between
packets carrying ciphertexts having valid and invalid padding. Notice also that DTLS
Heartbeat packets are not essential to building the oracle: any upper layer protocol
having suitably predictable and detectable response messages can be used.
In reality, the timing of packets is influenced by many factors beyond just DTLS’s
cryptographic processing. Moreover, as we noted above, the timing difference will be
rather small for normal-sized packets. So the DTLS padding oracle as presented would
be much too error-prone. To enhance the accuracy of the oracle, the adversary can:
• Choose a specific, favourable DTLS packet payload length, l.
• Send n copies of packet PC in a train followed by a Heartbeat request instead
of just one copy of PC . Here, the idea is that each copy of PC will be processed
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Algorithm 3: Padding Oracle for OpenSSL implementation of DTLS
Data: C
Result: VALID or INVALID
for q = 1 to m do
RTTq = Timer(C);
RTT=Mean(RTT1, RTT2, ..., RTTm);
if RTT ≥ T then
return VALID;
else
return INVALID;
Timer(C)
Set Ts = current time;
Send n copies of PC , a DTLS packet containing C, to the targeted system;
Send a Heartbeat request packet to the targeted system;
Set Te = time when Heartbeat response packet is seen;
return (Te − Ts)
in the same way, so the larger the accumulated time difference will become and
the easier it will become to distinguish between valid and invalid padding. This
exploits the fact that DTLS does not tear-down DTLS connections in the event of
errors (recall that when the padding oracle is used in a plaintext recovery attack,
all the ciphertexts sent in the attack will be invalid in some way – they will either
have invalid padding or invalid MACs). It also assumes that all the packets in the
train can be made to arrive at the target system in such a way that no adverse
delays are introduced during the processing of these packets.
• Send m packet trains (each containing n copies of PC), and use a suitable statis-
tical model to analyse the observed RTTs.
Algorithm 3 describes our basic DTLS padding oracle for a ciphertext C. In the
algorithm, RTTq denotes the response time in the q-th trial, T denotes the threshold
for deciding on whether C has valid or invalid padding, and simple averaging is used
to process the gathered RTTs. Other statistical measures could be used in place of
averaging here, an idea that we discuss in more detail in the next section. There,
we also explore the many practical issues that arise in building this padding oracle,
addressing issues such as packet timing, system profiling, parameter selection to tune
the attack, and dealing with anti-replay.
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4.3 Practical Considerations
In this section, we discuss a number of practical issues that arise in implementing our
attack. All of our remarks are specific to the OpenSSL implementation of DTLS.
4.3.1 Timing and OpenSSL Cryptographic Operations
Our attack relies on detecting the time difference introduced by MAC verification that is
performed for packets having valid padding but not for packets having invalid padding.
Failure to detect this time difference would result in the padding oracle providing an
incorrect answer. Figure 4.1 shows, for a variety of DTLS payload sizes, the time taken
by OpenSSL in our set-up to perform decryption with 3DES or AES-256 alongside the
time taken for MAC verification using HMAC-SHA-1. The hardware specifications of
our set-up are listed in Section 4.4. We note the following features evident from this
figure:
• In general, decryption is slower than MAC verification, especially in the case of
3DES.
• The MAC processing time for a single packet is on the order of a few tens of µs,
which is well below that reported in [25] and below the level of jitter expected in
a typical network.
• 3DES is much slower than AES-256: for a packet size of 1456 bytes, the factor
is about 4. For reasons that will be explained below, using a slower decryption
algorithm increases the effectiveness of the attack. Hence the attack parameters
(l,m, n) may need to be tuned depending on which block cipher is in use.
• With AES-256, the processing time rapidly drops from about 50 µs to about 20
µs when the DTLS payload size reaches 512 bytes. We do not know the exact
reason for this behaviour, but the adversary also needs to be aware of it when
selecting attack parameters. One possible explanation is that a switch to a more
efficient AES implementation is made once the payload is sufficiently large.
Although we have targeted HMAC-SHA-1 in our attack, the fundamentals of the
attack still apply when other MAC algorithms are in use. At the time of carrying out
this work, OpenSSL only supports HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-SHA-1. More detail about
how packets are processed and the source of the timing difference is provided in the
next section.
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Figure 4.1: Timing of cryptographic operations for DTLS payloads of sizes between 64
and 1456 bytes. With AES-256, the processing time rapidly drops from about 50 µs to
about 20 µs when the DTLS payload size reaches 512 bytes. One possible explanation
for this behaviour is that a switch to a more efficient AES implementation is made once
the payload is sufficiently large.
4.3.2 Timing and Packet Processing
Let us look in detail at how a receiver processes a packet, with a view to building a
simple model of how RTTs are affected by the attack parameters. To this end, Figure
4.2 shows a simplified time-line of how packet i, having valid padding, is processed by
the receiver.
In the time-line we have:
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Decryption and Padding Check MAC Check OSt
ti,0 ti,1 ti,2 ti,3
Figure 4.2: Packet processing time-line – valid padding: ti,0 is the time at which packet
i arrives in the OpenSSL buffer, ti,1 is the time at which the decryption and padding
check are completed for packet i, ti,2 is the time at which the MAC check is completed
for packet i, ti,3 is the time at which OpenSSL is ready to process the next DTLS
packet, packet i+ 1, and OSt is any additional time spent by the operating system in
relation to the processing of the packet (we assume this to be a constant, independent
of i).
Decryption and Padding Check OSt
ti,0 ti,1 ti,3
Figure 4.3: Packet processing time-line – invalid padding. In the case of a packet with
invalid padding, the MAC verification is not performed and hence we have ti,2 = ti,1.
• ti,0: The time at which packet i arrives in the OpenSSL buffer. The buffer holds
DTLS packets waiting to be processed.
• ti,1: The time at which the decryption and padding check are completed for
packet i.
• ti,2: The time at which the MAC check is completed for packet i.
• ti,3: The time at which OpenSSL is ready to process the next DTLS packet,
packet i+ 1.
• OSt: Any additional time spent by the operating system in relation to the pro-
cessing of the packet. We assume this to be a constant, independent of i.
In the case of a packet with invalid padding, the MAC verification is not performed
and hence we have ti,2 = ti,1. Figure 4.3 is the analogue of Figure 4.2 for the case of
invalid padding, and illustrates that, for a fixed DTLS packet length, the time taken to
process a packet with invalid padding is less than that taken to process a packet with
valid padding.
In Section 4.2, we defined RTT to be the time taken between sending the first
packet in a train to receiving a Heartbeat response packet. Next, we analyse the
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Figure 4.4: Time-line for a train with n = 2 (not to scale).
different contributions to RTT . As an example, the time-line in Figure 4.4 shows a
train made of two identical data packets (so n = 2), both having valid padding, followed
by a Heartbeat request packet, which then provokes a Heartbeat response packet. In
Figure 4.4 we have:
• Ts: The time at which the adversary sends the first DTLS packet, packet 1.
• Tf : The time at which the Heartbeat response packet is sent by the receiver
• Te: The time at which the Heartbeat response packet is received by the adversary.
• t1,0 − Ts: The time it takes for packet 1 to reach the receiver.
• Te−Tf : The time it takes for the Heartbeat response packet to reach the adversary
after being sent by the targeted system.
• Te − Ts: The RTT for the packet train.
Figure 4.4 shows the second data packet, packet 2, arriving after the completion
of processing of packet 1, i.e. so that t2,0 > t1,3. The same applies to the Heartbeat
request packet arriving after the completion of processing of packet 2. In this situation,
the receiver enters a wait state until the next packet arrives and the arrival time of
a packet and its processing start time are the same. In general, this situation results
in some or all of the timing difference arising because of the MAC verification being
“absorbed” into the wait state of the receiver, and hence is sub-optimal in terms of
detecting the time difference.
In the opposite situation, where packet 2 arrives before processing of packet 1 is
complete, packets are buffered. Then packet 2 is immediately available for processing
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Figure 4.5: Time-line for packet train with valid padding and packet buffering.
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Figure 4.6: Time-line for packet train with invalid padding and packet buffering.
at the receiver as soon as processing of packet 1 is complete, and none of the MAC
verification time is absorbed. The buffer is managed by OpenSSL and its maximum
size is 100 DTLS packets. Figures 4.5 and 4.6 illustrate this situation for packet trains
having valid and invalid padding, respectively, with the white boxes representing the
amount of time spent by packets in the buffer. It is evident from these figures how
the time arising from MAC verification (in the case of valid padding) accumulates
packet-by-packet to create an amplified time difference in the RTT for the train.
The upshot of this analysis is that, from the adversary’s perspective, it is desirable
to select the attack parameters so that the receiver’s buffer always contains some (but
not too many) packets. In this way, the receiver is never waiting for a packet to arrive
and the MAC processing time accumulates across the whole packet train.
We have experimentally verified the essential basic correctness of this model for
packet processing in the following way. Let RTT1 denote the RTT for a train that uses
packets having valid padding (and for which the MAC is verified), and let RTT2 denote
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Figure 4.7: Value of δ, the difference in RTTs for valid and invalid padding, against
artificial delay. The figure confirms that injecting artificial delays in between packets
from the train as they leave the adversary’s machine, results in the value of δ steadily
decreasing and eventually reaching zero as the size of the artificial delay increases.
the RTT for a train that uses packets having invalid padding. Let δ denote the time
difference between the two RTTs, so that:
δ = RTT1 −RTT2
Then, if we artificially inject delays in between packets from the train as they leave
the adversary’s machine, we would expect to see the value of δ steadily decrease and
eventually reach zero as the size of the artificial delay increases. Figure 4.7 shows the
results of such an experiment which confirms this behaviour. Somewhat surprisingly.
This is because, as the artificial delay increases, more and more of the extra time
introduced into RTT, by MAC processing is absorbed in waiting for the next DTLS
packet in the train to arrive. Figure 4.7 also shows that adding small artificial delays
can actually increase the time difference δ, making this difference in RTTs easier for
the adversary to detect. We do not have an explanation for this effect.
4.3.3 System Profiling
System profiling refers to the process by which the adversary collects information about
the targeted system prior to carrying out an attack. This provides the adversary with
the expected values for the RTTs (for valid and invalid padding) under some conditions
such as system load, the DTLS payload length, l, and the number of packets in the
train, n. This profiling in turn allows the threshold value T for the attack to be set.
Given a captured ciphertext, it is easy to construct ciphertexts having any desired
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length l and having either invalid or valid padding, simply by manipulating the last 2
blocks of the captured ciphertext and prepending random blocks (or truncating it if a
shorter ciphertext is needed). Given such pairs of ciphertexts and a Heartbeat request
message, the adversary can then construct packet trains containing the required number
of packets n. These trains can then be repeatedly sent to the target system and the
RTTs measured, to obtain two empirical probability density functions (PDFs), one
for trains with validly padded packets and the other for trains with invalid padding.
From these PDFs, the threshold T can be set by, for example, calculating the mean of
each distribution and setting T to be the mid-point between the means. In practice,
we tend to obtain small numbers of extreme outliers in such profiling experiments,
and removing these before calculating the means by using a simple cut-off generally
improves the performance of the attack. More sophisticated statistical methods can of
course be employed, but we have found profiling followed by thresholding to be already
adequate for our attacks to be successful.
4.3.4 An Attack without System Profiling
System profiling is not even strictly necessary – for a given byte position i in the
target block, an adversary can simply measure the RTTs for a packet train (consisting
of n DTLS packets with the target ciphertext block being located at the end of each
packet, followed by a Heartbeat request packet), for each of the 256 possible byte values
in position i in the ciphertext block preceding the target ciphertext block. Then the
adversary can select as the correct byte value (i.e. the one giving valid padding) the one
that maximises the RTT across the 256 measured RTT values. Accuracy can be further
improved by repeating the trial for each byte m times, removing outliers, and using
the maximum of the average RTTs. In fact, we have observed in our experiments that
repeating the trial for each byte value m times, removing outliers, and then selecting
the byte value that maximises the minimum of the m measured RTTs for each byte
value gives substantially higher success probabilities for the attack. We will illustrate
this in Section 4.4 where we discuss our experimental results in more detail. This, then,
is the preferred version of our attack. Note that, strictly speaking, this version of the
attack does not build a padding oracle, but rather considers all possible 256 byte values
simultaneously.
Even more sophisticated statistical techniques, such as sequential estimation (as
in [25]) or likelihood estimation, can be used in place of averaging or selecting the
minimum when processing the results of the m trials per byte. However, these more
advanced approaches were not needed in order to successfully launch our attack. They
could be useful in further reducing the amount of data sent or the number of Heartbeat
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request messages consumed in an attack.
Finally, we note two further advantages of using an attack without profiling. Firstly,
the process of profiling itself will require Heartbeat request messages to be gathered.
Secondly, the attack environment may change over time during the attack itself, as
varying network or server loads are experienced, for example. The attack without
profiling described here automatically adjusts for such changes, at least if they do not
occur within the time taken to recover a single byte of plaintext.
In Section 4.4, we describe the results of our implementation of the attack, where
profiling was not conducted.
4.3.5 Measuring Success Under Budgetary Constraints
The attack is such that a byte is successfully decrypted only if all the preceding bytes
in the same block are successfully decrypted. Hence, under a reasonable independence
assumption, if the probability of successfully decrypting a byte is p, then the probability
of successfully decrypting a block of size b will be pb = p
b. For AES, b = 16, so for
successful decryption of a whole block with a reasonable probability, we need p to
be rather close to 1. For example, with p = 0.99 and b = 16 we have pb = 0.85.
The adversary can tune the attack parameters (l,m, n) so as to increase the success
probability p of the attack and can try to find the optimal combination that results in
the highest success probability. However, in practice, an adversary will have a limit on,
for example, the maximum number of bytes that he wishes to send in order to recover
a byte. As discussed below, when anti-replay is enabled, Heartbeat request packets
(or their equivalents) will become a precious resource. Since each train consumes one
such packet in this situation, it may be desirable to increase l, the packet size and
n, the number of packets per train, so as to maximise the amplification effect, whilst
minimising m, the number of trains sent per byte. However, as our later experimental
results will show, simply increasing l and n does not always help, especially in the case
of AES-256.
4.3.6 Attacks with Anti-Replay Enabled
Attacking DTLS becomes slightly more complex when anti-replay is enabled. Since
the OpenSSL implementation of DTLS first checks the sequence number against the
anti-replay window before doing any cryptographic processing, the adversary has to
take care that all packets sent in trains do not have sequence numbers that are marked
as having previously arrived. Fortunately, the anti-replay window is only updated if
the MAC on a packet is successfully verified, and all the packets used in the attack will
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fail the MAC verification (with the exception of the Heartbeat packets), so the window
is not updated as a consequence of these attack packets.
With anti-replay enabled, each Heartbeat request packet can be used only once,
since its sequence number will be marked in the window as having been seen once the
packet arrives. Moreover, the adversary has to ensure that the sequence number for
each Heartbeat request packet used does fall within (or to the right of) the current
anti-replay window, otherwise the Heartbeat request will be discarded and no response
generated.
Thus Heartbeat request packets become a precious resource in the situation where
anti-replay is enabled: the attack can only proceed as quickly as they become available.
Hence decryption in this setting may be rather slow and “opportunistic” – every time
a packet is seen on the wire by the adversary, a new packet train can be launched and
a byte value tested.
Given these issues, it is apparent that the adversary should try to use as few Heart-
beat request packets as possible, which means minimising m for a given target success
probability p. A further enhancement arises by building packet trains that test multi-
ple byte values simultaneously. For example, the adversary could build two sets of m
trains, each train containing 128n packets, with half of the possible byte values being
tested in each train n times each. This would represent the first step in a binary search
for the correct byte value, requiring only 8 steps and therefore 16m Heartbeat request
packets to extract a byte. The number of Heartbeat requests consumed could be halved
again with initial system profiling. In contrast, our basic attack would consume 256m
Heartbeat request packets for the same result. We have not tested this version of the
attack, but our experience indicates that it would work well whenever using long packet
trains does not degrade performance.
Finally, we recall that packets from any suitable application layer protocol could
be used in place of Heartbeat request packets, so long as the corresponding application
always sends a detectable response packet with a predictable response time. So the
success of our attack does not depend completely on the availability of Heartbeat
request packets in the case where anti-replay is enabled.
4.4 Implementation and Results for OpenSSL
4.4.1 Implementation
In our laboratory set-up, we have a client, the adversary and the targeted system all
connected to a 100Mbps Ethernet switch on the same VLAN. The targeted system was
a machine running a single core processor operating at a speed of 1.87 GHz and having
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2 GByte of RAM.
We ran version 1.0.0a of OpenSSL on the client and the server. We used the built-in
OpenSSL utilities for the client1 and the server2, s client and s server respectively.
s client implements a generic client which connects to a remote host using DTLS,
while s server implements a generic server which listens for connections on a given
UDP port using DTLS. We implemented the Heartbeat extension feature by installing
the appropriate OpenSSL patch3. For experimental convenience, we deactivated anti-
replay, by directly modifying the OpenSSL code, i.e modifying the default behaviour
of OpenSSL.
4.4.2 Results
The results shown in this section reflect our specific set-up. Of course, the values would
change as the set-up changes – for example, the timings are heavily dependent on the
clock-speed of the processor used on the target system. However, the fundamentals of
the attack would remain the same.
Experimentally observed s:
The figures we discuss hereafter show PDFs4 observed in our experiments for different
attack parameters and encryption algorithms. In all the figures, the x-axis represents
RTTs while the y-axis represents the probability of observing these RTTs. In all figures,
outliers have been removed. Each figure shows two PDFs, PDF1 (in red) and PDF2 (in
blue), that correspond to having valid and invalid padding in the packets in the trains,
respectively. We recall that l denotes the DTLS payload size, m denotes the number of
trials per byte, and n denotes the number of DTLS packets per trial. Figures 4.8 and
4.9 show PDFs for n equal to 10 and varying the value of l, for 3DES and AES-256
respectively. We note the following:
• It is generally easier to distinguish between the two PDFs in the case of 3DES
when compared to AES-256, shown in Figures 4.8 and 4.9 respectively.
• Generally, there is an increasing overlap between the two PDFs as the value of l,
the DTLS payload size, increases. This is more evident in the case of AES-256.
1http://www.openssl.org/docs/apps/s_client.html
2http://www.openssl.org/docs/apps/s_server.html
3http://sctp.fh-muenster.de/dtls-patches.html
4The PDF figures shown in this chapter and the next chapter are mostly smooth histograms, i.e.
PDFs that are based on a smooth kernel density estimate.
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• In the case of AES-256, increasing l makes the PDFs much harder to distinguish.
The reason for this is that the adversary spends more time preparing and sending
packets as the packet size increases, while the targeted system may already have
finished AES decryption and MAC verification and be waiting for the next packet.
Thus long packets tend to arrive “late” at the targeted system.
Figures 4.10 and 4.11 show the PDFs for l = 1024 and varying the value of n, for
3DES and AES respectively. We note the following:
• In the case of 3DES, increasing the value of n helps in making the two PDFs
more distinguishable. This is the case with AES-256 when small DTLS payloads
are used.
• With AES, increasing the value of n when using large DTLS payloads makes the
PDFs harder to distinguish. Figures 4.12 and 4.11 show this effect when AES-256
is used for l = 256 and l = 1024 respectively.
• By appropriately choosing the attack parameters, it is possible to obtain PDFs
that are very easy to distinguish. For example, the last graph in Figure 4.12 shows
the PDFs for AES-256 when l = 256 and n = 160, where the peaks are separated
by more than 500µs while the distributions are entirely contained within 50 µs
of the peaks.
Success Probability:
Table 4.1 shows the success probability, p, of decrypting a byte under different attack
parameters (l,m, n) when AES-256 is used. We recall that the success probability for
a block is then given by pb where b is the block length in bytes.
These tables were obtained using the preferred version of our attack described in
Section 4.3.4, where no system profiling is used, outliers are removed, and, for each
byte, we use the minimum RTT value from the m values available, and then select
the correct byte as being the one that gives the maximum amongst these values. Each
entry in the tables is calculated using 100 runs of the attack.
We can clearly see that the probability of success increases as the number of trials,
m, increases. Success probabilities p equal to 0.99 or above are easily achieved for
moderate values of l, m and n, making our preferred attack both efficient and highly
reliable for these parameter choices.
Table 4.2 shows analogous success probabilities for 3DES. Note however that in
these tables, we report figures for substantially larger values of l than we did for AES-
256. This is indicative of the fact that our attacks are still quite successful for 3DES
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Figure 4.8: 3DES – PDFs for n = 10 and varying l (packet size), with outliers removed.
In this figure we show two PDFs, PDF1 (in red) and PDF2 (in blue), that correspond
to having valid and invalid padding in the packets in the trains, respectively. In the
case of 3DES, we can easily distinguish between the two PDFs.
even with long payloads, giving an additional amplification opportunity. As further
confirmation of the practicality of our attacks, Table 4.3 provides success probabilities
for AES-256 for l = 192 and various values of m and n, with the probabilities being
based on 1000 runs of the attack. For example, already for m = 10 and n = 2, the
success probability is 0.996, meaning that an entire block of plaintext can be recovered
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Figure 4.9: AES-256 – PDFs for n = 10 and varying l (packet size), with outliers
removed. In this figure we show two PDFs, PDF1 (in red) and PDF2 (in blue), that
correspond to having valid and invalid padding in the packets in the trains, respectively.
In the case of AES-256, It is harder, but possible, to distinguish between the two PDFs,
when compared to 3DES shown in Figure 4.8.
correctly with probability 0.94, at a cost of (roughly) 7000 bytes of network traffic per
byte.
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Figure 4.10: 3DES – PDFs for l = 1024 (packet size) and varying n (train size).
4.5 Attacking the GnuTLS Implementation of DTLS
We have examined the GnuTLS implementation of DTLS, with the intention of finding
similar attacks. However, the code for decryption5 is such that there is no timing differ-
ence for processing of packets with valid and invalid padding: the MAC verification is
carried out in either case, and only then is the packet dropped. However, the code does
5See http://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=gnutls.git;a=blob;f=lib/gnutls_cipher.c
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Figure 4.11: AES-256 – PDFs for l = 1024 (packet size) and varying n (train size).
include the lines shown in Figure 4.13 that are executed after CBC-mode decryption.
From this code, specifically line 552, it can be seen that if a certain test involving
the padding length in pad and the ciphertext size fails, then pad_failed is set to
GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED, which is a negative integer, and the variable length
(which would otherwise be negative) is set to 0.
The rest of the packet processing then proceeds as normal (but with a padding check
not being performed and length being set to 0. The time taken to process a packet
127
Chapter 4. Attacks Against DTLS 4.5. Attacking the GnuTLS Implementation of DTLS
520 530 540 550 560 570 580
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
(a) n = 10
1350 1400 1450 1500 1550
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
(b) n = 40
4600 4700 4800 4900 5000 5100 5200
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
(c) n = 160
Figure 4.12: AES-256 – PDFs for l = 256 (packet size) and varying n (train size).
when the test fails and length is set to 0 should be less than that taken to process a
packet when the previous value for length is maintained. This is because, when length
gets set to 0, no padding check is performed, and the MAC verification performed in
lines 582 to 593 is done on a smaller amount of data (effectively, just the 13 bytes of
sequence number and header data). Each packet that fails the padding length test or the
padding check results in GnuTLS printing a “Discarded message due to invalid
decryption” error message to the screen. Unless the debugging level is changed, no
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n
l
128 160 192 224 256 288
1 0.00 0.15 0.41 0.32 0.00 0.01
2 0.02 0.24 0.32 0.40 0.00 0.01
5 0.05 0.08 0.49 0.02 0.00 0.01
10 0.04 0.12 0.36 0.00 0.01 0.01
20 0.01 0.13 0.34 0.05 0.02 0.01
50 0.10 0.33 0.38 0.03 0.00 0.01
m = 1
n
l
128 160 192 224 256 288
1 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.99
2 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.98
5 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98
10 0.98 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99
20 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99
50 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.95
m = 5
n
l
128 160 192 224 256 288
1 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.99
2 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99
5 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98
10 0.98 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99
20 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99
50 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.95
m = 10
Table 4.1: Success probabilities per byte for AES, for various attack parameters.
other error messages are produced.
Packets that pass the test have their length set in line 564, a positive value in this
case, before the padding is checked in lines 569 to 574. The length of the padding check
loop, which translates to the amount of time spent in checking the padding, depends on
the value of the padding length byte, which is set every time to R[b−1]⊕Dk(C∗t )[b−1],
where R is an arbitrary block and C∗t is the target ciphertext block. The value of
the padding length byte corresponds to pad in line 550. Clearly, more iterations of
the padding check loop (translating to more time) are executed as the value of pad
increases, introducing a timing side channel that could potentially be exploited in an
attack. In addition, the MAC verification performed in lines 582 to 593 is done on data
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n
l
128 256 512 1024 1280 1456
1 0.00 0.12 0.39 0.06 0.01 0.13
2 0.03 0.12 0.26 0.03 0.03 0.18
5 0.03 0.20 0.23 0.30 0.07 0.02
10 0.04 0.17 0.09 0.38 0.08 0.04
20 0.14 0.10 0.08 0.22 0.09 0.07
50 0.04 0.08 0.17 0.41 0.15 0.05
m = 1
n
l
128 256 512 1024 1280 1456
1 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.93
2 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.93 0.92
5 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.90 0.93 0.83
10 0.99 1.00 0.92 0.89 0.81 0.57
20 0.97 1.00 0.91 0.92 0.77 0.54
50 0.98 1.00 0.90 0.89 0.68 0.59
m = 5
n
l
128 256 512 1024 1280 1456
1 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.93
2 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.93 0.92
5 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.91 0.94 0.83
10 0.98 1.00 0.93 0.89 0.81 0.57
20 0.98 1.00 0.92 0.92 0.77 0.54
50 0.99 1.00 0.91 0.89 0.68 0.59
m = 10
Table 4.2: Success probabilities per byte for 3DES, for various attack parameters.
with length set in line 564. The time it takes to process packets, of the same length,
relies on the number of MAC compression function evaluations performed on the data,
after removing the padding bytes. Recall that the length of the data, length, is set
in line 564 and relies on the value of pad. Simplistically, the time taken by the MAC
verification decreases as the value of pad increases. Increasing pad has the opposite
effect on the time it takes to perform the padding check. It is worth noting that the
MAC verification takes much more time than the padding check so that the overall
effect is to decrease the decryption time as the value of pad increases. In summary, the
time it takes for the padding check and the MAC verification varies when processing
packets of the same size, even when they pass the test. This is reflected in the red
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n p
1 0.017
2 0.210
5 0.205
10 0.012
20 0.035
50 0.147
m = 1
n p
1 0.961
2 0.983
5 0.983
10 0.985
20 0.989
50 0.965
m = 5
n p
1 0.983
2 0.996
5 0.995
10 0.994
20 0.995
50 0.973
m = 10
Table 4.3: Success probabilities per byte for AES-256, for l = 192, based on 1000 trials.
PDF shown in Figure 4.14 (for packets that pass the test), where we see a flatter
distribution, when compared to the blue PDF in the same figure (for packets that fail
the test). In Chapter 5, we give more detail on the exact construction of HMACs and
describe similar timing side channels that we successfully exploited to build further
attacks against TLS and DTLS.
The timing difference that arises from packets that fail the test and packets that
pass the test allows a partial plaintext recovery attack against GnuTLS. We explain
this next. For ease of presentation, we assume that the MAC size is 32 bytes (as would
be produced by HMAC-SHA-256), but a similar attack would apply for 20-byte MACs.
Now the padding length field pad is obtained from the last byte of the decrypted
ciphertext (see line 550 in Figure 4.13). Consider an adversary who builds a DTLS
packet whose encrypted payload (excluding the IV) is 160 bytes in length and ends
with two blocks R,C∗t . Then, recalling our numbering convention for the bytes of a
block and the CBC-mode decryption procedure, the padding length test in the GnuTLS
code will fail precisely when:
R[b− 1]⊕Dk(C∗t )[b− 1] > 127.
Thus, if the targeted system responds quickly to the adversary’s packet, he can infer
that the most significant bit (MSB) of R[b− 1]⊕Dk(C∗t )[b− 1] is set to 1. From this,
the MSB of P ∗t [b−1], the rightmost byte of the plaintext corresponding to C∗t , is easily
deduced, using the standard approach involving the CBC-mode decryption equation,
C∗t−1 ⊕DK(C∗t ) = P ∗t . The attacker can then target the second-MSB of P ∗t [b − 1], by
setting R[b− 1] so that the MSB of R[b− 1]⊕Dk(C∗t )[b− 1] equals 0 and then using a
DTLS packet of length 96 bytes (again excluding the IV). This provides a test of the
form:
R[b− 1]⊕Dk(C∗t )[b− 1] > 63,
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550 pad = ciphertext.data[ciphertext.size - 1] + 1; /* pad */
551
552 if ((int) pad > (int) ciphertext.size - tag_size)
553 {
................
561 pad_failed = GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
562 }
563
564 length = ciphertext.size - tag_size - pad;
................
568 if (ver != GNUTLS_SSL3 && pad_failed == 0)
569 for (i = 2; i < pad; i++)
570 {
571 if (ciphertext.data[ciphertext.size - i] !=
572 ciphertext.data[ciphertext.size - 1])
573 pad_failed = GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
574 }
575
576 if (length < 0)
577 length = 0;
................
582 preamble_size =
583 make_preamble (UINT64DATA(*sequence), type,
584 length, ver, preamble);
585 _gnutls_auth_cipher_add_auth (&params->read.cipher_state, preamble,
preamble_size);
586 _gnutls_auth_cipher_add_auth (&params->read.cipher_state, ciphertext.data,
length);
................
593 ret = _gnutls_auth_cipher_tag(&params->read.cipher_state, tag, tag_size);
Figure 4.13: Snapshot from GnuTLS code (gnutls cipher.c), version 3.0.0.
with the side information that R[b−1]⊕Dk(C∗t )[b−1] ≤ 127, from which the adversary
learns the second-MSB of R[b− 1]⊕Dk(C∗t )[b− 1]. An alternative approach to this is
setting R[b− 1] so that the MSB of R[b− 1]⊕Dk(C∗t )[b− 1] equals 1 instead of 0 and
then using a DTLS packet of length 224 bytes (again excluding the IV). This provides
a test of the form:
R[b− 1]⊕Dk(C∗t )[b− 1] > 191,
which again allows the adversary to learn the second-MSB of R[b− 1]⊕Dk(C∗t )[b− 1].
This alternative approach gives the adversary the opportunity to use packets with sizes
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that result in better success probabilities, and hence is preferable. For both approaches,
iterating, the attacker can extract the 4 MSBs of P ∗t [b − 1] when the block cipher is
AES, and the 5 MSBs of P ∗t [b − 1] when it is 3DES. The least significant bits (LSBs)
cannot be extracted using our attack because the packet size must be a multiple of the
block size b.
This provides a theoretical description of our attack. Of course, the adversary can
use the same techniques as worked for OpenSSL to amplify his attack: using packet
trains, multiple trials, and removal of outliers. A practical issue arises because GnuTLS
does not implement the Heartbeat extension, but here we can use any application layer
protocol with predictable timing differences. In principal, the same attack would work
against the GnuTLS implementation of TLS, with the TLS connection tear-down giving
the required timing information. But, in this case, trains of packets cannot be used to
amplify the timing difference, since the connection is terminated upon the first failure.
We have conducted experiments to test whether the timing difference is sufficient to
allow the attack for DTLS, with experimental results being presented in Figure 4.14 for
HMAC-SHA-256 and AES-256. Here, we see the slight separation between the two dis-
tributions (red for packets where the inequality “pad > ciphertext.size - hash_size”
is satisfied, blue for when it is not). In this attack, the adversary needs to adjust the
payload length, l, based on the position of the bit he tries to recover. Changing the
value of l to recover a bit would change the success probability of the attack.
With the second approach, where longer packets are used, we were able to achieve
success probabilities of 0.738, 0.744, 0.737 and 0.756 for individually extracting the
first, second, third and fourth MSB, respectively, meaning that the four MSBs can
be recovered correctly with probability 0.306, using (roughly) 43000 bytes of network
traffic. These probabilities were achieved with n = 5, m = 10 and measured over 1000
attack runs. We used percentile filters, similar to the approach used in [28] to achieve
these probability values. As expected, increasing the value of m significantly increases
the success probability. For example, we were able to achieve success probabilities of
0.797 and 0.990 for recovering the four MSBs when m = 50 and m = 100 respectively.
To implement the tests, we used the same hardware set-up as the one we used for
OpenSSL. We ran version 3.0.0 of GnuTLS on the client and the server. We used the
built-in GnuTLS utilities for the client and the server, gnutls cli and gnutls serv
respectively. We again disabled anti-replay by directly modifying the source code.
We made use of the echo and echo reply messages that gnutls cli and gnutls serv
implement, in order to compensate the case of not having Heartbeat messages available.
Heartbeat requests are replaced by echo messages, while Heartbeat replies are replaced
by echo reply messages. This proves the point we made earlier in the chapter which
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Figure 4.14: PDFs for AES-256 with HMAC-SHA256, l = 176 (packet size), n = 5
(train size), based on 1000 trials, with outliers removed.
is that the adversary can exploit any messages that predictably generate detectable
responses.
4.6 Disclosure
We informed the OpenSSL development team about our attack and worked with them
to test their proposed fix6, which we found to be effective against the attack. OpenSSL
applied the fix to releases starting from 1.0.0f and 0.9.8s. Interestingly, the proposed
fix introduced a flaw7 that could be exploited in a denial of service attack; accordingly,
users were asked to upgrade to OpenSSL 1.0.0g or 0.9.8t.
We also shared our findings with the GnuTLS development team. We worked with
them to identify the root cause of the timing difference and test the proposed fixed8.
A fix to prevent our specific attack was incorporated in version 3.0.11 of GnuTLS.
The DTLS and TLS libraries of OpenSSL and GnuTLS are used in a number of
software packages (for example, the RedHat and SuSe operating systems), which had
to be updated accordingly. CVE-2011-41089 identifies a number of software packages
that implement OpenSSL or GnuTLS, and which were affected by our attacks.
6http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20120104.txt
7http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20120118.txt
8http://www.gnutls.org/security.html
9http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2011-4108
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4.7 Chapter Conclusion
We have demonstrated plaintext recovering attacks against the OpenSSL and GnuTLS
implementations of DTLS. These are easily prevented by modifying the code so that
the receiver’s cryptographic processing time is independent of how decryption fails.
However, we contend that the attacks are still interesting for a number of reasons.
Firstly, the fix to prevent our OpenSSL attack is already mandated in the specifi-
cation for TLS 1.1, and is implemented in OpenSSL’s implementation of TLS, but not
in its implementation of DTLS. Without more insight into the software development
processes followed by the OpenSSL project, we can only speculate that the experience
about how to securely implement TLS’s MEE-TLS-CBC construction was not carried
over to the separate DTLS implementation. This, then, may also indicate of a lack
of truly expert code review in the OpenSSL project. This is concerning given the
prominence and wide application of the OpenSSL code, but also understandable given
its volunteer-led effort. By contrast, GnuTLS’s implementation has common code for
the TLS and DTLS packet decryption procedure, meaning that countermeasures im-
plemented for TLS are immediately carried over to DTLS. However, as we saw, even
this was not sufficient to fully protect the GnuTLS implementation against the type of
attack developed in this chapter.
A second reason that the obvious and mandated countermeasures were not im-
plemented in OpenSSL may stem from DTLS’s lack of error messages, which makes
the previous attacks apparently impossible against DTLS. We proved otherwise, ex-
ploiting DTLS Heartbeat request and response messages to obtain the required timing
information. This kind of approach may be more widely applicable than DTLS.
A third possible explanation is that the DTLS specification relies heavily on cross-
references to the TLS 1.1 specification, and indeed only gives specification details at
points where TLS and DTLS differ. So an implementor needs to be familiar with both
specifications in order to implement DTLS properly. We suggest that “specification
by diff” is not a good approach to specifying secure protocols, since it requires an
implementor to jump back and forth between specifications and may allow important
details to fall into the gap between.
Secondly, a comparison between our attacks on DTLS and previous attacks on TLS
is instructive. Our attacks are in some sense more challenging because of the lack
of explicit error messages, but also easier to carry out because of DTLS’s tolerance
of errors, meaning that DTLS connections are not torn-down whenever an error is
encountered as they are in TLS. Ultimately, this error-tolerance comes from DTLS’s
use of an unreliable transport protocol. For similar reasons, the anti-replay feature
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in DTLS is made optional in the specification. In this context, our work shows how
non-security features of lower layer protocols can have a major influence on security at
higher layers. This phenomenon is seemingly not that well-explored in the literature,
presenting an interesting challenge for future work.
Our work on DTLS, and in particular our findings in the GnuTL implementation
of TLS and DTLS, led us to suspect that there may be further possibilities to exploit
the manner in which TLS implementations, following the TLS specification, attempt
to achieve constant time decryption processing. Indeed, in the next chapter we present
a number of perviously unknown weaknesses in the TLS specification when using the
MEE-TLS-CBC construction. These TLS design weaknesses were carried over, as we
expected, to DTLS. We also present new techniques to attack TLS and DTLS, ex-
ploiting these new weaknesses, and report experimental results that demonstrate the
effectiveness of our attacks.
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Lucky Thirteen
5.1 Introduction
In Chapter 3, we discussed the structure of TLS and the various protocols that make
it. In Chapter 4, we described a number of attacks against the OpenSSL and GnuTLS
implementations of DTLS. In this chapter, we present a family of attacks that apply to
the MAC-then-PAD-then-Encrypt construction in all TLS and DTLS implementations
that are compliant with TLS 1.1 or 1.2, or with DTLS 1.0 or 1.2. They also apply
to implementations of SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 that incorporate padding oracle attack
countermeasures (implementations that do not are of course already vulnerable to
known attacks). Following Chapter 3, we refer to the (D)TLS MEE construction as
MEE-TLS-CBC. The core encryption process is illustrated in Figure 5.1 and explained
in more detail in Chapter 3 and this chapter.
The attacks come in various distinguishing, partial plaintext recovery, and full plain-
text recovery flavours. For the plaintext recovery attacks, no chosen-plaintext capability
MAC 
HDR Payload 
Padding 
Encrypt 
Ciphertext 
MAC tag Payload 
SQN 
Figure 5.1: D(TLS) encryption process. The figure shows how CBC-mode encryption
is applied in TLS and which we refer to as MEE-TLS-CBC in this chapter.
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is needed, in contrast to the BEAST attack: the attacks can be mounted by a standard
man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacker who sees only ciphertext and can inject cipher-
texts of his own composition into the network. The details of which specific attacks
are possible depends on the exact size of MAC tags output by the MAC algorithm
negotiated by the Handshake Protocol, and also on the fact that exactly 13 bytes of
header data are incorporated in the MAC calculation (hence the title of the chapter).
Although the attacks we describe in this chapter make use of the padding oracle,
they differ from the ones described earlier in Chapter 4 in various ways:
• The attacks in this chapter exploit weaknesses in the design of TLS and DTLS,
as defined in the RFCs, and apply to all versions of TLS and DTLS.
• Our attacks apply to all implementations that follow the TLS and DTLS stan-
dards.
• We also developed versions of the attacks that apply to implementations that do
not follow the TLS and DTLS standards, for example GnuTLS.
• We developed a new realisation of the padding oracle, in which we exploit a
smaller timing difference, when compared to the attacks in Chapter 4.
The applicability of the attacks is also implementation-dependent, because of the
manner in which different implementations interpret the RFCs. We have investigated
several different open-source implementations of TLS and DTLS, and found all of them
to be vulnerable to our new attacks or variants of them (or even old attacks in one
case). We also found basic coding errors in the security-critical decryption function
of one popular implementation, GnuTLS. In view of the amount of variation we have
seen in open-source code and our success in devising variant attacks, we expect all
implementations – whether open or closed – to be vulnerable to our attacks to some
extent.
We have implemented a selection of the attacks in an experimental setting. As
with earlier attacks, discussed in Chapter 3, completely breaking TLS is challenging
because the attacks create “broken” TLS records and so consume many TLS sessions.
Nevertheless, our basic attack can extract full plaintext for the current OpenSSL im-
plementation of TLS assuming the attacker is located, say, in the same LAN segment
as the targeted TLS client or server, using roughly 223 TLS sessions to reliably recover
a block of plaintext in a multi-session attack scenario like that considered in [25]. Such
a scenario is applicable when, for example, an application protocol performs automatic
TLS reconnection and password retransmission.
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Given its complexity, this basic attack would seem to present only a theoretical
threat. However, variants of it are much more effective:
• The distinguishing attacks against TLS are quite practical for OpenSSL, requiring
just a handful of sessions in order to reliably tell apart the encryptions of chosen
messages. We describe the attack in Section 5.3.
• Breaking DTLS implementations is fully practical even for a remote attacker,
since we can exploit the fact that DTLS errors are non-fatal to mount the attacks
in a single session, and reuse the amplification techniques from Chapter 4 to boost
the delicate timing signals on which our attacks depend.
• We also have more efficient partial plaintext recovery attacks on TLS and DTLS.
For example, against OpenSSL TLS, an attacker who knows one byte of a block
in either of the last two byte positions can reliably recover each of the remaining
bytes in that block using 216 sessions.
• The complexity of all our attacks can be reduced using language models and se-
quential statistical techniques as in [25, 35]. As a simple example, if the plaintext
is base64 encoded [48], as is the case for HTTP basic access authentication and
cookies [17], then the number of TLS sessions needed to recover a block reduces
from roughly 223 to 219.
• In the web setting, our techniques can be combined with those used in the BEAST
attack [35], discussed in Section 3.10: a JavaScript (or similar) running in the
browser can be used to initiate all the needed TLS sessions, with an HTTP
cookie being automatically injected by the browser in a predictable location in
the plaintext stream in each session. The JavaScript can also control the location
of the cookie such that there is only one unknown byte in the target block at each
stage of the attack. The attacker then combines the “one known byte” variant
of our attack and the base64 optimisation above (assuming the sensitive part
of the cookie is base64 encoded). Putting all of these improvements together,
we estimate that HTTP cookies can be recovered using 213 sessions per byte of
cookie (with all the sessions being automatically generated by the JavaScript and
the browser). Note that the JavaScript does not need the ability to inject chosen
plaintext into an existing TLS session for our attack to work.
Our new attacks exploit the fact that, when badly formatted padding is encountered
during decryption, a MAC check must still be performed on some data to prevent the
known timing attacks discussed in Chapter 3. But what data should be used for that
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calculation? The TLS 1.1 and 1.2 RFCs recommend checking the MAC as if there was
a zero-length pad. As noted in those RFCs:
This leaves a small timing channel, since MAC performance depends to
some extent on the size of the data fragment, but it is not believed to be
large enough to be exploitable, due to the large block size of existing MACs
and the small size of the timing signal.
We confirm that there are indeed small timing differences, but, contrary to what
is written in the RFCs, they can be exploited. In short, provided there is a fortuitous
alignment of various factors such as the size of MAC tags, the block cipher’s block size,
and the number of header bytes, then there will be a time difference in the time that it
takes to process TLS records having good and bad padding, and this difference will show
up in the time at which error messages appear on the network. This timing side-channel
can then be “wrangled” into revealing plaintext data via careful statistical analysis of
multiple timing samples. As we shall show, other natural methods for handling MAC
checking in the event of bad padding also lead to exploitable timing differences.
Our new attacks demonstrate that properly implementing MAC-then-PAD-then-
Encrypt in (D)TLS so as to avoid all exploitable timing differences is in fact quite
difficult, and is not achieved by any of the implementations we examined. A compli-
cating factor, in addition to dealing with padding, is the need for careful sanity checking
of various fields during decryption. We provide a detailed prescription for dealing with
these issues. We also discuss other, more easily-implemented countermeasures.
It is worth noting that recent work on the security of TLS implementations includes
[36, 40, 8]. In particular, in independent work, Pironti et al. [8] identify effectively
the same timing channel in TLS that we exploit. However they dismiss it as being
“too small to be measured over the network” and instead focus on using it to recover
information about message lengths.
Section 5.2 provides further background on the HMAC calculation, which helps to
establish an understanding of the fundamental root cause of the timing difference we
exploit in the attacks. Section 5.3 presents the basic distinguishing attack against RFC-
compliant implementations of TLS and DTLS, while Section 5.4 describes our plaintext
recovery attacks in the context of TLS and explains how to modify them to apply to
DTLS. In Section 5.5 we report on the experimental validation of our attacks for the
OpenSSL implementation, and in Section 5.6 we describe the modifications needed
to make our attacks applicable to other implementations, including GnuTLS, CyaSSL
and PolarSSL. Section 5.7 discusses countermeasures to our attacks, giving guidance on
how to implement MEE-TLS-CBC so as to avoid the attacks. It also includes details
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of how we disclosed our attacks and how vendors reacted to them. Finally, Section 5.8
concludes with a recap of the main issues raised by our work in this chapter.
5.2 Details of HMAC
In Section 3.3.2, we discussed a number of constructions for calculating MACs. TLS
and DTLS exclusively use the HMAC algorithm [58], with HMAC-MD5, HMAC-SHA-
1, and HMAC-SHA-256 being supported in TLS 1.21. To compute the MAC tag T for
a message M with key Ka, HMAC applies the specified hash algorithm H twice, in an
iterated fashion:
T = H((Ka ⊕ opad) || H((Ka ⊕ ipad) ||M)). (5.1)
Here opad and ipad are specific 64-byte values, and the key Ka is zero-padded to bring
it up to 64 bytes before the XOR operations are performed. For all the hash functions H
used in TLS, the application of H itself uses an encoding step called Merkle-Damg˚ard
strengthening. Here, an 8-byte length field followed by padding of a specified byte
format are appended to the message M to be hashed. The padding is at least 1 byte
in length and aligns the data on a 64-byte boundary. The relevant hash functions also
have an iterated structure, processing messages in chunks of 64 bytes (512 bits) using
a compression function, with the output of each compression step being chained into
the next step. The compression function in turn involves a complex round structure,
with many basic arithmetic operations on data being involved in each round.
In combination, these features mean that HMAC implementations for MD5, SHA-1
and SHA-256 have a distinctive timing profile. Messages M of length up to 55 bytes
can be encoded into a single 64-byte block, meaning that the first, inner hash operation
in HMAC is done in 2 compression function evaluations (since its input is a 128-byte
string), with 2 more being required for the outer hash operation, for a total of 4
compression function evaluations. Messages M containing from 56 up to 64 + 55 = 119
bytes can be encoded in two 64-byte blocks, meaning that the inner hash is done in 3
compression function evaluations, with 2 more being required for the outer operation,
for a total of 5. In general, an extra compression function evaluation is needed for
each additional 64 bytes of message data, with the exact number needed being given
by the formula d `−5564 e+4, where ` is the message length in bytes. A single compression
function evaluation takes typically around 500 to 1000 hardware cycles (depending on
1TLS cipher suites using HMAC with SHA-384 are specified in RFC 5289 (ECC cipher suites for
SHA256/SHA384) and RFC 5487 (Pre-Shared Keys SHA384/AES) but we do not consider this version
of HMAC further here.
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the hash function and details of the implementation), giving a time in the sub-µs range
for modern processors.
Recall that in TLS the MAC is computed on plaintext after removing padding.
Hence, one might expect the total running time for decryption processing to reveal
some information about the size of the depadded plaintext, perhaps up to a resolution
of 64 bytes in view of the above discussion. Our distinguishing attack exploits this, but
we will show that much more is possible.
5.3 A Distinguishing Attack
In this section we describe a simple distinguishing attack against the MEE-TLS-CBC
construction as used in TLS. This is a warm-up to our plaintext recovery attacks, but
we note that even a distinguishing attack against such an important protocol would
usually be regarded as a significant weakness.
In a distinguishing attack, the attacker gets to choose pairs of messages (M0,M1).
One of these is encrypted, Md, say, and the resulting ciphertext is given to the attacker.
The attacker’s task is to decide the value of the bit d. To prevent the attacker from
winning trivially, we require that M0 and M1 have the same length.
To visualise (and simplify) the configuration, the reader can think of an attacker
submitting (M0,M1) to a web server that would return Md. The attacker can choose
a reliable method when submitting the pairs of messages to the web server. Again, the
attacker’s task is to decide the value of the bit d.
We focus on the case where b = 16, i.e. the block cipher is AES. A variant of the
attack works for b = 8. Suppose the MAC algorithm is HMAC-H where H is either
MD5, SHA-1 or SHA-256. Let M0 consist of 32 arbitrary bytes followed by 256 copies of
0xFF. Let M1 consist of 287 arbitrary bytes followed by 0x00. Note that both messages
have 288 bytes, and hence fit exactly into 18 plaintext blocks. Our attacker submits
the pair (M0,M1) for encryption and receives a MEE-TLS-CBC ciphertext HDR || C.
Now C consists of a CBC-mode encryption of an encoded version of Md, where the
encoding step adds a MAC tag T and some padding pad. Because the end of Md aligns
with a block boundary, the additional bytes T || pad are encrypted in separate blocks
from Md. The attacker now forms a new ciphertext HDR || C ′ in which C ′ keeps the
same 16-byte IV as C (if explicit IVs are being used), but truncates the non-IV part of
C to 288 bytes. This has the effect of removing those blocks of C that contain T || pad.
Now the attacker submits HDR || C ′ for decryption. If the record underlying C was
M0, then the plaintext P
′ corresponding to C ′ appears to end with the valid 256-byte
padding pattern 0xFF . . . 0xFF. In this case, all of these bytes are removed, and the
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remaining 32 bytes of plaintext are interpreted as a short message and a MAC tag.
For example, if H is SHA-1, then we have a 12-byte message and a 20-byte MAC tag.
The MAC verification fails (with overwhelming probability), and an error message is
returned to the attacker. If the underlying record was M1, then P
′ appears to end with
the valid 1-byte padding pattern 0x00. In this case, a single byte is removed, and the
remaining 287 bytes of plaintext are interpreted as a long message and a MAC tag.
Again, the MAC verification fails and an error message is returned to the attacker.
Notice that when d = 0, so C encrypts M0, a short message consisting of 13 bytes
of header plus at most 16 bytes of message (when the hash algorithm is MD5) is
passed through the MAC algorithm. To calculate the MAC requires 4 evaluations of
H’s compression function. On the other hand, when d = 1, C encrypts M1, and a
long message consisting of 13 bytes of header plus at least 255 bytes of message is
passed through the MAC algorithm. Then to calculate the MAC requires at least 8
evaluations of H’s compression function, at least 4 more than for the d = 0 case. Hence,
we expect the time it takes to produce the error message on decryption failure to be
somewhat larger if d = 1 than when d = 0, on the order of a couple of µs for a modern
processor. This timing difference then allows, in theory, a distinguishing attack on the
MEE-TLS-CBC construction used in TLS.
5.3.1 Practical Considerations
In describing the attack, we have ignored the time taken to remove padding. This is
different for the two messages being processed, and the difference is opposite to that
for MAC checking in that padding removal for M0 takes longer than for M1. Similarly,
we have ignored any other timing differences that might arise during other processing
steps. In practice, as we will see in Section 5.5, these differences turn out to be smaller
than the MAC timing difference.
The attack exploits the requirement from the (D)TLS RFCs that implementations
be able to properly decrypt records having variable length padding, but does not require
implementations to actually send records containing such padding. A variant attack
is possible in case only minimum-length padding is supported, but involves a smaller
timing signal.
In TLS, the error messages are sent over the network, and so can easily be detected
by the attacker. However, these messages are subject to network jitter, and this may
be large enough to swamp the timing difference arising from the 4 extra compression
function evaluations. On the other hand, the timing signal may be quite large when
the cryptographic processing is performed in a constrained environment, e.g. on an
8-bit or 16-bit processor, or even on a smartphone. Furthermore, the jitter may be
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significantly reduced when the adversary runs as a separate process on the machine
performing TLS decryption. This may be possible in virtualised environments, e.g. in
a cloud scenario as explored in [86]. The attack also destroys the TLS session, since in
TLS such errors are fatal. The attack can be iterated across L sessions, with Md being
encrypted in each session, and statistical processing used to extract the timing signal.
In DTLS, there are no error messages, but the techniques from Chapter 4 can be
applied to solve this problem. There, we send a packet containing a ciphertext C closely
followed by a DTLS message, with the latter always provoking a response message. Any
timing difference arising from the decryption of C then shows up as a difference in the
arrival time of the response messages. The signal amplification techniques from Chapter
4 can also be used to boost the timing difference – here, the idea is to send multiple
packets all containing C in quick succession, to create a cumulative timing difference
(since each time C is processed, it will be processed in the same way).
In the attack as described, we have used 288 byte messages. This ensured that
there were sufficient bytes left after the removal of padding to leave room for a message
(possibly of zero length) and a MAC tag. This ensures that C ′ passes any sanity
checks that might be applied during decryption. However, these sanity checks might
be exploitable in variants of our basic attack. For example, an implementation that
finds it does not have enough bytes left to contain a MAC after depadding may choose
to skip MAC verification altogether, leading to an increased timing difference. In fact,
we saw such behaviour in Chapter 4 for the GnuTLS implementation.
Note that the attack would still work as described if the truncated MACs specified
for TLS in [2] were used, since the full HMAC-H computation is still performed but
only certain bytes of the computed tag are compared to bytes of the plaintext.
We report on the successful implementation of this attack in Section 5.5.
5.4 Plaintext Recovery Attacks
5.4.1 General Approach
As we have seen in the previous section, the processing time for a (D)TLS record
(and therefore the appearance time of error messages) will depend on the amount of
padding that the receiver interprets the encoded plaintext as containing. However, by
placing a target ciphertext block at the end of the encrypted record, an attacker can
arrange that the plaintext block corresponding to this block is interpreted as padding,
and hence make the processing time depend on plaintext bytes. But, it seems that
large amounts of valid padding are needed to create a significant timing difference, and
this is difficult to arrange in a plaintext recovery attack. We show that this barrier to
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plaintext recovery can be overcome under certain circumstances.
Let C∗ be any ciphertext block whose corresponding plaintext P ∗ the attacker
wishes to recover. Let C ′ denote the ciphertext block preceding C∗. Note that C ′ may
be the IV or the last block of the preceding ciphertext if C∗ is the first block of a
ciphertext. We have:
P ∗ = DKd(C
∗)⊕ C ′.
Following Chapter 3, for any block B made of b bytes of plaintext or ciphertext, we
write B = [B[0]B[1] . . . B[b− 1]], where B[i] denote the bytes of B. In particular, we
have P ∗ = [P ∗[0]P ∗[1] . . . P ∗[b− 1]].
As usual, we assume that the attacker is capable of eavesdropping on the (D)TLS-
protected communications and of injecting messages of his choice into the network. For
TLS, or DTLS with sequence number checking disabled, we do not need the ability to
prevent messages from reaching their destination, nor do we require a chosen-plaintext
capability.
5.4.2 Full Plaintext Recovery
For simplicity of presentation, in what follows, we assume the CBC-mode IVs are
explicit (as in TLS 1.1, 1.2 and DTLS 1.0, 1.2, described in Section 3.4.7). We also
assume that b = 16 (so our block cipher is AES). It is easy to construct variants of our
attacks for implicit IVs and for b = 8. We begin by considering only TLS, with details
for DTLS to follow. We also assume that the TLS implementation follows the advice
in the TLS 1.1 and 1.2 RFCs about checking the MAC as if there was a zero-length
pad when the padding is incorrectly formatted. We will examine the security of other
implementation options in Section 5.6. Most importantly, and for reasons that will
become clear, we assume for the moment that t = 20 (so that the MAC algorithm is
HMAC-SHA-1). We consider t = 16 and t = 32 (HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-SHA-256)
shortly.
Let ∆ be a block of 16 bytes and consider the decryption of a ciphertext Catt(∆)
of the form
Catt(∆) = HDR || C0 || C1 || C2 || C ′ ⊕∆ || C∗
in which there are 4 non-IV ciphertext blocks (blocks not containing an IV), the penul-
timate block C ′ ⊕ ∆ is an XOR-masked version of C ′ and the last block is C∗. The
corresponding 64-byte plaintext is P = P1 || P2 || P3 || P4 in which
P4 = DKe(C
∗)⊕ (C ′ ⊕∆)
= P ∗ ⊕∆.
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Notice that P4 is closely related to the unknown, target plaintext block P
∗. We consider
3 distinct cases, which between them cover all possibilities for what can happen during
decryption of Catt(∆):
1. P4 ends with a 0x00 byte: in this case, a single byte of padding is removed, the
previous 20 bytes are interpreted as a MAC tag T , and the remaining 64−21 = 43
bytes of plaintext are taken as the record R. MAC verification is then performed
on a 13 + 43 = 56-byte message SQN || HDR || R. Recall, exactly 13 bytes of data
are prepended to the record R here before the MAC is computed (the 8-byte
sequence number and the 5-byte header).
2. P4 ends with a valid padding pattern of length at least 2 bytes: in this case, at
least 2 bytes of padding are removed, and the next 20 bytes are interpreted as
a MAC tag T . This leaves a record R of length at most 42 bytes, meaning that
MAC verification is then performed on a message of length at most 55 bytes.
3. P4 ends with any other byte pattern: in this case, the byte pattern does not
correspond to valid padding. Following the prescription in the TLS 1.1 and 1.2
RFCs, the plaintext is treated as if it contains no bytes of padding, so the last 20
bytes are interpreted as a MAC tag T , and the remaining 44 bytes of plaintext are
taken as the record R. MAC verification is then performed on a 57-byte message.
In all cases, the MAC verification will fail (with overwhelming probability) and an
error message produced. Notice that, in accordance with the discussion in Section 5.2,
in Cases 1 and 3, the MAC verification will involve 5 evaluations of the compression
function for SHA-1, while Case 2 only requires 4 evaluations. Therefore, we can hope
to distinguish Case 2 from Cases 1 and 3 by timing the appearance of the error message
on the network. Here the timing difference is that needed for a single SHA-1 compres-
sion function evaluation (compared to 4 such evaluations in our distinguishing attack).
Notice that the size of the header, 13 bytes, in conjunction with the MAC tag size, 20
bytes, are critical in generating this distinctive timing behaviour.
In Case 2, assuming that the plaintext has no special structure, the most likely
padding pattern to arise is the one of length 2, namely 0x01 || 0x01, with all longer
padding patterns being roughly 256 times less likely. Thus, if the attacker selects a
mask ∆ in such a way that he detects Case 2 after submitting Catt(∆) for decryption,
then he can infer that P4 ends with 0x01 || 0x01, and, using the equation P4 = P ∗⊕∆,
can now recover the last 2 bytes of P ∗. (In fact, by repeating the attack with a mask
∆′ that is modified from ∆ in the third-to-last byte, the attacker can easily separate
the case of a length 2 padding pattern from all longer patterns.)
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The question remains: how does the attacker trigger Case 2, so that he can extract
the last 2 bytes of P ∗? Recall that the attacker has the freedom to select ∆. By
injecting a sequence of ciphertexts Catt(∆) with values of ∆ that vary over all possible
values in the last 2 bytes ∆[14],∆[15], then (in the worst case) after 216 trials, the
attacker will surely select a value for ∆ such that Catt(∆) triggers Case 2.
Once the last 2 bytes of P ∗ have been extracted, the attacker can more efficiently
recover the remaining bytes of P ∗, working from right to left. This phase is essentially
identical to Vaudenay’s original padding oracle attack [102] discussed in Chapter 3.
For example, to extract the third-to-last byte, the attacker can use his new knowledge
of the last two bytes of P ∗ to now set ∆[14],∆[15] so that P4 ends with 0x02 || 0x02.
Then he generates candidates Catt(∆) as before, but modifying ∆[13] only. After at
most 28 trials, he will produce a ciphertext which falls into case 2 again, which reveals
he has managed to set a value 0x02 in the third-to-last byte of P4 = P
∗ ⊕ ∆. From
this, he can recover P ∗[13]. Recovery of each subsequent byte in P ∗ requires at most
28 trials, giving a total of 14 · 28 trials to complete the extraction of P ∗.
Practical considerations: In practice, for TLS, there are two severe complications.
Firstly, the TLS session is destroyed as soon as the attacker submits his very first
attack ciphertext. Secondly, the timing difference between the cases is very small, and
so likely to be hidden by network jitter and other sources of timing difference.
The first problem can be overcome for TLS by mounting a multi-session attack,
wherein we suppose that the same plaintext is repeated in the same position over
many sessions (as in Canvel et al. [25], for example). We have used masks ∆ in such a
way that no further modification to the attack is needed to cater for this setting – of
course blocks C ′ and C∗ change for each session.
The second problem can be overcome in the same multi-session setting by iterating
the attack many times for each ∆ value and then performing statistical processing of
the recorded times to estimate which value of ∆ is most likely to correspond to Case
2. In practice, we have found that a basic percentile test (and even averaging) works
well – see Section 5.5 for further details. Assuming that L trials are used for each ∆
value, the attack as described consumes roughly L · 216 sessions, with one ciphertext
Catt(∆) being tried in each session.
More efficient variants: The attack complexity can be significantly reduced by as-
suming that the language from which plaintexts are drawn can be modelled using a
finite-length Markov chain. This is a fair assumption for natural languages, as well as
application-layer protocol messages such as HTML, XML etc. This model can be used
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to drive the selection of candidate plaintext bytes in order of decreasing likelihood, and
from this, determine the bytes of ∆ needed to test whether a guess for the plaintext
bytes leads to valid padding or not. Similar techniques were used in [25, 35] in com-
bination with sequential statistical techniques to reduce the complexity of recovering
low-entropy plaintexts. Note that this approach does not work well if TLS’s optional
compression is used. Another possibility is that the plaintext bytes are drawn from a
reduced space of possibilities. For example, in HTTP basic access authentication, the
username and password are Base64 encoded, meaning that each byte of plaintext has
only 64 possible values. Similar restrictions often apply to the sensitive parts of HTTP
cookies.
In a related attack scenario, if the attacker already knows one of the last two bytes
of P ∗, he can recover the other byte with much lower complexity than our analysis
so far would suggest. This is then a plaintext recovery attack with partially-known-
plaintext. For example, suppose the attacker knows the value of the byte P ∗[14]. Then
he sets the starting value of ∆ such that ∆[14] = P ∗[14]⊕ 0x01, so that when Catt(∆)
is decrypted, the second-to-last byte of P4 already equals 0x01. Then he iterates over
the 28 possible values for ∆[15], eventually finding one such that P4 has its last two
bytes equal to 0x01 || 0x01, triggering Case 2. He can then proceed to recover the rest
of P ∗ with the same complexity as before. Overall, this attack, which recovers 15 bytes
of plaintext with 1-out-of-2 of the last bytes of the target block known, consumes only
15L · 28 sessions, where L is the number of trials used for each ∆ value in each byte
position. This can be further reduced by combining the two variants. For example, for
base64 encoded plaintext, only 15L · 26 sessions are needed to decrypt a block.
Combining Lucky 13 with BEAST: A significant limitation of our attacks as
described so far is their consumption of many TLS sessions. This limitation can be
overcome by combining our attacks with techniques from the BEAST attack [35], dis-
cussed in Section 3.10, to target TLS-protected HTTP cookies. The combined attack
does not require the blockwise privilege needed by the original BEAST attack (because
the attacker does not need to be able to prepend a plaintext block to ongoing HTTP
requests). Assuming the targeted part of the cookie is base64 encoded, the attack
consumes L · 26 sessions per byte of HTTP cookie. As we will discuss in more detail
in Section 5.5, we found that setting L = 27 yields reliable plaintext recovery in our
experimental set-up, giving us an attack that recovers HTTP cookies using roughly 213
sessions per unknown byte of cookie.
We effectively use the BEAST-style JavaScript means to be in the 1-out-of-2 bytes
known case, described above. It is worth noting that our attack does not require
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the BEAST-style same-origin policy (SOP) bypass. We only require to be able to
pad HTTPS requests (for example, GET or POST requests). In this case, the browser
will automatically establish the needed TLS sessions when the JavaScript makes the
HTTPS requests.
5.4.3 Plaintext Recovery for Other MAC Algorithms
A critical feature of our attack above is the relationship between the size of the header
included in the MAC calculation (fixed at h = 13 bytes), the MAC tag size t, and the
block size b. For example, if TLS happened to be designed such that h = 12, then, with
t = 20 and b = 16, a similar case analysis as before shows that our ciphertext Catt(∆)
would have the property of having faster MAC verification if P4 also ends with the
single byte 0x00 (the valid padding pattern of length 1). This would allow an improved
28 attack against TLS with CBC-mode and HMAC-SHA-1. In some sense, 13 is lucky,
but 12 would have been luckier!
Similarly, we have (less efficient) variants of our attacks for HMAC-MD5 and
HMAC-SHA-256, where the tag sizes t are 16 and 32 bytes, respectively. In fact,
because here t is a multiple of b, the analysis is largely the same in both cases, and
we consider only HMAC-MD5 in detail. This time Catt(∆) is such that we fall into
Case 2 (valid padding with a message of size at most 55 bytes, giving fast MAC ver-
ification) only if P4 = P
∗ ⊕ ∆ ends with a valid padding of length 6 or more. With
no additional information on P ∗ the attacker would need (worst case) 248 attempts to
construct the correct ∆ so as to trigger this case; detecting that he had done so would
be more difficult in view of the large number of candidate ∆ values. This is not an
attractive attack, especially in view of the practical considerations for TLS mentioned
above. On the other hand, we do have attractive partially-known-plaintext attacks for
HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-SHA-256. For example, if any 5 out of the last 6 bytes of P ∗
are known, we can recover the remaining 11 bytes using 11L · 28 sessions. The attack
can also be made more efficient if the plaintext has low entropy, by trying candidates
for the last 6 bytes of P ∗ in order of decreasing probability and then recovering the
remaining bytes of P ∗ once the right 6-byte candidate is found. This would be an good
option for password recovery, for example.
A similar analysis can be carried out for truncated MAC algorithms, as per [2]. For
example, for an 80-bit (10-byte) MAC tag, if any 11 out of the last 12 bytes of P ∗ are
known, we can recover the remaining 5 bytes using 5L · 28 sessions.
Finally, we note that the “Lucky 13 + BEAST” attacks work equally well, no matter
what the MAC tag size is.
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5.4.4 Applying the Attacks to DTLS
So far we have focussed on TLS. The changes needed to handle DTLS are the same
as for our distinguishing attack in Section 5.3: we can use the techniques discussed
in Chapter 4 to amplify the timing differences and to emulate TLS’s error messages.
The amplification capability reduces the attack complexity dramatically: essentially,
we can accurately test each ∆ value using just a few packet trains instead of requiring
L trials.
There is one further critical difference that we wish to emphasise: as already noted,
DTLS does not treat errors arising during decryption as being fatal. This means that
the entire attack against DTLS can be carried out in a single session, that is, without
requiring the same plaintext to be repeated in the same position in the plaintext across
multiple sessions, and without waiting for the Handshake Protocol to rerun for each
session.
These differences brings our attack well within the bounds of practicality for DTLS.
This is particularly so if DTLS’s optional checking of sequence numbers is disabled.
Even if this is not the case, the attacks are quite feasible in practice, provided enough
DTLS Heartbeat messages are available, or if the upper layer protocol being protected
by DTLS produces replies to sent messages in a consistent manner. These points are
discussed at greater length in Chapter 4 and the next section, where we report on the
successful implementation of our attacks for the OpenSSL implementation of TLS and
DTLS.
5.5 Experimental Results for OpenSSL
5.5.1 Experimental Setup
We ran version 1.0.1 of OpenSSL on the client and the server. In our laboratory set-up,
a client, the attacker and the targeted server are all connected to the same VLAN on a
100Mbps Ethernet switch. The targeted server was running on a single core processor
machine operating at 1.87 GHz with 2 GByte of RAM, while the attacker was running
on a dual core processor machine operating at 3.4 GHz, with 2 GByte of RAM.
To simulate the (D)TLS client, we made use of s client, a generic tool that is
available as part of the OpenSSL distribution package. We developed a basic Python
script that calls s client whenever the TLS connection is terminated, implementing
the multi-session setting discussed in Section 5.3.1 of this chapter. Our attack code is
written in C and is capable of capturing, manipulating and injecting packets of choice
into the network.
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In the case of TLS, the attacker captures the “targeted” packet, i.e. the packet
containing the plaintext that the attacker tries to recover, manipulates it and then sends
the crafted version to the targeted server causing the TLS session to terminate. This
crafted packet forces the client and the targeted server to lose TCP synchronisation,
causing delay in the TCP connection shutdown. To speed up the TCP connection tear
down, the attacker sends spoofed RST packets to the client and the targeted system
upon detecting the TLS encrypted alert message, forcing both systems to independently
destroy the underlying TCP structure associated with the terminated TLS session.
All the timing values presented in the chapter are based on hardware cycles, which
are specific to processor speed. For example, 187 hardware cycles on our targeted server
operating at speed of 1.87 GHz translate to an absolute timing of 100ns. To count the
hardware cycles, we made use of an existing C library licensed under GNU GPL v32.
5.5.2 Statistical Analysis
The network timings we collect in each experiment are from skewed distribution(s) with
long tails and many outliers. However, we found that using basic statistical techniques
(medians and, more generally, percentiles) was sufficient to analyse our data.
5.5.3 Distinguishing Attack for OpenSSL TLS
Figure 5.2 shows the experimental distribution of timing values for the TLS distinguish-
ing attack described in Section 5.3. The figure indicates that, with enough samples, it
should be possible to distinguish encryptions of message M0 (consisting of 32 arbitrary
bytes followed by 256 copies of 0xFF) from encryptions of message M1 (consisting of
287 arbitrary bytes followed by 0x00).
We used a simple threshold test to build a concrete attack: we calculate a threshold
value T based on profiling, gather L timing samples, filter outliers, calculate the median
of the remaining timing samples, and then output 1 if the median value is greater
than T and 0 if it is less. Table 5.1 shows the success probabilities for this concrete
distinguishing attack; it is evident that the attack is reliable even if only a moderate
number of samples are available. The attack already has a significant advantage over
guessing when L = 1, i.e. when only one sample is available.
5.5.4 Plaintext Recovery Attacks for OpenSSL TLS
Partial plaintext recovery: Section 5.4 describes an attack where byte P ∗[15] can
be recovered when P ∗[14] is known. This involves setting ∆[14] to force P ∗[14]⊕∆[14]
2http://code.google.com/p/fau-timer
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Figure 5.2: Distribution of timing values (outliers removed) for distinguishing attack
on OpenSSL TLS, showing faster processing time in the case of M0 (in red) compared
to M1 (in blue).
L Success Probability
1 0.756
2 0.769
4 0.858
8 0.914
16 0.951
32 0.983
64 0.992
128 1
Table 5.1: OpenSSL TLS distinguishing attack success probabilities.
to equal 0x01, and then trying all possible values of ∆[15], identifying which one forces
P ∗[15]⊕∆[15] to also equal 0x01. Figure 5.3 shows the median server-side decryption
time as a function of ∆[15] for the particular values of P ∗[14] = 0x01 (so ∆[14] =
0x00) and P ∗[15] = 0xFF. A clear reduction in processing time can be seen for the
expected value of ∆[15], namely ∆[15] = 0xFE. Also notable is the stability in the
median processing time for other byte values. These server-side times indicate that
an attack based on timing error message on the network has some prospect of success.
Figure 5.4 shows the corresponding distribution of median network timings in our
experimental setup. Clearly, the data is noisier, but the “dip” at ∆[15] = 0xFE is
clearly distinguishable.
Figure 5.5 shows success probabilities for the attack. Each data-point in the figure
is based on at least 64 experiments. Each curve in the figure represents a different
number of total sessions consumed in the attack (corresponding to different values for
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Figure 5.3: OpenSSL TLS median server timings (in hardware cycles) when P ∗[14] =
0x01 and P ∗[15] = 0xFF. As expected, ∆[15] = 0xFE leads to faster processing time.
L, the number of trials for each ∆ value). The x-axis represents the percentile used in
our statistical test3: if the percentile value is p, then we take as the correct value for
∆[15] the one for which the p-th percentile value of the timing distribution (measured
over L samples) is minimised. It is evident that a range of percentiles work well,
including the median. As expected, the success probability of the attack increases as
L increases. We already reach a success probability of 1 when L = 28, where the total
number of sessions needed is 216. Similarly, we have a success probability of 0.93 when
L = 27, where the total number of sessions is 215.
Given these results, we anticipate that the attack would extend easily to recov-
ering 15 unknown bytes from a block, given one of the last two bytes. We have not
implemented this variant.
It is worth noting that the amount of connections required for the attack would
potentially trigger alarms on network intrusion detection tools, in case they have been
deployed in the path that the attack takes.
Full plaintext recovery: The next step would be to perform the full plaintext
recovery attack from Section 5.4. In this case, the attacker would need a total of L ·216
trials to discover which mask value triggers Case 2. In the case of TLS, this takes a
considerable amount of time due to the underlying TCP and TLS connection set-up
and tear-down times. For example, with L = 27 we estimate that the 223 sessions would
take around 64 hours in our setup. However, once the last two bytes of a block have
3We used the GNU statistics package (http://www.gnu.org/software/gsl/manual/html_node/
Statistics.html) for calculating the percentiles. The algorithm for computing the percentiles in-
volves interpolation, which can over-estimate the success probability for small values of L.
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Figure 5.4: OpenSSL TLS median network timings in terms of hardware cycles when
P ∗[14] = 0x01 and P ∗[15] = 0xFF. As expected ∆[15] = 0xFE leads to faster processing
time.
been successfully recovered, then the remaining bytes in that block can be recovered in
a much shorter time. We have not implemented the full plaintext recovery attack for
TLS. Our results below for DTLS strongly indicate that the full attack would work for
TLS with L = 27, albeit slowly.
5.5.5 Plaintext Recovery Attacks for OpenSSL DTLS
As explained in Section 5.4.4, we can use the timing and amplification techniques from
Chapter 4 in combination with the previously described attacks to attack DTLS. Now
the attacker sends a number (n) of crafted packets, followed by a DTLS Heartbeat
request and waits for the corresponding Heartbeat reply. This process is repeated L
times for each mask value. The attacker selects n and L in order to trade-off the
attack success probability and the total number of packets injected. We have found
experimentally that n = 10 is a good choice for achieving stable timing values. On the
other hand, n = 1 is indicative of what might be expected to happen with TLS but
without enduring the overhead of TCP and TLS connection setups (note that the noise
levels for DTLS are generally somewhat higher since we depend on an application-layer
error message rather than a native TLS error message). Higher values of n could be
used if the attacker is remote from the server.
Figure 5.6 shows the percentile-based success probabilities for recovering P ∗[15]
assuming that P ∗[14] is known, for n = 10. It can be seen that the attack is very
effective, reliably recovering the unknown plaintext byte with only 211 trials (L = 23).
Even for 28 trials (L = 1), the success probability is 0.266.
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Figure 5.5: OpenSSL TLS partial plaintext recovery: percentile-based success proba-
bilities for recovering P ∗[15] assuming P ∗[14] is known.
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Figure 5.6: OpenSSL DTLS partial plaintext recovery: percentile-based success prob-
abilities for recovering P ∗[15] assuming P ∗[14] is known, n = 10.
We also conducted a 2-byte recovery attack against OpenSSL DTLS; this attack is
effectively the first step of the full plaintext recovery attack described in Section 5.4.
Figure 5.7 shows the success probabilities for recovering P ∗[14] and P ∗[15] when n = 10.
Again, the attack is very effective, recovering both bytes with success probability 0.93
for 219 trials (L = 23). The quality of these results is evidence that the attack should
extend easily to a full plaintext recovery attack. Figure 5.8 shows our results for n = 1,
which we recall serves as an experimental model for TLS. We see that 2-byte recovery
is reliable given 223 trials (L = 27); we already reach more than 80% success rate using
222 trials.
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Figure 5.7: OpenSSL DTLS 2-byte recovery: percentile-based success probabilities for
recovering P ∗[14] and P ∗[15], n = 10.
5.5.6 More Challenging Network Environments
We have not conducted experiments where the attacker is not situated in the same
LAN as the server. Given the small timing differences involved, we would expect the
attacks to fail, in the case of TLS, when the attacker is remote, i.e. more than a couple
of hops away from the server, or that very large numbers of sessions would be needed
to get reliable results. Nevertheless, there are realistic scenarios where the proximity
requirement can be met, for example when a hostile network service provider attacks
its customers, or in cloud computing environments. For DTLS, the timing signals can
be amplified, effectively by an arbitrary amount, and so we would expect to be able to
mount the attacks remotely.
5.6 Other Implementations of TLS
5.6.1 GnuTLS
The GnuTLS implementation of MEE-TLS-CBC deals with bad padding in a different
way to that recommended in the RFCs: instead of assuming zero-length padding, it uses
the last byte of plaintext to determine how many plaintext bytes to remove (whether
or not those bytes are correctly formatted padding). More precisely, GnuTLS sets a
variable pad as:
pad = ciphertext->data[ciphertext->size - 1] + 1
and then, after doing some basic sanity checking on the value of pad, subtracts pad
bytes from the length field:
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Figure 5.8: OpenSSL DTLS 2-byte recovery: percentile-based success probabilities for
recovering P ∗[14] and P ∗[15], n = 1.
length = ciphertext->size - tag_size - pad
The GnuTLS code then proceeds to check the padding bytes, but the value of
length stays the same for the remainder of the processing whether the padding check
succeeds or fails. This variable dictates the number of record bytes involved in the
MAC verification.
Since this approach is a natural alternative to the RFCs’ advice for handling bad
padding, we analyse it in detail, first for HMAC-SHA-1 as the MAC algorithm, and
then in brief for other MAC algorithms. As before, we assume that our block cipher
is AES and that IVs are explicit, with obvious modifications for other cases. We focus
on TLS, but our attacks apply equally to DTLS. We then report experimental results.
GnuTLS + HMAC-SHA-1: Firstly, we point out that GnuTLS-style processing is
just as vulnerable to distinguishing attacks as RFC-compliant processing. Indeed, the
attack described in Section 5.3 will work just as before4. We next present an attack
that recovers the rightmost byte of plaintext in any target block for GnuTLS-style
padding processing.
Let C∗ denoting the target ciphertext block, C ′ denote the previous ciphertext block
and ∆ denote a mask block of 16 bytes. We consider the decryption of a ciphertext
Catt(∆) of the form:
Catt(∆) = HDR || C0 || C1 || C2 || . . . || C18 || C ′ ⊕∆ || C∗
4In fact, since the attack only involves plaintexts which are correctly padded, it will work for any
correct decryption algorithm, that does not implement special countermeasures.
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in which there are 20 non-IV ciphertext blocks, the penultimate block is an XOR-
masked version of C ′ and the last block is C∗, the target ciphertext block. The corre-
sponding 320-byte plaintext is P = P1 || P2 || . . . || P19 || P20 in which
P20 = DKe(C
∗)⊕ (C ′ ⊕∆)
= P ∗ ⊕∆.
Now we need consider only two distinct cases, which between them cover all possi-
bilities:
1. P20 ends with a 0x00 byte: in this case, a single byte of padding is removed, the
next 20 bytes are interpreted as a MAC tag T , and the remaining 320− 21 = 299
bytes of plaintext are taken as the record R. MAC verification is then performed
on a 13 + 299 = 312-byte message SQN || HDR || R.
2. P20 ends with any other byte value: in this case, at least two bytes of “padding”
are removed, the next 20 bytes are interpreted as a MAC tag T , and the remaining
bytes of plaintext are taken as the record R. Because the starting message length,
at 320 bytes, is long enough to allow for the removal of 256 bytes of padding and a
20-byte MAC whilst still leaving a non-null record, no length sanity tests will fail.
MAC verification is then performed on a message SQN || HDR || R that contains at
most 311 bytes.
In both cases, the MAC verification will fail (with overwhelming probability) and an
error message produced. Notice that, in accordance with the discussion in Section 5.2,
in Case 1, the MAC verification will involve 9 evaluations of the compression function
for SHA-1, while Case 2 requires at most 8 evaluations. Therefore, we can hope to
distinguish the two cases by careful timing, as previously.
Now the single-byte plaintext recovery attack is straightforward: the attacker injects
a sequence of ciphertexts Catt(∆) with values of ∆ that vary over all possible values
in the last byte ∆[15], then (in the worst case) after 28 trials, the attacker will surely
select a value for ∆ such that Catt(∆) triggers Case 1. When this is detected, he knows
that P20 ends with a 0x00 byte and can infer the value of the last byte of P
∗ via the
blockwise equation P20 = P
∗ ⊕∆.
This basic attack can be further improved. The 2 most significant bits of the last
byte of P ∗ can be extracted using 4 trials by simply examining the time taken to
produce an error message when ciphertexts Catt(∆) are injected for values ∆ which
vary in the 2 most significant bits of ∆[15]: the maximum running time is produced
when the last byte of P20 is set to have bits 00 in the most significant positions. The
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remaining 6 bits can then be extracted using a further 64 trials to find the value of
∆[15] which triggers Case 1. Thus an enhanced version of the attack only needs 68
trials to recover the last byte of the target block.
For TLS, the usual problems of fatal errors and noisy timing information can be
overcome in a multi-session attack. For DTLS, we can use the techniques from Chapter
4 to amplify the timing differences and overcome the lack of error messages.
GnuTLS + HMAC-MD5/HMAC-SHA-256: For HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-SHA-
256, a similar analysis as before shows that the ciphertext Catt(∆) triggers “slow” MAC
evaluation (9 compression function evaluations) if P20 has last byte that is any of the
5 possibilities 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, while all other values for the last byte of P20
result in “fast” MAC evaluation (at most 8 evaluations). These 5 byte values corre-
spond to bit patterns 000, 001, 010, 011, 100 in the 3 least significant bits. Exploiting
this, we can build an attack using even fewer trials than previously. For TLS, we will
need a multi-session attack, but note that the parameter L can be quite small since we
only need to distinguish between a few possibilities (at most 16) in each phase of the
attack. We omit the details.
Interestingly, the attacks for HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-SHA-256 are much more
efficient for GnuTLS-style processing than they are for RFC-compliant processing. This
is opposite to the situation for HMAC-SHA-1. We note that we have not found attacks
for GnuTLS-style processing that can extract more than the last byte of the target
block. This is not surprising in view of the fact that the decryption time for GnuTLS-
style processing depends only on the last byte of plaintext.
Attack implementation for GnuTLS: We worked with version 3.0.21 of GnuTLS
to implement the above attacks. In doing so, we found some subtle coding errors.
Firstly, the variable pad is defined as being of type uint8. In the code:
pad = ciphertext->data[ciphertext->size - 1] + 1
this has the unintended action of setting pad to zero when the last byte of plaintext
equals 0xFF instead of the desired value of 256, meaning that no bytes of padding
are removed in this case instead of 256 bytes. As a consequence, GnuTLS does not
properly support variable length padding during decryption, and the TLS session would
be terminated if the encrypting party ever uses 0xFF padding.
This coding error is easily patched, but means that our attacks do not quite work
as described, since now 2 byte values (0x00 and 0xFF) in the last byte of P20 lead to
slow MAC verification (in the HMAC-SHA-1 case). In fact, this does not present a
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serious barrier to our attack, and there is a variant using at most 66 trials to recover
the last byte of P ∗.
The second coding error we found relates to the implementation of the padding
check. This uses the following for loop:
for (i = 2; i < pad; i++)
{
if (ciphertext->data[ciphertext->size - i] !=
ciphertext->data[ciphertext->size - 1])
pad_failed = GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
}
It is not hard to see that this loop should also cover the edge case i=pad in order to
carry out a full padding check. This means that one byte of what should be padding
actually has a free format. This would enable, for example, a variant of the short MAC
attack of [74] even if variable length padding was not supported. This coding error does
not affect our attack. Notice also that the number of iterations in the loop depends on
pad, which is plaintext-dependent.
Experimental Results for GnuTLS: By default, GnuTLS adds random length
padding to every TLS record it sends (including alerts), subject to constraints imposed
by the TLS specification. The time required to encrypt that random padding disrupts
the timing signal that our attacks attempt to detect. For the purposes of experimental
validation, we disabled GnuTLS’s random padding. Note, however, that the attacks
would still be effective even if the random padding were to be reactivated, since the
error messages can be grouped according to their lengths, and the time difference
attributable to adding extra padding can be profiled and subtracted for each group.
We began by measuring the time (in hardware cycles) taken by the GnuTLS server
to perform the padding check, MAC verification and other associated operations as a
function of the value of ∆[15], for ciphertexts containing 20 non-IV blocks and with the
last byte of P ∗ equal to 0x00. Figure 5.9 shows the results. The expected behaviour
is observed: byte values 0x00 and 0xFF have similar, long processing times. Moreover,
there are four “blocks” of timings, corresponding to the reducing number of compression
function evaluations needed as the byte value ∆[15] ⊕ P ∗[15] increases. (Here, P ∗[15]
denotes the last byte of the target plaintext block P ∗.) Within these blocks, the trend
is upwards, and this is attributable to the increasing amount of time needed for the
padding check as the value of pad increases.
Our next step was to gather timing of error messages from the network. Figure
5.10 shows median network timings for the same ciphertext structure. It is evident
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Figure 5.9: GnuTLS TLS median server timings (in hardware cycles) for varying values
of ∆[15] and P ∗[15] = 0x00.
that there are anomalies at byte values 0x01, 0x11, ..., 0xF1 (with 16 byte increments).
In further testing, we discovered that their positions did not depend on the plaintext
byte P ∗[15]. This phenomenon was subsequently explained to us [61] as arising from the
way in which GnuTLS’s random number generator updates its state (when generating
CBC-mode IVs for TLS’s encrypted error messages). We handled this in our attack by
setting the timing values for these mask values to the average value of the neighbouring
bytes.
The data is clearly very noisy, and the distinct pattern exhibited in the server
timings in Figure 5.9 is not immediately evident in Figure 5.10. However, a zoomed
view (see Figure 5.11) shows that an overall descending pattern is evident. Further
analysis using linear regression shows that the ascending pattern within each of the
4 blocks is weakly preserved in the network timings (see Figure 5.12). We could not
reliably distinguish the values 0x00 and 0xFF needed for the attack mentioned above;
however, we are able to reliably extract the 4 most significant bits (MSBs) of P ∗[15], as
we explain briefly next. It is worth noting that after sharing our findings, the GnuTLS
development team conducted similar experiments and reached the same conclusions as
us, confirming our findings; they published their results in [60].
Extracting 4 bits of P ∗[15]: To extract the 2 MSBs of P ∗[15], the attacker focusses
on the overall downward trend in the processing time (as a function of ∆[15]⊕P ∗[15])
exhibited in Figure 5.11. Let δ7δ6 . . . δ0 denote the bits of ∆[15]. By setting δ7 = 0 and
then δ7 = 1, the attacker has 2 sets each containing 128 masks; he gathers timings for
each of these two sets; if larger timings are obtained on average when δ7 = 0, then the
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Figure 5.10: GnuTLS TLS median network timings (in hardware cycles) for varying
values of ∆[15] and P ∗[15] = 0x00.
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Figure 5.11: Zoomed view of GnuTLS TLS network timings.
attacker deduces that the MSB of P ∗[15] is a 0; otherwise he guesses that the MSB is 1.
The attacker can also use a reduced set of masks, and collect multiple timing samples
for each mask that he tries. Thus we have two parameters: the total number of masks
S that he uses across the two sets, and the number of timing samples L for each mask.
The second MSB of P ∗[15] is extracted in the same way: now we consider masks for
δ6 = 0 and then δ6 = 1. In principle, we have S as large as 256 again, by varying δ7 as
well as the other 6 bits of ∆[15]. In practice, we just set δ7 = 0 when extracting the
second MSB. The third and fourth MSBs are extracted in roughly the same way, but
now we reverse the test, setting the targeted bit to 1 if larger timings are obtained on
average when δ5 = 0 or δ4 = 0, respectively. This change reflects the ascending trend
within the 4 blocks observed in Figure 5.9.
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(a) 1st block
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(b) 2nd block
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(c) 3rd block
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(d) 4th block
Figure 5.12: Zoomed view of GnuTLS TLS network timings for each of the 4 blocks.
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Success probabilities for this attack are shown in Table 5.2. We tried to recover the
remaining bits, but did not obtain significant success probabilities. Whilst extracting
less plaintext than our OpenSSL attack, far fewer TLS sessions are required in this
attack on GnuTLS. This indicates that ignoring the recommendations of the RFCs can
have severe security consequences.
S
L
4 8 16 32 64 128
4 0.575 0.662 0.746 0.828 0.875 0.937
8 0.516 0.615 0.781 0.836 0.844 1
16 0.531 0.609 0.766 0.852 0.969 1
32 0.536 0.596 0.750 0.898 0.984 1
64 0.544 0.596 0.781 0.937 0.984 1
128 0.555 0.627 0.812 0.977 1 1
256 0.593 0.635 0.859 1 1 1
MSB
S
L
4 8 16 32 64 128
4 0.511 0.580 0.629 0.687 0.656 0.812
8 0.513 0.576 0.695 0.789 0.812 0.812
16 0.515 0.564 0.637 0.742 0.734 0.844
32 0.509 0.549 0.617 0.734 0.766 0.844
64 0.519 0.570 0.656 0.859 0.953 0.969
128 0.544 0.557 0.557 0.914 1 1
Second MSB
S
L
4 8 16 32 64 128
4 0.486 0.451 0.418 0.391 0.422 0.375
8 0.522 0.508 0.523 0.500 0.531 0.625
16 0.537 0.555 0.598 0.625 0.625 0.781
32 0.543 0.572 0.609 0.609 0.609 0.609
64 0.528 0.541 0.602 0.758 0.758 1
Third MSB
S
L
4 8 16 32 64 128
4 0.456 0.434 0.363 0.336 0.312 0.25
8 0.487 0.484 0.445 0.477 0.484 0.375
16 0.495 0.531 0.539 0.570 0.594 0.687
32 0.506 0.520 0.566 0.695 0.828 0.812
Fourth MSB
Table 5.2: GnuTLS success probabilities for recovering the four MSBs of P ∗[15].
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5.6.2 Further Implementations
NSS: Network Security Services (NSS)5 is an open-source set of libraries implement-
ing, amongst other things, TLS. It is widely used, including in Mozilla client products
and Google Chrome.
In the decryption code6 the variable plaintext->len is reduced by the assumed
amount of padding (padding_length + 1) before the padding is checked for correct-
ness. This is the same approach as taken in GnuTLS, potentially rendering the code
vulnerable to an attack recovering a single byte of plaintext per block. The sanity
check performed at the beginning of the decryption code is also problematic, since it
leaves plaintext->len unmodified if the check fails, meaning that MAC verification
may take longer than when the check passes.
PolarSSL: We also examined the PolarSSL7 implementation of TLS. The code8 be-
haves in much the same way as OpenSSL, setting a variable padlen to 0 if the padding
check fails, and then verifying the MAC on a record stripped of padlen bytes. This
would render it vulnerable to the attacks described in Section 5.4.
In fact, this implementation has other problems too. The code does not sanity check
padlen before running the padding check, meaning that out-of-bounds comparisons
may be made if the value of padlen exceeds the plaintext length. It does sanity
check padlen after the padding check, checking that the plaintext is big enough to
contain both the expected amount of padding and the MAC tag. However, it does not
perform any MAC check if this sanity check fails, but instead exits immediately. This
would render the implementation vulnerable to a simple timing-based distinguishing
attack as follows: M0 consists of 256 copies of 0xFF, while M1 consists of 255 arbitrary
bytes followed by 0x00; as in the attack of Section 5.3, the encrypted version C of
one of these is received; the attacker truncates C so that the underlying plaintext has
256 bytes; if the message was M0, then the padding is good, but the post-padding
sanity check fails and no MAC computation is performed; if the message was M1, then
the padding is also good, but now the post-padding sanity check passes and a MAC
computation is performed. This attack produces a larger timing difference than our
previous distinguishing attack and illustrates the role that careful sanity checking plays
in preventing attacks.
5http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/pki/nss
6We worked with version 3.13.6 available at https://ftp.mozilla.org/pub/mozilla.org/
security/nss/releases/NSS_3_13_6_RTM/src/.
7polarssl.org/
8We worked with version 1.1.4 available at http://polarssl.org/trac/browser/trunk/library/
ssl_tls.c.
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However, none of these attacks would work in practice, since in its default config-
uration, PolarSSL does not send any TLS alert messages when decryption errors are
encountered. This means that PolarSSL is not RFC-compliant in this aspect, since
such alerts are a required part of TLS implementations.
yaSSL: The yaSSL9 embedded SSL library, CyaSSL, is targeted at embedded and
real-time operating system environments. It appears to have rather few known vulner-
abilities, with only 5 being reported in the CVE database10 since 2005. The CyaSSL
code11 does not perform proper padding checks, but instead just examines the last byte
of plaintext and uses this to determine how many bytes to remove. This can be seen
in the following CyaSSL code extract:
if (ssl->specs.cipher_type == block) {
if (ssl->options.tls1_1)
ivExtra = ssl->specs.block_size;
pad = *(input + idx + msgSz - ivExtra - 1);
padByte = 1;
}
dataSz = msgSz - ivExtra - digestSz - pad - padByte;
if (dataSz < 0) {
CYASSL_MSG("App data buffer error, malicious input?");
return BUFFER_ERROR;
}
This approach renders the code vulnerable to the old attack from [68] which recovers
one byte of plaintext per block. This was the only implementation that we found that
still contains this basic flaw. Note also that the sanity checking represented by the last 3
lines of code above would render the code vulnerable to other plaintext recovery attacks
even if the padding check was done properly, since it exits the code without performing
a MAC check if the tested condition (which depends on the byte pad extracted from
the plaintext) is violated.
9http://yassl.com/yaSSL/Home.html
10http://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-list/vendor_id-3485/Yassl.html
11We worked with version 2.3.0 available at http://yassl.com/yaSSL/Source/output/src/
internal.c.html.
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Java: We have examined the BouncyCastle12 and OpenJDK13 Java implementations
of TLS.
The BouncyCastle code does careful sanity checking of the padding length (as
indicated by the last byte of plaintext) but treats the padding as having length 1 if
the padding format, when checked, is found to be incorrect (a variable paddingsize is
set to 0, but then the plaintext size is reduced by an amount paddingsize+minLength
where minLength is set to be 1 larger than the MAC tag size). This deviates slightly
from the recommendation of the RFCs to treat the padding as having length zero, but
still allows our attacks in Sections 5.3 and 5.4 to be applied (for Case 3 of the main
plaintext recovery attack in Section 5.4, MAC verification ends up being performed on
a 56-byte message, but this will still involve 5 evaluations of the compression function
for SHA-1).
The OpenJDK code appears follow the recommendation of the RFCs in treating
the padding as having zero length if the padding format, when checked, is found to
be incorrect. This is because this case is trapped by exception handling, during which
the variable defining the plaintext length is not changed. This potentially renders it
vulnerable to our attacks in Sections 5.3 and 5.4.
Other implementations: There are further open-source and many closed-source
implementations of (D)TLS. We have not conducted any further testing to see if these
are vulnerable to any of our attacks. However, we expect that any RFC-compliant
implementation will be vulnerable. We also expect that all implementations will be
vulnerable to simple variants of our attacks, unless the implementers have taken great
care to ensure that the decryption processing time is uniform, or nearly so. Our expe-
riences in investigating open-source implementations suggests this is unlikely.
5.7 Countermeasures
Add Random Time Delays: A natural reaction to timing-based attacks is to add
random time delays to the decryption process to frustrate statistical analysis. In fact,
this countermeasure is surprisingly ineffective, as we explain next.
Consider our distinguishing attack: this attack involves distinguishing two distri-
butions X, Y , where X has mean µ and Y has mean µ + 4, where we measure time
12http://www.bouncycastle.org/viewcvs/viewcvs.cgi/java/crypto/src/org/bouncycastle/
crypto/tls/TlsBlockCipher.java?view=markup
13http://hg.openjdk.java.net/jdk7/l10n/jdk/file/3598d6eb087c/src/share/classes/
sun/security/ssl/SSLSocketImpl.java and http://hg.openjdk.java.net/jdk7/2d/jdk/file/
85fe3cd9d6f9/src/share/classes/sun/security/ssl/CipherBox.java
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in units of compression function evaluations. Suppose X, Y both have variance σ2.
Now suppose we add a random delay that is uniformly chosen from the interval [0, T ]
to the decryption process. Then we obtain distributions X ′, Y ′ with means µ + T/2
and µ + 4 + T/2 and variance σ2 + (T 2 − 1)/12. Now consider the random variables
VL =
∑L
i=1X
′
i/L and WL =
∑L
i=1 Y
′
i /L obtained from averaging L samples of X
′, Y ′,
respectively. Treating these samples as being independent, the Central Limit Theorem
guarantees that VL, WL are approximately Normal with means µ + T/2, µ + 4 + T/2
and equal variance τ2 = (σ2 + (T 2 − 1)/12)/L. Note that the difference between the
means of VL, WL is 4; now, using standard results about the Normal distribution, it
is easy to see that if 4τ ≤ 4, then the distributions of VL, WL are sufficiently “tight”
about their means that a simple statistical test based on taking means of L samples
will be 90% accurate. Solving for L, we see that we need
L ≥ σ2 + (T 2 − 1)/12
and it is apparent that the effect of adding the random time delay is to increase the
number of samples needed from σ2 to σ2 + (T 2 − 1)/12. From our experiments for
OpenSSL, we estimate that σ ≈ 10; then taking T = 50 only increases the number of
samples needed for a 90% success rate from 100 to about 300, at the cost of increasing
the average decryption time by 25 compression function evaluations. This does not
seem like a good trade-off between security and performance.
Use RC4: The simplest countermeasure for TLS is to switch to using the RC4 stream
cipher in place of CBC-mode encryption. However, this is not an option for DTLS.
When a stream cipher is used in TLS, no padding is required. Consequently none of
the attacks in this chapter will work. RC4 is widely supported in implementations of
TLS, the same countermeasure is effective against the BEAST attack, and was fairly
widely adopted in response to BEAST (e.g. by Google and Facebook). The use of a
stream cipher in a MEE construction is well-supported by theory [57]. There are two
potential drawbacks of making this switch. Firstly, the use of variable length padding
in CBC-mode allows for a modicum of plaintext length hiding, and this is no longer
possible when using a stream cipher. Secondly, and more importantly, the first bytes
of keystream output by the RC4 generator have certain small biases, and TLS does
not seem to discard these before starting encryption [94]. Recently, the authors of [4]
presented new biases in the RC4 keystream output, as described in Chapter 3, making
RC4 less likely to be a feasible long-term replacement of CBC-mode encryption for
TLS.
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Use Authenticated Encryption: Another possibility is to switch from MEE-TLS-
CBC to using a dedicated authenticated encryption algorithm, such as AES-GCM or
AES-CCM which were standardised for use in TLS in RFCs 5288 [90] and 6655 [63],
respectively. In theory, this should obviate all attacks based on weaknesses in the MEE
construction. However, we cannot rule out implementation errors, and we are not aware
of any detailed analysis of implementations of these algorithms in (D)TLS for potential
side-channels. A further issue is that authenticated encryption was only added in TLS
1.2, and this version of TLS is not yet widely supported in implementations. Finally,
the current authenticated encryption algorithms do not offer any length-hiding facility.
Careful implementation of MEE-TLS-CBC decryption: Our final option is to
encourage more careful implementation of MEE-TLS-CBC decryption. However, we
believe that implementers will find it difficult to do this in a way that eliminates all
significant timing channels (especially for DTLS).
The key requirement is to ensure constant processing time for all MEE-TLS-CBC
ciphertexts of a given size. That is, the total processing time should depend only on the
ciphertext size, and not on any characteristics of the underlying plaintext (including
padding). The basic principle to be followed in achieving this is quite simple: since
the major timing differences arise from MAC processing, implementations should make
sure the same amount of MAC processing is carried out no matter what the underlying
plaintext indicates the message length to be.
However, this simple principle is complicated by the need to also perform careful
sanity checking on the underlying plaintext whilst avoiding the introduction of yet more
timing side-channels, and to make sure appropriate amounts of MAC processing are
performed even when these checks fail.
A further complication arises because the number of bytes to be examined in the
padding check depends on the last byte of the last plaintext block, and so, even if
the MAC processing is made uniform, the running time of the padding check may
still leak a small amount of information about the plaintext. This can be seen for
GnuTLS in Figure 5.9: notice that the maximum difference in the running time for
the padding check is more than 1000 hardware cycles for this implementation. For
example, then, distinguishing attacks would require a timing resolution of around 1000
hardware cycles, while a timing resolution of 250 cycles would be sufficient to allow an
attack recovering 2 bits of plaintext per block for this implementation.
With these remarks in mind, we now proceed to give a detailed prescription of
how to achieve constant-time processing of MEE-TLS-CBC ciphertexts, incorporating
suitable sanity checking. In what follows, we let plen denote the length (in bytes) of
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the plaintext P obtained immediately after CBC-mode decryption of the ciphertext,
padlen denote the last byte of that plaintext interpreted as an integer between 0 and
255, and t denote the length of the MAC tags (in bytes). Also, let HDR, SQN denote the
(D)TLS record header and the expected value of the sequence number for this record.
Our recommended procedure is then as follows:
1. First sanity check the ciphertext: check that its length in bytes is a multiple of
the block-size b and is at least max{b, t+1} (for chained IVs) or b+max{b, t+1}
(for explicit IVs). If these conditions are not met, then return fatal error.
2. Decrypt the ciphertext to obtain plaintext P ; now plen will be a multiple of b
and at least max{b, t+ 1}.
3. If t + padlen + 1 > plen, then the plaintext is not long enough to contain the
padding (as indicated by the last byte of plaintext) plus a MAC tag. In this case,
run a loop as if there were 256 bytes of padding, with a dummy check in each
iteration. Then let P ′ denote the first plen − t bytes of P , compute a MAC on
SQN || HDR || P ′ and do a constant-time comparison of the computed MAC with
the last t bytes of P . Return fatal error.
4. Otherwise (when t+padlen+ 1 ≤ plen), check the last padlen+ 1 bytes of P to
ensure they are all equal (to the last byte of P ), ensuring that the loop does check
all the bytes (and does not stop as soon as the first mismatch is detected). If this
fails, then run a loop as if there were 256 − padlen − 1 bytes of padding, with
a dummy check in each iteration, and then do a MAC check as in the previous
step. Return fatal error.
5. Otherwise (the padding is now correctly formatted) run a loop as if there were
256−padlen−1 bytes of padding, doing a dummy check in each iteration. Then
let P ′ denote the first plen−padlen−1− t bytes of P , and let T denote the next
t bytes of P (the remainder of P is valid padding). Run the MAC computation
on SQN || HDR || P ′ to obtain a MAC tag T ′. Then set L1 = 13 + plen − t,
L2 = 13 + plen− padlen− 1− t, and perform an additional dL1−5564 e − dL2−5564 e
MAC compression function evaluations (on dummy data). Finally, do a constant-
time comparison of T and T ′. If these are equal, then return P ′. Otherwise, return
fatal error.
When implementing the above procedure, it would be tempting to omit seemingly
unnecessary computations that are performed, for example when t + padlen + 1 >
plen. However, these are needed to prevent other timing side-channels like those
reported in Chapter 4 for the GnuTLS implementation of DTLS. Notice also that the
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Figure 5.13: Distribution of timing values (outliers removed) for distinguishing attack
on OpenSSL TLS, using our decryption procedure.
dummy computations performed in the last step are compression function evaluations
and not full MAC computations. These give a MAC computation time that is the same
irrespective of how much padding is removed (and equal to that carried out in earlier
steps). Finally, note that some adjustments to this procedure would be needed when
SHA-384 is used as the hash function in HMAC: SHA-384 operates on 128-byte blocks
and uses a 16-byte encoding for message length.
We have implemented the above procedure by modifying OpenSSL version 1.0.1,
the same version used for our attacks. We modified the code in files ssl/s3_pkt.c
and ssl/t1_enc.c to perform the required sanity checks, dummy padding checks,
and dummy MAC compression function evaluations. In ssl/s3_pkt.c, we make a
single call to OpenSSL’s SHA1_Update function using a message size that will invoke
the required number of dummy MAC compression function evaluations. Our call to
SHA1_Update happens before OpenSSL’s actual MAC calculation and comparison op-
erations.
We then ran our distinguishing attack from Section 5.3 against the modified code
of OpenSSL. Each packet in the attack passes the padding check, but fails MAC ver-
ification, causing the server to close the TLS session and send an encrypted alert
message. Figure 5.13 shows the distribution of timing values (in hardware cycles) after
implementing our procedure. This figure should be compared with Figure 5.2: visual
inspection alone shows that the timing difference is substantially reduced. In fact, the
separation between the medians of the two distributions is reduced from about 8500 to
about 1100 hardware cycles (from around 2.5µs to 0.32µs). In turn, this small separa-
tion means that 128 sessions are needed to achieve a distinguishing success probability
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of 0.68, whereas, prior to our modifications, just 1 session was enough to give a success
probability of 0.756. For the plaintext recovery attack, the adversary will have access
to timing differences roughly one quarter of this, i.e. roughly 80ns on our hardware.
Notice also that the two distributions are reversed compared to Figure 5.2, i.e. process-
ing 0xFF packets now takes longer, on average, than for 0x00 packets. We believe that
this is caused by overhead introduced by the SHA1_Update function call that occurs for
0xFF packets but not 0x00 packets.
To achieve further reductions in timing difference would require a more sophisticated
“constant time” programming approach. The OpenSSL patch addressing the attacks
in this chapter provides an exemplar of how to do this. The complexity of the OpenSSL
patch is notable, with around 500 lines of new ‘C’ code being required14.
5.7.1 Disclosure
Given the large number of affected implementations, we first notified the IETF TLS
Working Group chairs, the IETF Security Area directors and the IRTF Crypto Forum
Research Group (CFRG) chairs of our attacks in November 2012. We then began the
process of contacting individual vendors:
OpenSSL addressed the attacks in versions 1.0.1d, 1.0.0k and 0.9.8y15.
NSS addressed the attacks in version 3.14.316.
Microsoft performed an investigation and determined that the issue had been ade-
quately addressed in previous modifications to their TLS and DTLS implementations
Apple were notified of our attacks in December 2012. The status of patch development
by Apple was not communicated to us.
GnuTLS corrected the programming errors in decryption that we identified in version
3.1.6 (released 02/01/2013) and addressed the attacks in versions 2.12.23, 3.0.28 and
3.1.717.
PolarSSL addressed the attacks in version 1.2.518.
CyaSSL addressed the attacks in CyaSSL version 2.5.019.
MatrixSSL addressed the attacks in version 3.4.120.
Opera addressed the attacks in Opera version 12.1321.
14http://www.imperialviolet.org/2013/02/04/luckythirteen.html
15http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20130205.txt
16https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/NSS/NSS_3.14.3_release_notes
17http://www.gnutls.org/news.html
18https://polarssl.org/tech-updates/releases/polarssl-1.2.5-released
19http://www.yassl.com/yaSSL/Docs-cyassl-changelog.html
20http://matrixssl.org/news.html
21http://www.opera.com/docs/changelogs/unified/1213/
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F5 were notified of the attacks in December 2012. They have informed us that their
TLS data plane traffic is not vulnerable due to cryptographic oﬄoad, but that local
management ports and virtual editions were vulnerable and the attacks were addressed
for different F5 platforms22.
BouncyCastle addressed the attacks in version 1.48 of the Java library23. The C#
version of BouncyCastle was fixed in CVS at a similar time, and will be included in
release 1.8 at a later date.
Oracle (Java) addressed the attacks as part of a special critical patch update of
JavaSE24.
In addition, a number of other companies and organisations were given advance
notice of the attacks prior to them being made public.
5.8 Chapter Conclusion
We have demonstrated a variety of attacks against implementations of (D)TLS. We
reiterate that the attacks are ciphertext-only, and so can be carried out by the standard
MITM attacker, without a chosen-plaintext capability. The attacks that are possible
depend crucially on low-level implementation details, as well as factors such as the
relationship between the MAC tag size t and the block size b. All implementations we
examined were vulnerable to one or more attacks.
For TLS, we need a multi-session attack, with, in some cases, many sessions. This
limits the practicality of the attacks, but note that they be further improved using
standard techniques such as language models and sequential estimation. They can also
be enhanced in a BEAST-style attack to enable efficient recovery of HTTP cookies.
The timing differences we must detect are close to or below the levels of jitter one
typically finds in real networks. In particular, our attacker needs to be positioned
relatively close (in terms of network hops) to the machine being attacked. Still, the
attacks should be considered as a realistic threat to TLS, and we have described a
range of suitable countermeasures. The attacks are much more serious for DTLS,
because of this protocol’s tolerance of errors and because of the availability of timing
amplification techniques from Chapter 4. Very careful implementation of the MEE-
TLS-CBC decryption algorithm is needed to thwart these amplification techniques.
In view of this, we highly recommend the use of a suitable authenticated encryption
algorithm in preference to CBC-mode for DTLS.
22http://support.f5.com/kb/en-us/solutions/public/14000/100/sol14190.html
23http://www.bouncycastle.org/latest_releases.html
24http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/topics/security/javacpufeb2013update-1905892.html
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More generally, our attacks illustrate the difficulty of implementing MEE securely.
Similar issues were identified for MEE configurations of IPsec in [30]. We encourage
protocol designers in general, and the IETF TLS working group in particular, to move
away from using MEE. None of the attacks on TLS presented here would have been
possible with an Encrypt-then-MAC approach, for example. A more realistic solution
for TLS is to move as quickly as possible to TLS 1.2 and adopt its authenticated
encryption algorithms.
174
Chapter 6
Conclusion
6.1 Themes
In this thesis, we demonstrated how weaknesses in the design and implementation of
three secure network protocols can be exploited using new techniques. For example:
The DepenDNS protocol suffers from a number operational definicies and is vulnerabe
to cache poisoning and denial of service attacks under some assumptions.
The OpenSSL implementation of DTLS did not include the padding oracle attack
countermeasure, due, most likely, to the assumption that the lack of error messages
makes DTLS irrelevant to padding oracle attacks. This is an implementation decision
that we exploited to perform a full plaintext recovery attack against the OpenSSL
implementation of DTLS, discussed in Chapter 4.
The authors of the DTLS standards [82, 83] opted to make anti-replay an optional
security feature. This is a design decision that greatly assisted us to speed up the
attack against DTLS, discussed in Chapter 4.
The padding oracle attack countermeasures introduced in TLS 1.1 and 1.2, DTLS 1.0
and 1.2, and in implementations of TLS 1.0 and SSL 3.0, did not fully implement
constant time processing. The way the countermeasures were constructed is a design
decision that we exploited to create new plaintext recovery attacks, discussed in Chapter
5.
A number of TLS and DTLS implementations had trivial coding errors in some security
checks, were not compliant with the standards, or did not implement countermeasures
against known attacks. For example, the GnuTLS implementation of (D)TLS did not
handle the padding check correctly. PolarSSL, on the other hand, did not generate
TLS Alert messages as per the standard, while yaSSL was vulnerable to old TLS
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attacks. More examples are discussed in Chapter 5, demonstrating the current state of
implementing (D)TLS in some popular open source libraries.
MEE is hard to analyse and hard to implement securely: The MAC-Encode-
Encrypt construction has proven to be hard to implement securely with long history of
attacks and fixes. In addition, despite all the effort, achieving constant time processing
is difficult. The 500-line patch to address our attacks in OpenSSL demonstrates the
amount of efforts and changes required to try to achieve constant time processing,
eliminating side channel leakages in general.
Practicality: Our work on (D)TLS demonstrates the possibility of practicality im-
plementing attacks that might seem purely theoretical in nature. We argue that our
attacks against TLS and DTLS are on the verge of being practical.
Attacks only get better: In Chapter 5, we demonstrated how to reduce the com-
plexity of all our attacks against (D)TLS, lowering the number of sessions required to
recover an unknown byte from roughly 223 to 213, by exploring the possibility of com-
bining the original attack with the use of a JavaScript and targeting base64 encoded
cookies.
Impact: The TLS community (the IETF TLS working group, open source code de-
velopers, vendors and researchers) reacted positively to our work. The impact of our
work extends from patching most of the TLS implementations to further speeding up
the deployment of TLS 1.2 and the adoption of authenticated encryption. For example,
NSS, which is used in Firefox and Google Chrome, released in July 2013 version 3.15.11
that brings TLS 1.2 support, but without AES-GCM that is planned for a future re-
lease. In fact, a patch that implements AES-GCM has already been submitted to NSS2
and is available in the beta of version 3.15.23.
Bridging a gap: During the period of discussing and implementing the countermea-
sures to our attacks in Chapter 5, we were surprised by the lack of collaboration, other
than some individual initiatives, between the IETF TLS working group, TLS open
source code developers, vendors and academic researchers. In the case of (D)TLS, we
advocate for collaboration between the IETF TLS working group and the rest of the
1https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/NSS/NSS_3.15.1_release_notes
2https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=880543
3https://hg.mozilla.org/integration/mozilla-inbound/rev/096d62676298
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TLS community (researchers and software developers); we argue that our work is one
step towards achieving this.
6.2 Areas of Further Research
Enhancing our attacks against (D)TLS is one area that could be explored further. One
idea is to implement the attacks in combination with a language model as described
in Chapter 5. There is also the opportunity to examine the possibility of mounting
the attacks in a multi-hop network setup, combined with more sophisticated statistical
methods than the ones we used.
Almost all of the open source (D)TLS libraries have implemented countermeasures
for the attacks discussed in Chapter 5. An interesting question is whether the deploy-
ment of these fixes has effectively eliminated the side channels exploited in our attacks.
Further work can be carried out to test this. In addition, there is the potential of
discovering other unknown sources of side channel information in the current deploy-
ments of (D)TLS, and which could be exploited to construct new attacks against the
protocols.
Analysing the AES-GCM implementation in open source (D)TLS libraries is an-
other area of research, especially that authenticated encryption, supported in TLS 1.2,
is now generally considered the natural replacement for MEE and RC4 in (D)TLS.
We advocate for further research in understanding the interaction between secure
network protocols and their upper and lower-layer protocols, and its impact on the
overall security level of a system. We believe that this is an area where further research
is needed.
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